delivered the opinion of the court:
This case comes before us as a direct appeal of a decision of the Pollution Control Board, pursuant to section 41 of Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111M, par. 1041), Supreme Court Rule 335 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 335), and the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.). The Monsanto Company, petitioner-appellant (hereinafter “Monsanto”), filed an amended petition with the Pollution Control Board (hereinafter “Board”) seeking a permanent variance from the provisions of Illinois Water Pollution Regulation 702(a), which pertains to mercury discharges to public sewer systems. That regulation provides, “No effluent to any public sewer system shall include mercury or any of its compounds in excess of 0.0005 mg/1 as Hg [0.5 parts of mercury per billion parts of water] at any time.”
On April 24, 1975, the Board entered its opinion and order granting Monsanto a variance from November 6,1974, to November 5,1975. The Board imposed as conditions of the variance the requirements that Monsanto limit its mercury discharge to 0.20 pounds per day based on a “six-month moving average” with the mercury discharge for any 24-hour period not to exceed 0.30 pounds. Monsanto on this appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the conditions imposed by the Board in granting the variance are supported by the evidence, and (2) whether the Board erred in concluding that it could only grant a variance for a one-year period.
Monsanto operates a large chemical plant in the Village of Sauget, Illinois, known as the William G. Krummrich plant. Monsanto owns approximately 350 acres in Sauget, of which 100 acres are occupied by the plant’s main operating area. Waste water from the plant is discharged into the Village of Sauget sewer treatment system which empties into the Mississippi River.
The Krummrich plant produces approximately 1.2 billion pounds of chemicals each year, consisting of more than 70 different chemical products for use in the steel, rubber, agricultural, construction, drug, cosmetic, and other industries. Essential to the production of 80 percent of the chemical products made at the plant are chlorine, hydrogen, sodium hydroxide, and potassium hydroxide. These four chemicals are produced by a production unit known as the “chlor-alkili facility.” Mercury is used solely as a conductor of electricity within the chlor-alkili facility. Although the system is designed for the complete recycling of the mercury used, and although all effluent streams from the chlor-alkili facility are collected and passed through a mercury treatment system prior to discharge to the Sauget sewer system, nevertheless, some mercury is discharged into the Sauget sewer system.
The chlor-alkili facility is the only area of the Krummrich plant where mercury is used as part of the production process, although mercury is present in other parts of the plant in thermometers, switches, and other instruments, and in raw materials brought into the plant. Mercury is also present in the wastewater discharged into the Sauget sewer system from these other areas of the plant. The Board found that in 1974 the mercury discharged from the chlor-alkili facility averaged less than 0.1 lb/day and the mercury discharged from the other areas of the plant averaged approximately 0.15 lb/day, making a total average mercury discharge of 0.25 lb/day.1
In the past Monsanto has requested and been allowed variances for its discharge of mercury into the Sauget sewer system. In November of 1971 Monsanto was granted a variance limiting its discharge of mercury to 0.5 lb/day. In October of 1972 it was granted a variance limiting the discharge to 0.33 lb/day, based on a 6-month moving average, but not to exceed 0.5 lb/day in any given 24-hour period. And in November of 1973 it was granted a variance limiting its discharge to 0.25 lb/day, based on a 6-month moving average, but not to exceed 0.4 lb/day in any given 24-hour period. Because of its continued inability to meet the standards of Regulation 702(a), Monsanto sought the variance which is presently before us.
Before reaching the issues raised by Monsanto on this appeal it is necessary that we consider two motions which were taken with the case. The first is Monsanto’s motion to strike portions of the brief and designation of excerpts from the record filed by respondents. The material objected to consists of data regarding mercury discharges, filed by Monsanto with the Board after the Board rendered the opinion which is the subject of the instant appeal. The data is from quarterly reports submitted by Monsanto to the Board during June and September 1975 and shows that in 5 of the 9 months from November 1974 through July 1975 Monsanto’s average mercury discharge per day was within the 0.20 standard imposed by the Board.
The second motion taken with the case is respondents’ “Motion to Correct Record” (which would more appropriately be called a “motion to supplement the record”). By this motion respondents ask this court to consider as part of the record the above-mentioned data as well as data from a quarterly report submitted by Monsanto to the Board in December 1975. The data from the latter report shows that Monsanto’s 6-month average daily mercury discharge was 0.17 lb/day, 0.17 lb/day, and 0.16 lb/day at the end of September, October and November 1975, respectively.
