¶ 38. {dissenting). The error of the majority lies in what it avoids. This case involves two actions. The first is the process of eliminating three social worker positions. The second is entering into contracts to fulfill the statutory responsibility of providing social work. Even though the first action, the process of eliminating the positions, is the basis of the arbitrator's award, the majority nevertheless addresses only the second.
¶ 39. This case stems from actions taken by the County. The majority, however, avoids focusing on the County's actions and instead attributes those actions to the director of family court services, Van Kampen. As a result, it subordinates the actions of directors to the demands of the County.
¶ 40. Finally, this case involves an arbitrator's determination that a County employee, Vuvunas, was laid off in direct violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The majority, however, fails to explain why that determination is error, despite vacating the arbitration award.
¶ 41. By failing to address the process by which the County eliminated the three positions, attributing-the County's actions to Van Kampen, and failing to address Vuvunas's layoff, the majority ignores the standard of review and the determinations of the arbitrator that this court should not disturb. Despite its claim of *534protecting the rights of directors of family court services, who are agents of the circuit courts, the majority's decision ultimately subordinates those rights to the County. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I — I
¶ 42. Despite the fact that the arbitration decision, coupled with the collective bargaining agreement, provides the factual basis of this case, the majority spends a scant four paragraphs explaining the arbitrator's determinations. See majority op., ¶¶ 4-7. It nevertheless argues that the arbitration award should be vacated because "the arbitrator exceeded her authority and violated separation of powers principles." Id., ¶ 22.1
*535¶ 43. The majority maintains that Van Kampen acted under the authority of § 767.405(2)(b)2 when he "contracted with Berndt, LaFave, and Engel, after Racine County eliminated the three original positions." Majority op., ¶ 22. The director, according to the majority, "is not bound by the collective bargaining agreement when exercising the statutory authority to fill the vacated positions." Id., ¶ 20. Because Van Kampen acted pursuant to this statutory authority, the majority contends that the "collective bargaining agreement and the arbitration award . . . attempted to take away from Van Kampen" the "statutory right to hire" the social workers. Id., ¶ 21.
¶ 44. The consequences of the arbitration award, according to the majority, are dire. It asserts that the award "left [LaFave, Berndt, and Engel] without an ability to work for Racine County." Id., ¶ 7. In so doing the arbitrator "put[] into jeopardy the effective functioning of the judicial branch." Id., ¶ 22.
*536¶ 45. The abbreviated treatment given by the majority to the actual decision of the arbitrator leaves a void. I therefore describe the background of this case in more detail.
¶ 46. According to the arbitration decision, the County decided to eliminate the positions in order to take them off the tax levy and informed the director, Van Kampen, of its decision in mid-2003. As the majority notes, in the fall of 2003 LaFave and Berndt were informed that their positions were being eliminated and Vuvunas was told that her position was being reduced to part-time status and that she could choose to exercise bumping rights or be laid off. Neither LaFave nor Berndt had planned to retire when they did until they learned of the plan to eliminate their positions.
¶ 47. Van Kampen advised them that the county executive had directed him to provide the statutorily mandated services by entering into individual contracts. The County negotiated service agreements with LaFave and Berndt to provide social work after their retirement. At the direction of County corporate counsel, Van Ka-mpen discussed setting up limited liability corporations with them.
¶ 48. After LaFave and Berndt retired and came back to work, and after Vuvunas was laid off, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to its right under the collective bargaining agreement. The parties submitted to arbitration of the case as a contract issue. Because the parties submitted a contract issue, the arbitrator limited her award to the terms of the parties' contract, and did not stray from the positions argued by the parties into the area of statutory law. There is no indication that the County raised its Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and separation of *537powers arguments until the case reached the circuit court.3
¶ 49. The Union argued that the County violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and "engaged in a subterfuge resulting in performance of bargaining unit work performance pursuant to individual contracts and improper lay-off. ..." It also asserted that the County's discussions with LaFave and *538Berndt regarding subcontracting constituted individual bargaining. The collective bargaining agreement includes a recognition clause providing that the "County recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representive for all. .. Social Workers/Case Managers ...According to the Union, the County orchestrated the retirements by negotiating with LaFave and Berndt individually.
¶ 50. The County maintained that it did not violate the collective bargaining agreement and that the retirements of LaFave and Berndt and the lay-off of Vuvunas were voluntary. It further argued that its discussions with LaFave and Berndt did not constitute promises for future contracts.
