dissenting.
The trial court sustained the defendant’s preliminary objections questioning jurisdiction due to plaintiff’s claim before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). It found that where the plaintiff had sought relief under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the Act) and thereafter sought to unilaterally close the file with the PHRC, the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedy precluded an action proceeding within the common pleas court. I agree and, therefore, dissent.
In Fye v. Central Transportation, Inc., 487 Pa. 137, 409 A.2d 2 (1979), our Supreme Court found that a claimant’s initial election to seek redress under the Act divested jurisdiction of an equity court of common pleas to entertain the complaint subsequently filed in that court. In examining and rejecting the claimant’s act of terminating the action before the PHRC, the Fye court expressly considered the 1974 amendments to section 12 of the Act. Section 12(c) provided two exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of *277section 12(b), namely (1) dismissal of the complaint by the Commission, or (2) failure by the Commission to enter into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party. Our Supreme Court concluded that the closing of the PHRC file at the claimant’s request fit neither of the two exceptions, that the perimeters of the terms of the section 12(c) exceptions were expressly unambiguous, and the chancellor’s decree dismissing the state court complaint upon preliminary objections should be, and was, affirmed. Id. at 141, 409 A.2d at 4-5.
Most recently, our supreme court has re-affirmed its holding in Fye v. Central Transportation, Inc., while declaring that the rationale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to actions brought under section 12(c), 43 P.S. § 962(c). Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917 (1989).
The majority would hold that where a PHRC complaint has not been resolved by the Commission within one year, then the Act authorizes the grievant — without more — to proceed in the common pleas court, even though the matter remains pending before the Commission. On the facts of this case, I would proceed more cautiously. It is not unreasonable to require that one seeking to move away from an exclusive statutory remedy be required to allege a good faith attempt at exhausting that remedy prior to invocation of the ultimate resort of the courts. Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, supra; Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 276 Pa.Super. 232, 276-277, 419 A.2d 431, 455 (1980).
Snyder has the burden of convincing this court that he is entitled to pursue his claims before the court of common pleas. Snyder’s entire pleading with regard to the pendency of his claims before the PHRC is as follows:
12. Thereafter, on or about February 3, 1986, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging age and sex discrimination (E-35807-D — 031862255) with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC), which state agency is designated as the “deferral” agency for the federal Equal *278Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As a “deferral” agency, the PHRC has responsibility for investigating both State and Federal age and sex discrimination charges.
19. a) Plaintiffs initial charge of discrimination was docketed by the PHRC at E-35807-D — 031862255.
b) Subsequently, Plaintiff sought to amend that charge to add the retaliation conduct alleged in this complaint to the charge, the PHRC elected to entertain that retaliation and continuing violation allegation at docket no. E-42113D.
20. Both of the aforementioned charges of age and sex discrimination, on the part of PASR, were timely and dually filed with the EEOC, Philadelphia Regional Office and its designated state agency, the PHRC.
21. By letter, Plaintiff has advised the PHRC, the U.S. Department of Labor and the EEOC of his intention to pursue this matter through litigation in the state court system.
22. Plaintiff anticipates and therefore avers that the PHRC will close its pending charge procedures and charges in this matter based upon Plaintiffs request and indication that this matter will be proceeding .to litigation on the State and pendent Federal claims involving Plaintiff and Defendants which allege unlawful age and sex discrimination in employment.
23. All conditions precedent to the maintenance of this litigation have been satisfied.
Plaintiffs complaint at pp. 4, 6-7. [Emphasis added].
Snyder has pled only that he advised the PHRC of his intent to file charges in the court of common pleas and that he anticipated the closing of his PHRC charges “based upon [his] request and indication that this matter will be proceeding to litigation on the State and pendant Federal claims.” It is unclear what is meant by the word “request” in this context. We do know, however, that Snyder did not make a *279formal request for the withdrawal of his PHRC charges until after filing his complaint and therefore, his pleading could not refer to a past request that his charges be dropped. On the basis of these pleadings, the majority would permit the complainant to pursue his claims in the court of common pleas.
Clearly, Snyder had not, as of the time that his complaint was filed, been given notice by the PHRC. His complaint contains no averment that he requested any such notice. While I would agree that it is unnecessary to require an aggrieved party to initiate an action in mandamus to compel the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, I am unwilling to afford a complainant who has already invoked the jurisdiction of the PHRC access to the court of common pleas merely upon the averment that the complainant “advised the PHRC” of his “intention to pursue” state court remedies. I should think it not too heavy a burden for the party seeking access to the state courts to show either compliance with the exclusivity provisions of section 12(c) of the Act or some valid reason why compliance (notice) should be excused in any particular case: such as the PHRC’s failure or refusal to issue, upon a valid request, notice that the claims have either been dismissed or have not been the subject of a conciliation agreement. Here, Snyder has failed to do either.
In this case, the trial court’s function was to determine whether the law will bar recovery due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1017(b)(1). In re Ordinance No. 1-9-86, Logan Township, 116 Pa.Cmwlth. 640, 542 A.2d 1051 (1988). The only pleadings properly before the trial court during consideration of the objections were the Complaint and the Preliminary Objections. The Notice of Appeal was filed September 27, 1988. Although Snyder filed a Motion and Brief in support of a request for reconsideration, the order sustaining the preliminary objection raising a question of jurisdiction also dismissed the complaint. That order was final and appealable.
*280Snyder did not seek to amend his complaint within ten days of service of the preliminary objections, although permitted to do so. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(c). He has attempted to place additional facts before this court on appeal, facts which were not of record at the time the preliminary objections were decided by the trial court. This is improper. When an appeal is from the sustaining of preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint are admitted, as well as any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. LaZar v. RUR Industries, Inc., 337 Pa.Super. 445, 448, 487 A.2d 29, 31 (1985). Here, the propriety of the order sustaining preliminary objections cannot be reviewed on a set of facts different from those submitted to the trial court in the complaint.
I agree with the majority that the complaint and preliminary objections thereto placed sufficient information before the trial court for it to determine the jurisdictional issue. Those operative facts are: (1) Snyder, on February 3, 1986, filed a sex and age discrimination complaint with the PHRC; (2) Snyder sought to amend his complaint to add retaliation conduct; (3) the PHRC assigned a separate docket number to the claim of retaliation and continuing violation; (4) Snyder wrote to the PHRC to tell the Commission of his intention to pursue his claim(s) in the state court system; and (5) at the time the state court complaint was filed, the PHRC had taken no action to dismiss the complaint or enter into a conciliation agreement.
The only issue before us is whether, upon these facts, the law will not permit recovery by Snyder, resolving any doubt in favor of a refusal to sustain the objections. Preliminary objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from doubt. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108, 299 A.2d 585 (1973), In re Estate of Thompson, 332 Pa.Super. 360, 361, 481 A.2d 655, 656 (1984). When we limit our consideration to the facts contained within the complaint, there are no equitable considerations to support a modification of the exclusivity provisions of the *281Act. Snyder neither averred compliance with 43 P.S. § 962(c) nor alleged any facts suggesting that compliance with § 962(c) should be waived or modified. There may be other circumstances where the exhaustion of administrative remedies might be foregone, but the facts here presented are not that case.
As Mr. Justice Flaherty points out in Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 522 Pa. at 95, 559 A.2d at 921, the intended forum for addressing grievances of the sort presented here is the PHRC. Where the proper methods for addressing those grievances have not been exercised, judicial recourse is foreclosed. Id.
For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the trial court which sustained the preliminary objections. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.