The arguments with respect to both of these motions are the same. Monsanto argues that the data consists of “new or additional evidence in support of” the decision of the Board and, as such, cannot properly be considered by this court because of section 11 of the Administrative Review Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 274.) Respondents, on the other hand, argue that this information demonstrates that compliance with the Board’s order was achievable without arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. Respondents further argue that this court should take notice of this information in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency and that this court can take such notice because the information renders moot the first issue on this appeal.
Section 11 of the Administrative Review Act provides:
“Every action to review any final administrative decision shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient speed. The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and of fact presented by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.” (Emphasis added.)
The constant statement of the supreme and appellate courts of this State, consistent with the clear language of the portion of section 11 of the Administrative Review Act emphasized above, has been that upon administrative review the court is limited to considering only the evidence submitted in the administrative hearing and may not hear further evidence or conduct a hearing de novo. (Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Board of Appeals, 411 Ill. 559, 104 N.E.2d 612; Pipe Trades v. Rauch, 2 Ill. 2d 278, 118 N.E.2d 319; West End Savings & Loan Association v. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d 523, 158 N.E.2d 608; Curtis v. State Police Merit Board, 349 Ill. App. 448, 111 N.E.2d 159; Zito v. Illinois Liquor Control Com., 113 Ill. App. 2d 103, 251 N.E.2d 727; Lake County Contractors Association v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 6 Ill. App. 3d 762, 286 N.E.2d 600, aff’d, 54 Ill. 2d 16, 294 N.E.2d 259.) Overriding this clear mandate, however, is the rule, recognized in Illinois both before and after enactment of section 11 of the Administrative Review Act, that a court reviewing an administrative decision will dismiss the case, subject to certain limited exceptions, if the question presented has become moot. This rule has been applied both in cases in which the court on its own has become aware of facts making the question moot and in cases in which one of the parties has brought those facts to the court’s attention by way of a motion to dismiss. National Jockey Club v. Illinois Racing Com., 364 Ill. 630, 5 N.E.2d 224; Railway Express Agency v. Commerce Com., 374 Ill. 151, 28 N.E.2d 116; Central States Import & Export Corp. v. Illinois Liquor Control Com., 405 Ill. 58, 89 N.E.2d 903; Maywood Park Trotting Association, Inc. v. Illinois Harness Racing Com., 15 Ill. 2d 559, 155 N.E.2d 626; Goers v. Carpentier, 27 Ill. App. 2d 355, 169 N.E.2d 858; Daley v. License Appeal Com., 55 Ill. App. 2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 269.
A moot question has been defined as a question which presents or involves no actual controversy, interest, or rights of the parties, or which involves issues that have ceased to exist. (People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736; La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 375, 121 N.E.2d 486.) It is obvious from this definition that the question presented by the first issue on this appeal has not been made moot by the facts not part of the record made before the Board, which respondents have brought to our attention. We do not know what action Monsanto may be subjected to for those months during the variance period in which Monsanto was not able to comply. Nor do we know that Monsanto would ever again be able to repeat the compliance it achieved during some of those months. Perhaps most importantly, however, we do not know the reason for Monsanto’s having been able to comply during those months to which respondents draw our attention. For all we know, compliance may have been achieved because a major part of the plant was not in operation during those months. Whatever was the reason for the compliance is a matter of speculation as far as this court is concerned, and we will not engage in such speculation either to find an issue moot or to find it not moot. Moreover, even if Monsanto were shown to have complied during every month within the variance time period, the mere fact of such compliance would not remove the power of this court to review the decision of the Board and grant appropriate relief if the Board’s action was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Federal Power Com. (4th Cir. 1948), 170 F.2d 948, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 953.) In light of the above discussion, we find that the first issue presented for review is not moot. We also find that we are precluded from considering the data submitted by Monsanto to the Board subsequent to the Board’s order of April 24, 1975, because of section 11 of the Administrative Review Act. We therefore allow Monsanto’s motion to strike portions of respondents’ brief and designation of excerpts from the record and deny respondents’ motion to “correct” the record.
