Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.The statute creating the Superior Court of Lake County as a multi-judge court, Ind. Code § 33-5-29.5-19, provides in part as follows:
“The chief judge shall be responsible for the operation and conduct of the court and to seeing that the court shall efficiently and judicially operate. . . . The chief judge may authorize a judge in one division to hear a case originating in another division where necessary for the efficient operation of the court.”
Individual judges of the court acquire jurisdiction over the particular case through an assignment process. Each judge of the court has general subject-matter jurisdiction over cases properly commenced in the court. In the statutory provision quoted above, the Legislature has reposed the ultimate responsibility in the Chief Judge to see to it that the judicial business of the court is handled promptly and efficiently. The Chief Judge, presently Judge Richards, is the foreperson of the court. The buck stops on his desk.
The decision as to whether one judge or another should be vested with jurisdiction over a particular matter is a local court administrative matter to be determined in that court with a view toward current practical considerations and f undaméntal fairness to the litigants. That decision, however it is made, should be subject to successful jurisdictional attack at this level upon the single ground that the judge receiving the case was disqualified. This Court could not possibly undertake a general superintendence of the assignment process of multi-judge trial courts in original actions.
*478In the case at bar, Chief Judge Richards did not enter a formal order assigning himself the shock probation petition. He should have done so. His judicial actions in taking the shock probation petition and promptly deciding it under the circumstances of this case amply support the conclusion that he was in fact assigning the case to himself under his statutory authority as Chief Judge. He did so in the immediate aftermath of having decided the Gubitz post-conviction petition and signing the order committing Gubitz to prison. He did so after Judge Letsinger had testified in the Gubitz post-conviction hearing and when in his opinion he was as familiar with the crime and character of Gubitz as was Judge Letsinger. In my opinion the omission by Judge Richards of a formal assignment order was a mere irregularity and should not under these circumstances be permitted to have an effect upon his jurisdiction over the case.
The majority construes the suspension of sentence and shock probation statute as impliedly limiting the jurisdiction to sentencing judges to grant shock probation. I do not agree that it has this high degree of restrictive force. There is at the outset no express language to this effect. Moreover, it is typical for rules and statutes of this type to require “the court” to take a particular series of related steps. For example, Ind. R. Tr. P. 16, requires “the court” to order a pre-trial conference upon motion of a party. The resulting pre-trial order is exquisitely related to the trial to follow. Yet no implication arises from the rule that in order for the judge to have jurisdiction of the trial, he must have conducted the pre-trial conference. As I read the shock probation statute, the language expresses a strong legislative preference for the exercise of authority granted in it by the sentencing judge, and nothing more. Holding this view of the statute, I can only conclude that the relator has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Chief Judge Richards was disqualified to act upon the shock probation petition, and that *479the temporary writ should be dissolved and the permanent one denied.
Hunter, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 381 N.E.2d 475.