¶ 51. The arbitrator determined that the County improperly displaced the three positions and violated several provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, including the recognition and subcontracting provisions. She further determined that the positions had not been eliminated, but instead that the County had simply "replaced [the] bargaining unit positions with the identical service provided under individual contracts." Despite the fact that the County "narrowly focused upon the topic of sub-contracting," the arbitrator determined that the service agreements entered by Berndt, LaFave, and Engel "are not sub-contracts" insofar as they "do not provide new or temporary service or service supplemental to that being provided in part by bargaining unit members."
¶ 52. The positions, according to the arbitrator, "have not been truly eliminated." Instead, the arbitrator agreed with the Union that the County orchestrated LaFave's and Berndt's retirements and that they were motivated to retire by the County's offer to enter service agreements with them. Their work and their positions *539did not change. They had the same responsibilities, had the same supervisors, were provided office space in the same area, continued to receive office supplies, maintained the same work relationship with other employees, received the same compensation, and did not provide their services to anyone other than the County. Colleagues and co-workers did not know that LaFave's and Berndt's employment status had changed.
¶ 53. With respect to Vuvunas, the arbitrator determined that even if LaFave's and Berndt's retirements were independent of the County's actions, "Vu-vunas plainly was deprived of an opportunity to be fully employed in her Court Services Social Worker position" by the service agreements. This action was in direct violation of Article 27.07 of the collective bargaining agreement, which provides in relevant part:
27.07 Racine County reserves the right to subcontract any work normally done by bargaining unit employees, but no bargaining unit employees will be laid off or have their normal hours reduced as a direct result of such subcontracting. . ..
¶ 54. In determining that the County violated the agreement, the arbitrator relied on the testimony of Van Kampen, who "unequivocally testified that he had been directed by the County Executive to enter into Contracts with individuals to provide the statutorily required service 'off the levy.'" Van Kampen further testified that in light of the County's decision "he was very concerned with regard to how the service would be provided." In addition to being worried about how to provide the services when the County informed him of its plan, Van Kampen testified that he di$ not know how the services were going to be provided after the contracts expired on December 31, 2004, less than one *540year after the positions were changed from bargaining unit positions to contract positions.
¶ 55. The arbitration award for the violations was that the County could no longer continue or enter agreements that displace bargaining unit positions:
The County shall cease and desist from continuing existing Service Agreements or entering into new Agreements which displace Court Services Social Worker/Case Manager bargaining unit positions consistent with this Opinion. The Union and its members shall be made whole for damages which have been sustained including loss of dues, expenses to pursue this matter, and loss of wages and benefits without loss of seniority.
No specific remedy was set forth because the arbitrator had insufficient evidence of the extent of the Union's damages. The arbitrator was cautious so as not to "fashion [] a remedy which is either impossible or impractical to implement." The arbitrator instead noted that the award "will require discussion and perhaps some negotiation between the parties."
II.
¶ 56. Although the majority cites to the standard of review, it ignores the application of that standard. The role of reviewing courts in arbitration cases is limited, and courts "will not overturn the arbitrator's decision for mere errors of law or fact." Madison v. Madison Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 435 N.W.2d 8 (1988). It will do so only when "perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct is plainly established, or if there is a manifest disregard of the law, or if the award itself is illegal or violates strong public policy." Id. (citing Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. *541Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n, 93 Wis. 2d 415, 422, 287 N.W.2d 131 (1980)) (internal punctuation omitted).
¶ 57. Despite this standard of substantial deference, the majority nevertheless ignores the arbitrator's factual and legal determinations. It instead bases its arguments on claims that are belied by the arbitrator's findings.
A
¶ 58. To begin, the majority fails to address the basis of the arbitrator's decision — the process of eliminating the positions. It asserts that Van Kampen acted "after Racine County eliminated the three original positions" and filled "vacated positions" with contractors. Majority op., ¶¶ 22, 19. The basis of the arbitration award, however, is that the County did not really eliminate the positions and then subcontract for the services. Instead, the arbitrator determined that the positions remained intact, with LaFave, Berndt, and Engel doing the same work under the same conditions as was performed before.
¶ 59. Thus, it is the process of eliminating the positions and the fact that LaFave, Berndt, and Engel were not true subcontractors that is the basis of the arbitration award and the respondents' arguments. The arbitrator's decision does not address the prospect that legitimately eliminated or vacated positions could be filled with subcontractors. Indeed, the Union admitted to the circuit court that "[ujnder the collective bargaining agreement, during layoffs there can be subcontracting." Further, there is no question that prior to the events here, LaFave, Berndt, and Vuvunas were County employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement. The County conceded that point at oral argument.