Monsanto’s first contention on this appeal is that although the evidence supports the Board’s finding that a variance should be granted, the limits imposed by the Board on Monsanto’s mercury discharge are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree. The rule in Illinois is that the findings of an administrative agency are deemed to be prima facie correct and on review the court cannot disturb such findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 274; Fenyes v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 17 Ill. 2d 106, 160 N.E.2d 810; Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 42 Ill. 2d 13, 244 N.E.2d 598; Cobin v. Pollution Control Board, 16 Ill. App. 3d 958, 307 N.E.2d 191.) A reviewing court, however, will not hesitate to grant relief where the record does not disclose evidentiary support for the agency’s determination (Kerr v. Police Board, 59 Ill. 2d 140, 319 N.E.2d 478), or where the decision was capricious or arbitrary. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 27 Ill. App. 3d 704, 327 N.E.2d 364.
In the instant case there was no evidence presented regarding the daily discharges of mercury by Monsanto over a period of time nor any other evidence upon which the Board could have arrived at the “0.30 pounds per any 24 hour period” limitation. It appears that the Board simply was intent on progressively “tightening the noose” with respect to the daily discharge standard, the previous “24 hour” limitations having been 0.40 lbs/day in the 1-year variance granted in November of 1973 and 0.50 lbs/day in the 1-year variance granted in October of 1972.
Furthermore, the record does not disclose evidentiary support for the Board’s imposition of a 0.20 lb/day limitation based upon a 6-month rolling average. Indeed, the evidence showed that Monsanto had never been able to achieve a 6-month rolling average of 0.20 or below. Monsanto’s Exhibit No. 4, which consists of data of Monsanto’s monthly mercury discharge in pounds per day during the months from November 1973 through January 1975, states that Monsanto’s 6-month rolling average at the end of each month from June 1974 through January 1975, respectively, was 0.633, 0.234, 0.226, 0.265, 0.262, 0.245, 0.241, and 0.175. It is obvious from a casual glance at the rest of the data in the exhibit that the January figure of 0.175 is the result of a mathematical error, since the figures from which that 6-month rolling average would have to be computed are 0.113, 0.402, 0.285, 0.248, 0.220, 0.194. There is no indication from the record that the Board arrived at the 0.20 lb/day limitation by relying upon this mistaken figure; and even if the Board had relied upon this mistaken figure, it would be unconscionable to conclude that Monsanto must blindly be held to such figure.
There was considerable testimony by witnesses for Monsanto concerning the improvements Monsanto had made over the years with respect to its mercury discharge and concerning projects Monsanto was undertaking which were aimed at further improvements. The uncontradicted evidence was that in reaching the levels that it had, Monsanto was already employing the best technologically available methods of controlling its mercury discharge. Although Monsanto was undertaking various projects with respect to further control of its mercury discharge, all of the projects being undertaken by Monsanto, with the exception of water flow reduction projects, were aimed at stabilizing the amount of mercury discharged by Monsanto at the lowest levels that had been achieved. That is, the projects were aimed at eliminating the wide fluctuation in monthly discharges of mercury (ranging from a low of 0.113 lbs/day in August 1974 to a high of 2.57 lb/day in January 1974) by guaranteeing consistently repeatable performance at the lower range of discharge. The water flow reduction projects on the other hand, were aimed specifically at mercury discharge reduction rather than at repeatability of performance, since the amount of mercury being discharged would necessarily decrease along with decreases in the amount of water flowing from the Krummrich plant into the Sauget sewer system. The witnesses, however, continuously referred to the expected completion dates for all of these projects as being in 1976 or 1977. In light of the fact that the variance which is the subject of the instant appeal was to extend only until November 5, 1975, the Board could not rely upon improvements Monsanto might make through these projects which would not be completed until after the variance period had elapsed. We conclude that the limitation which the Board imposed of 0.20 lbs/day based upon a 6-month rolling average was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Monsanto also contends in this appeal that the Board erred in concluding that it was without authority to grant a permanent variance and that its authority in situations such as that of the instant case was limited to granting variances not in excess of one year. The rationale for the conclusion reached by the Board in this regard is set forth in the following portion of the Board’s opinion and order of April 24, 1975:
“The Board notes that legislative intent is for the Board to not grant permanent variances, in that the General Assembly felt it necessary to amend the [Environmental Protection] Act to allow the Board to grant 5-year variance [sic] to those individuals required to obtain NPDES permits. As Monsanto’s discharge is to the village of Sauget Sanitary Sewage Treatment Plant, no NPDES permit is required of Monsanto. Therefore, the Board may only grant one year variances in this case.”
