¶ 47. {dissenting). I agree with the majority that Davis's statements are admissible if the voice stress examination and the post-examination interview in which Davis made the inculpatory statement are totally discrete events. In addition, I agree with the majority that determining whether they are totally discrete events requires an examination of the totality of circumstances test, as explained in State v. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, ¶ 11, 265 Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518.
¶ 48. However, I disagree with the majority's analysis because it alters the essential inquiry and misapplies the totality of the circumstances test. The proper inquiry and application of the totality of the circumstances test require the conclusion that the examination and the interview here were not totally *612discrete. A review of our precedent further supports that conclusion. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
¶ 49. This is not a case in which the examination clearly took place in one room and the interview clearly took place in another room. Rather it is a case where there was an ongoing process with both the examination and the interview occurring in two places.
¶ 50. A review of the relevant facts here is helpful as a preface to the analysis. While at the police station, Detective Swanson met with Davis in an interview room. Swanson left and returned with Detective Buen-ning. Davis was escorted by Buenning to the family room where the voice stress examination was conducted in Swanson's absence.
¶ 51. After the test, Davis was returned to the interview room. Buenning told Swanson that he believed Davis had been deceptive. Both detectives then escorted Davis back to the family room.
¶ 52. "While in the family room, with Swanson present, Buenning confronted Davis and told him that his answers had been deceptive, showing him charts of the test results. Although Davis protested that he had not done anything, Buenning continued to press him. Eventually Davis capitulated and acknowledged the results. Buenning then asked Davis if he wanted to talk. Davis responded "yes." Buenning asked if Davis preferred to talk to Swanson, and Davis indicated that he did. Then Buenning said "I'm finished here," closed his laptop, and left the family room with the examination paraphernalia.
¶ 53. Next, Swanson spoke to Davis, indicated that they needed to talk, and took Davis back to the interview room. He left the room to retrieve forms, *613returning within five minutes. When Swanson returned, Davis made the statements at issue here.
h — I hH
¶ 54. The majority states that the issue in the case is "whether Davis's statement was so closely associated with the voice stress analysis that it must be suppressed." Majority op., ¶ 2. It asserts that a statement made during a voice stress analysis is generally inadmissible by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 905.065, id., ¶ 45, but ultimately concludes that the statement at issue here was made after the analysis was completed and that the statement is admissible.1
¶ 55. According to the majority, the question of whether Davis's statement is admissible depends on whether the statement and the voice stress examination were two discrete events. Id., ¶ 23. In order to determine whether the examination and the statement are totally discrete, the majority applies a totality of the circumstances test based on Greer.
¶ 56. The majority concludes that there were discrete events. It bases its conclusion on the facts that there were two officers involved, and that Buenning *614stated that he was finished, closed his laptop, and left with the examination equipment before Davis made his statement. Id., ¶ 30. Further, the majority explains that Swanson did not refer to the examination or results during the time that Davis made the statements, and that the examination and Davis's statements occurred in different rooms.
A
¶ 57. The problems with the majority's analysis begin with its statement of the inquiry. In State v. Schlise this court determined that the admissibility of statements made after a polygraph examination turns on whether the interview in which statements are made is totally discrete from the examination. 86 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 271 N.W.2d 619 (1978). Following Schlise, the court of appeals in Greer stated that the admissibility turns on "whether the interviews eliciting the statements are found to be totally discrete from the examination which precedes them." 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶ 10 (internal quotations omitted).
¶ 58- At several points in the opinion, the majority correctly states that the inquiry is whether the examination and interview were two discrete events. However, in the analysis section the majority alters the test set forth in Schlise and Greer and instead asks whether the examination and Davis's statement are discrete events. Majority op., ¶ 23.
¶ 59. By altering the test, the majority implies that the post-examination interview commenced when Davis began making his statement. That assumption is untenable. The majority recognizes that the voice stress examination was over when Davis was unhooked from the voice stress analysis equipment. See id., ¶ 9. What *615it fails to acknowledge, however, is that when Buenning and Swanson escorted Davis to the family room and confronted him with the test results, they were initiating the post-examination interview.
¶ 60. Schlise and Greer demand that we analyze whether Davis's statements occurred during an interview that was totally discrete from the examination. Thus, the proper analysis should focus on whether the interview, including the period during which Davis was in the family room with both Buenning and Swanson, is totally discrete from the examination. Yet the majority does not examine the interview as including that period.
