concurring in part, dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority as to Guenther's first three issues, I respectfully dissent as to its resolution of the enhancement of sentence question.
The trial court is vested with wide discretion to determine whether a presumptive sentence should be enhanced because of aggravating factors. Shippen v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 903, 905; Fointno v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 140, 144. Statutory factors that may be considered as aggravating circumstances serve as guidelines but do not limit the matters the judge may consider when determining what sentence should be imposed. Thurston v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 198, 203. The majority holds the trial court considered improper factors in enhancing Guenther's sentence.
I believe the majority erred by so holding. Its position ignores the first aggravating factor listed by the trial court, Guenther's past criminal history, even though it consisted only of misdemeanor and infraction offenses. Our Supreme Court has held a trial court's consideration of a defendant's criminal history is not limited to felonies, but may include misdemeanor and other criminal activity which has not been reduced to a conviction. Therefore, Guenther's past criminal history was a proper factor for the court to consider as an aggravating circumstance. Hoelscher v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 715, 717, and cases cited therein.
The majority also holds the fact the vie-tim was Guenther's stepdaughter is not a proper aggravating factor. Without citation to supporting authority, it reasons because of the relationship existing between Guenther and the victim, the incest statute * was violated but the State chose not to charge Guenther with that crime. Since the State chose not to so charge Guenther, the trial court is foreclosed from enhancing Guenther's sentence on that basis, it opines. Again, the majority errs in my opinion.
The majority's decision clearly contravenes previous holdings of this district. As Judge Miller stated in McMichael v. State (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 726, 733.
There are no limitations on what a court may consider in enhancing a sentence, even if such factor may have also led to a conviction on a greater charge.
*794Further, I believe the step parent/child relationship here indeed makes this a more heinous crime than ordinary child molesting. Standing in the role of parent Guen-ther should be a figure in whom T.S. could put her trust and to whom she could turn for protection. Instead Guenther violated that trust and became the one T.S. needed to be protected from. The majority, again without citing authority, states the heinousness of a crime relates to the manner of its commission rather than to the nature of the crime itself. I know of no such limitation on determining whether a crime is heinous.
Webster's New World Dictionary (2d College Ed.1970) states, "heinous implies such extreme wickednous as to arouse the strongest hatred and revulsion [a Reinous crime]", at page 1010; Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976) states, "[hjeinous describes that which excites extremest hatred, loathing, and horror [a murder, and a particularly ketnous murder for it involves the violation of hospitality and of gratitude-R.P. Warren]", at page 1608. As is Webster's example, this is a particularly heinous child molestation for it involves violation of the trust and protection ordinarily associated with the parent/child relationship. That fact also is a proper ground for enhancement of Guen-ther's sentence.
Finally, the majority states Guenther's vaginal examinations of his stepdaughters reflects upon his character and his need for rehabilitative treatment. This was also one of the trial court's specific grounds for enhancement. Having accepted this premise, the majority is required to affirm the trial court's enhancement of sentence. Our Supreme Court has held only one valid aggravating factor need be shown to sustain the enhancement of a presumptive sentence. Rowley v. State (1979), Ind., 394 N.E.2d 928, 931. At the point even one valid factor is found by the reviewing court, whether the trial judge might have considered other factors which were not valid is irrelevant. The majority clearly errs by holding otherwise.
There were at least three valid grounds stated by the trial court for enhancement of Guenther's sentence. It committed no error.
I would affirm the trial court in all things.