We find the Board’s conclusion and the rationale upon which it based that conclusion erroneous.
Variances are governed by title IX, sections 35 through 38 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111%, pars. 1035 through 1038). Section 35 provides in pertinent part:
“To the extent consistent with applicable provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92 — 500), and regulations pursuant thereto, the Board may grant individual variances beyond the limitations prescribed in this Act, whenever it is found, upon presentation of adequate proof, that compliance with any rule or regulation, requirement or order of the Board would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.”
Section 36, at the time of the instant proceeding before the Board, read in pertinent part:
“(a) In granting a variance the Board may impose such conditions as the policies of this Act may require. If the hardship complained of consists solely of the need for a reasonable delay in which to correct a violation of this Act or of the Board regulations, the Board shall condition the grant of such variance upon the posting of sufficient performance bond or other security to assure the completion of the work covered by the variance. ° °
(b) * * * [A]ny variance granted pursuant to the provisions of this Section shall be granted for such period of time, not exceeding one year, except for variances for discharges for which a permit is required under Section 39(b) of the Act, which variances shall be granted for such period of time, not exceeding five years, as shall be specified by the Board at the time of the grant of such variance, and upon the condition that the person who receives such variance shall make such periodic progress reports as the Board shall specify. Such variance may be extended from year to year by affirmative action of the Board, but only if satisfactory progress has been shown.”2
Prior to September 14,1973, section 36(b) did not contain the language “except for variances for discharges for which a permit is required under Section 39(b) of the Act, which variances shall be granted for such period of time not exceeding five years.” This language was included by amendment of section 36(b) by Public Act 78 — 862, effective September 14,1973. The Board looked to the addition of this language and reasoned that the amendment demonstrated a legislative intent that the Board not grant permanent variances. We do not feel this amendment indicates any such intent on the part of the legislature. The apparent intent for this amendment was to achieve compliance with section 402(b)(1)(B) (33 U.S.C. 51342(b)(1)(B) (1972 Supp.)) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter “FWPCA”) so that Illinois could obtain approval to administer its own State NPDES permit program. Under section 402(b)(1)(B) the Administrator of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency cannot approve a proposed State NPDES permit program unless such program provides adequate authority for the State water pollution control agency to issue NPDES permits for fixed terms not exceeding 5 years. Prior to the amendment of section 36(b) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act by Public Act 78 — 862, the Pollution Control Board was limited to granting variances which were requested under section 36 for only up to 1 year, thus necessitating the amendment.
Since the Board’s order and opinion of April 24,1975, section 36(b) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act has again been amended (by Public Act 79 — 1064, effective October 1,1975) and now reads as follows:
“(b) Except as provided by Section 38 of this Act, any variance granted pursuant to the provisions of this Section shall be granted for such period of time, not exceeding five years, as shall be specified by the Board at the time of the grant of such variance, and upon the condition that the person who receives such variance shall make such periodic progress reports as the Board shall specify. Such variance may be extended from year to year by affirmative action of the Board, but only if satisfactory progress has been shown.”3
Respondents urge that the second issue before us is now moot, because this latest amendment shows that all variances (other than those under section 38) can now be granted for a period of time not exceeding 5 years. In our opinion, this latest amendment of section 36(b) has no bearing on the issue presently before us.
Section 36(b), as it now reads, as it read before the most recent amendment, and as it read in its original form, is limited in application to a specific type of variance. Other than the capitalization of the word “section” the opening words of section 36(b) — “Any variance granted pursuant to the provisions of this Section 0 0 0 ” — have never been changed by any amendment.