B
¶ 61. The majority opinion is also problematic in its application of the test it sets forth. It sets forth five factors from Greer that are relevant in determining whether the voice stress examination and the interview are totally discrete:
(1) whether the defendant was told the test was over; (2) whether any time passed between the analysis and the defendant's statement; (3) whether the officer conducting the analysis differed from the officer who took the statement; (4) whether the location where the analysis was conducted differed from where the statement was given; and (5) whether the voice stress analysis was referred to when obtaining a statement from the defendant.
Majority op., ¶ 23. As noted, in Greer the factors refer to the "interview" rather than the "statement."
¶ 62. Rather than examining the five factors in a straightforward way, determining whether each factor indicates that the events were totally discrete, the *616majority lists several factors that indicate that the events are discrete. Id., ¶ 30. When it reaches the factors that indicate that the events are related, it discounts them on the ground that the events are totally discrete.
¶ 63. A close analysis of factors, however, reveals that the examination and the interview here were not discrete events. I examine each in turn.
1. Was the defendant told the examination was over?
¶ 64. Buenning did not give Davis any indication that the examination was over until well into the post-examination interview, when he stated "I'm finished here." Moreover, Buenning's statement that "I'm finished here" is equivocal. Both Buenning and Swanson were in the family room at the time, Buenning had just asked Davis if he would prefer to talk to Swanson, and Davis had responded that he would. Thus, Buenning's statement can be interpreted to mean that he was finished, not that the examination was finished.
2. Did any time pass between the examination and the interview?
¶ 65. The majority focuses on the five minutes between Buenning packing up the voice stress analysis equipment and Davis giving his statement to Swanson. Although it concedes that the short period of time is an indication that the events are not discrete, the majority merely states that "time alone is not dispositive." Id., ¶ 31.
¶ 66. The important point, however, is that after Davis agreed to give a statement, only enough time passed for him to be escorted to a different room and for *617Swanson to retrieve some paperwork. After the break, things picked up precisely where they had left off, with Davis agreeing to give the statement that had been elicited by Buenning in the family room. It is incorrect to suggest that there are totally discrete events when the break between them was so short and the subject of discussion (that Davis had previously not told the truth and would now agree to give a truthful statement) was identical before and after the break.
3. Was the officer conducting the examination different from the officer conducting the interview?
¶ 67. The majority maintains that different officers conducted the exam and the interview. However, as noted, the interview began when both Buenning and Swanson were in the family room with Davis. Both were present when Davis capitulated and conceded the results of the test, agreeing to give a statement.
¶ 68. Although only Swanson was present in the room when Davis gave his statement, Swanson merely asked Davis to give his statement after Davis had already agreed to give it while they were in the family room. The interview (that is, all of the discussion regarding Davis's actions and the examination) took place in the family room with Buenning. Thus, while there were two officers involved, both conducted the interview. Because Buenning was involved in both the examination and the interview, the officer conducting the examination was not different from "the" officer conducting the interview.
4. Was the location of the examination different from the location of the interview?
¶ 69. Although the post-examination interview began in the same room in which the examination was *618conducted, Davis was moved to the interview room to give his statement to Swanson. More importantly, though, this is a case in which there was an ongoing process.
¶ 70. Davis was at the police station for the purpose of the examination. He was moved back and forth between the interview room and the family room several times. Davis had been in both rooms with both officers. As noted above, this is not a case in which the examination and the interview each clearly took place in a single room. Rather, it is a case in which there was ongoing process, including an examination and an interview, which occurred in two places.
5. Were the examination results used in obtaining the statement?
¶ 71. There is no question that the results of the examination were used to obtain Davis's statement. The majority maintains that "so long as the examination and interview are two totally discrete events, letting the defendant know that he or she did not pass the examination . .. does not negate that the examination and post-examination interview are .. . totally discrete events." Majority op., ¶ 33. However, the use of examination results is a factor to consider in determining whether there are two discrete events. Discounting the factor on the ground that there are two discrete events just begs the question.
¶ 72. The majority also maintains that "at no time during the interview did Detective Swanson relate back to or rely on the voice stress evaluation or its results." Id. The reason is that Swanson did nothing but ask Davis to recite the statement that Buenning had elicited from Davis a few minutes prior.