*542¶ 60. The majority, however, has simply assumed that the determination at the heart of the arbitration award (i.e., that the County did not properly eliminate the positions) is incorrect without providing an explanation. It then answers a question that is not at issue, and which the respondents do not contest, namely, whether the director can subcontract to fill legitimately eliminated positions.
¶ 61. In fact, the arbitrator's conclusion that the County's actions are an improper attempt to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement is supported by the court of appeals decision in County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME, 190 Wis. 2d 298, 526 N.W.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1994). In that case a county clerk of court and register of deeds deputized their employees, and argued that the employees were therefore exempt from a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under Wis. Stat. § 111.704 on the ground that the employees had been deputized pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 59.38 and 59.50.5 The court of appeals determined that such an action could exempt employees from the collective bargaining agreement only when the action is not an attempt at subterfuge. Id. at 306.
¶ 62. Similarly, the arbitrator here determined that the County's orchestration of the retirements and service agreements was merely an attempt to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement. Even if the arbitration award would conflict with § 767.405(2), *543under County of Eau Claire, the statutory exemption applies only where there is no subterfuge.
¶ 63. The majority tries to distinguish this case from County of Eau Claire on the ground that the employees in that case "were continuing employees who, other than being deputized, did not see any change in their employment status." Majority op., ¶ 26. It is difficult to discern the basis for that distinction, as the arbitrator specifically determined that, other than being contractors, LaFave and Berndt saw no change in their employment status, but instead had performed the same work, in the same offices, for the same supervisors, and for the same compensation.
B
¶ 64. By failing to focus on the actions of the County and instead attributing those actions to Van Kampen, the majority opinion again ignores the arbitrator's factual determinations. This error is particularly pernicious, as it ultimately subordinates the actions of directors like Van Kampen, who are agents of the judiciary, to the demands of counties.
¶ 65. The arbitration decision and Van Kampen's testimony make it clear that it was the County, not Van Kampen, that required the social worker positions to be filled by subcontractors. A prior decision had been made to provide the statutorily required social services with bargaining unit employees.6 There is no indication that Van Kampen wished to have different personnel provid*544ing the services or to have the services provided by subcontractors rather than County employees.
¶ 66. In fact, it was the County that decided the positions would be eliminated, and only after so deciding informed Van Kampen. The arbitrator's decision indicates that Van Kampen did not welcome the changes required by the new directive. He was concerned about how to provide the services under the new regime. Contrary to the majority's suggestion that he was "exercising. .. statutory authority," Van Kampen was forced by the County (i.e., "directed by the County Executive") to use contractors rather than his longtime employees to provide the services.
¶ 67. Given that the County was directing the actions in this case, it is puzzling that the majority purports to protect the rights of the director and the judiciary by vacating the arbitration award. See majority op., ¶¶ 21-22. The parties agree, and the majority acknowledges, that under § 767.405(2) the director is free to fill the positions with County employees, independent contractors, or a mix of both. A director chose to initially employ persons pursuant to § 767.405(2)(a) by filling the positions with County employees, and the County superceded that choice by requiring Van Ka-mpen to provide the services only by contract pursuant to § 767.405(2)(b).
*545¶ 68. The majority has in effect let counties constrain the statutory rights of directors under § 767.405, while apparently believing that it has protected them. The majority has been misled. It is not the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitration award that would "abrogate the director's statutory authority as the agent of the circuit court judges." Majority op., ¶ 20. It is the County.
C
¶ 69. The majority also disregards the arbitrator's decision concerning the layoff of Vuvunas. The arbitrator determined that Vuvunas was laid off in direct violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The majority vacates the award with respect to Vuvunas, but fails to explain why the arbitrator's determination was in error.
¶ 70. The arbitrator determined that the County's actions plainly deprived Vuvunas of the opportunity to be fully employed due to the subcontracting, and that this was "in direct violation of Article 27.07 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." This determination by the arbitrator is a straightforward interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, it is a determination that is squarely within the arbitrator's authority to make, and courts will generally not overturn such a decision. See Madison Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d at 585-86 (the goal of reviewing an arbitra- • tion decision is "assuring that the parties are getting the arbitration that they contracted for.")