Respondents argue that the words “this Section” were used by the legislature to mean “this Title,” so that section 36(b) would apply to all of title IX of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (111. Rev. Stat., eh. 111/2, pars. 1035-1038), and thereby to all types of variances. This interpretation is utterly without foundation. Throughout the Environmental Protection Act the legislature consistently used the word “Title” whenever it wished to refer to a particular title of the Act rather than to a particular section. For a few such usages one need only look, for example, at sections 4, 5, 7.1, 9,10,11,13, 20, 22, 25, 25a, 32, 41 and 43 of the Act. In addition to the references to “this Section,” the legislature in section 36(b) itself also referred to “Section 39(b)” (before the most recent amendment) and to “Section 38” (in the most recent amendment). In light of the legislature’s consistent and unambiguous usage of the words “Section” and “Title,” the words “this Section” can only refer to section 36 and not to all of title IX.
Section 35 of the Environmental Protection Act is a general statement of the Board’s authority to grant an individual variance whenever requiring compliance would “impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.” On the other hand, section 36, at least from the second sentence on, speaks of a specific type of variance, namely, one which is granted because the “hardship complained of consists solely of the need for a reasonable delay” in order to come into compliance. If, for instance, a party seeking a variance has the technological ability to comply and would in fact be complying but for the fact that a certain amount of time is needed to put that ability into effect, the variance proceeding will be governed by the provisions of section 36. In considering the party’s request for a variance the Board will be required to have the party post a performance bond or other security to insure compliance and the Board will only be able to grant a variance within the time limits set in section 36(b). If, however, the need for additional time is not the only barrier to compliance (as, for example, where it is not technologically possible to comply), then the Board is not required to have a bond or other security posted nor is it constrained by the time limitations of section 36(b). Thus a variance sought pursuant to section 35, but not subject to the limitations of section 36, can be granted for whatever period of time the Board finds justified subject only to the condition that the variance granted must be consistent with applicable provisions of the FWPCA, and regulations pursuant thereto.
As we have pointed out above, an NPDES permit is not required of an industrial user of a publicly owned sewage treatment plant. However, the industrial user is required by section 301(b) of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C. §1311(b) (1972 Supp.)) to comply with the pre-treatment standards established by the Administrator of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 307(b) of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1972 Supp.)). Under section 307(b)(1) the industrial user must comply with the pre-treatment standards promulgated by the Administrator within the time period specified in the standards (which cannot exceed 3 years). We need not consider on this appeal whether Monsanto’s mercury discharge to the Sauget sewer system is in compliance with the applicable pre-treatment standard promulgated by the Administrator. We have concluded that the Board erred in finding that it was only authorized to grant a one-year variance in the instant case. We leave it to the Board upon remand to consider in light of what we have said here and in light of the applicable Federal pre-treatment standard, what length of time the variance requested by Monsanto should properly be granted.
Because in the instant case we have concluded that the conditions imposed by the Board in granting the variance to Monsanto were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and because we have concluded that the Board erred in ruling that it could only grant a variance for up to 1 year, we reverse the decision of the Board and remand for further consideration not inconsistent with the law as set forth in this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
CARTER, J., concurs.
From Monsanto’s Exhibit No. 4, which appears in the record on appeal, it is apparent that the average amount of mercury discharged from November of 1973 through January of 1975 was 0.075 lb/day from the chlor-alkili facility while the average amount from the remainder of the plant was 0.283 lb/day if the January 1974 discharge was included and 0.163 if it was not. In January 1974 a major failure of the effluent treatment system occurred which lasted 19 days and which caused tiie average daily discharge of mercury from parts of the plant other than the chlor-alkili facility to be 1.96 lb/day.
“Section 39(b) of the Act” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. Hill, sec. 1039(b)), referred to in subsection (b) above, is the portion of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act which governs the granting of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. As indicated in the portion of the Board’s opinion and order set forth above, the Board concluded that the instant case is not one requiring an NPDES permit. This conclusion is correct; for an NPDES permit is not required for industrial discharges to publicly owned sewage treatment plants, even though such a permit may be required for discharges by the publicly owned treatment plant itself and even though the discharges by the industrial user may be subject to Federal pre-treatment standards. (See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) and (2) (A) and §1317(b) and (c) (1972 Supp.).)
“Section 38 of this Act” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1111$, par. 1038), governs variances which are automatically granted for failure of the Board to take final action on a request for a variance, within a specified time.