*619¶ 73. The factors cited by the majority therefore indicate that there were not two totally discrete events. Whether Davis was told the exam was over is unclear; there was essentially no time breaking up the events involved; both officers were involved in the process and Buenning performed most of the interviewing; the two rooms were each used for both the examination and the interview; and the examination results were used during the interview to elicit Davis's statement.
C
¶ 74. Finally, a review of prior cases supports the conclusion that the examination and the interview were not discrete events. This case closely resembles Schlise, where an officer conducted a polygraph examination and a post-examination interview that were both a part of a longer, seamless process. That process included a lengthy pre-examination interview, the actual polygraph examination, and the post-examination interview, all conducted by one officer. 86 Wis. 2d at 42-43. The post-examination interview involved the officer confronting the defendant with the results of the test, thereby eliciting an incriminating statement. Id. at 40. This court determined that the examination and the interview were so closely associated in time and content that they had to be considered one event. Id. at 43.
¶ 75. The present case is similar. Davis was given the voice stress examination, which was over when he was unhooked from the equipment and escorted to the interview room. Swanson and Buenning brought Davis back into the family room and confronted him with the results of the test in a post-examination interview. During the interview Buenning used the results of the test to elicit a statement from Davis. Davis was taken *620back to a room he had been in and out of during the entire process so that he could put his statement in writing.
¶ 76. Thus, as in Schlise, there was a single, ongoing process, the post-examination interview was conducted by the officer that conducted the examination, and the results of the test were used to elicit an incuplatory statement. The primary difference between this case and Schlise is that this case involved two officers, both of whom were involved in the entire process. Further, while there were two rooms involved, each had been used throughout the ongoing process.
¶ 77. This case is also different in important ways from Greer and State v. Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d 382, 535 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1995), in which the examinations and interview were discrete. In Greer, one officer spoke to the defendant the day before the defendant was given a polygraph examination. The examination was conducted by a different officer. After it was completed, the defendant was told orally and in writing that the examination was over. 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶¶ 3-4. An hour passed and the defendant was moved to a different room. There, the first officer conducted an interview in which the defendant confessed. Id., ¶ 7. The court of appeals determined that the examination and the interview were not totally discrete. Id., ¶ 16.
¶ 78. In Greer the statement that the examination was over was clear, whereas here the statement was equivocal. The defendant in that case had an hour to differentiate between the examination and interview, whereas Davis had only long enough for Swanson to retrieve paperwork. The officers in Greer played distinct roles, whereas both officers here were involved throughout the process. Although this case involves two rooms, as did Greer, it is distinct in that both rooms *621were used throughout the process. The Greer court determined that the officer's use of the examination results during the interview did not alone prevent the examination and interview from being discrete. Id., ¶ 14. Nonetheless, it recognized that using the results counts against a determination that the events are totally discrete. Id., ¶ 11.
¶ 79. The court of appeals determined in Johnson that there were discrete events even though there was only one officer conducting the examination and the interview. 193 Wis. 2d 382, 389. It based the determination on the facts that the defendant was moved to a different room, there was a distinct break between the two events, and the officer did not refer to the test results in order to elicit the inculpatory statement. Id. There is no indication that the interview room had been used throughout the process, as is the case here. More importantly, in this case it was the use of the test results that elicited Davis's statement. Further, Davis's statement to Swanson came directly after Buenning had induced him to give it, with only enough time passing for Swanson to retrieve paperwork.
¶ 80. Because this case is similar to Schlise, and distinct from Greer and Johnson, the case law favors the conclusion that the examination and the interview were not discrete events.
rH 1 — H I — I
¶ 81. In sum, the majority has altered the focus of the inquiry set forth in Greer and Schlise. As a result of skewing the focus, it incorrectly assumes that the post-examination interview commenced when Davis made his statement. Additionally, the majority misapplies the totality of the circumstances test. I conclude *622the proper inquiry and application of the totality of the circumstances test, together with our prior case law, requires the conclusion that the examination and the interview here were not discrete events. I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 82. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.
The majority concludes that the underlying rationale for excluding statements made during honesty testing is that "our state legislature has generally precluded such a scenario under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 905.065." Majority op., ¶ 44. The majority's conclusion seems problematic for two reasons.
First, its conclusion implies that the opinion should resolve the present case by interpreting and applying § 905.065. However, the majority does not purport to do this.
Second, the majority resolves this case by relying upon a line of cases, none of which interprets or applies § 905.065. How can the rationale underlying a rule established in these cases be a statute that none of the cases ever mentions?