¶ 71. The arbitrator's determination with respect to Vuvunas follows the express language of the collective bargaining agreement. Although section 27.07 provides that the County may subcontract work normally *546performed by bargaining unit employees, it expressly states that "no bargaining unit employees will be laid off or have their normal hours reduced as a direct result of such subcontracting." The parties do not dispute that Vuvunas was a bargaining unit employee and they do not dispute that she was laid off. Moreover, the County concedes the reason Vuvunas was laid off was to subcontract her work in order to get it "off the levy." Her layoff, therefore, is a "direct result of such subcontracting."7
¶ 72. The majority notes that Vuvunas did not exercise her bumping rights, that the Union filed the grievance rather than Vuvunas, and that Vuvunas's husband retired at roughly the same time she was laid off.8 From these facts it concludes that Vuvunas's situation is not legally distinguishable from that of LaFave and Berndt.
*547¶ 73. However, the majority's decision regarding the legal status of LaFave and Berndt appears to be that they are legitimate subcontractors based on the director's statutory authority to contract for services under § 767.405(2) and that the arbitrator's award violated that statute. Majority op., ¶¶ 22-23. Vuvunas, though, is not a subcontractor. She was laid off and the arbitrator determined that the layoff violated the collective bargaining agreement. The majority opinion addresses only the status of her replacement.
¶ 74. Moreover, the majority appears to conclude that the arbitrator erred in determining that the layoff of Vuvunas violated the collective bargaining agreement. In essence it has reviewed the decision independently of the arbitrator's determination. However, it does so without examining the language of the agreement or explaining why the arbitrator's determination, which follows the express language of the agreement, is incorrect.
¶ 75. In doing so, the majority leaves many questions unanswered. Does the collective bargaining agreement require that wrongly laid-off employees grieve on their own behalf? What does the collective bargaining agreement say about exercise of bumping rights? Does it matter? The effect of the majority's analysis on our review of arbitration decisions is unclear.
I — I I — I I — I
¶ 76. Finally, I address the majority's unsupported claim regarding the consequences of the arbitration award. The majority asserts that the award "left [LaFave, Berndt, and Engel] without an ability to work for Racine County," majority op., ¶ 7, "putting into jeopardy the effective functioning of the judicial branch." Id,., ¶ 22.
*548¶ 77. The arbitration decision does not support this assertion. The award did not prevent LaFave, Berndt, and Engel from working for the County per se. Rather, it prevented them from doing so pursuant to contracts that displace bargaining unit positions. The award emphasized that the parties would have to discuss and negotiate in order to come to an agreement regarding remedy, and it explicitly refrained from fashioning a remedy that would be impractical to implement. The parties were therefore free to negotiate a remedy that included provisions for reinstatement or subcontracting, so long as bargaining unit positions were not eliminated.
¶ 78. The claim that the award jeopardizes the effective functioning of the judicial branch is equally unfounded. To the contrary, it is the County's actions that undermine its effective function. Here, the County wanted the collectively bargained for positions to be off the tax levy. The County, not the circuit court judges, was orchestrating the maneuver. The County, not the arbitrator, was limiting the statutory power of the director of family court services. Contrary to § 767.405(2)(a), the director was not free to fill the positions with County employees. Instead the County required that the positions be filled only by subcontracting the positions. Thus, the majority's concern about effective functioning of the judiciary is more appropriately directed at the County's actions.
IV
¶ 79. For the reasons set forth, I conclude that by failing to address the process by which the County eliminated the three positions, attributing the County's actions to Van Kampen, and failing to address Vuvunas's layoff, the majority ignores the standard of *549review and the determinations of the arbitrator. Ultimately, it also subordinates to counties the rights of the directors of family court services, who Eire agents of the circuit courts, to choose whether to provide services by employee pursuant to § 767.405(2)(a) or by contract pursuant to § 767.405(2)(b).
¶ 80. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent.
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405(2) (2005-06) provides that the director of family court services shall:
(a) Employ staff to perform mediation and to perform any legal custody and physical placement study services ....
(b) Contract under sub. (3)(c) with a person or public or private entity to perform mediation and to perform any legal custody and physical placement study services ....
The majority inexplicably asserts that "the arbitrator had not considered the statutory and constitutional issues Racine County presented." Majority op., ¶ 35. As noted in the text, the statutory and constitutional arguments were not presented to the arbitrator. The "evidence" that the majority adduces as support is a reference to Van Kampen's testimony in the County's postarbitration brief to the arbitrator contesting the award. However, that brief concerns only the contract dispute and makes no mention of the statutory and separation of powers arguments at issue here, indicating that the County did not raise those issues to the arbitrator. Additionally, the brief discusses Van Kampen's testimony (in which he merely mentions a statute) as part of its argument that the County did not violate the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Rather than demonstrating that the County presented the statutory and separation of powers arguments to the arbitrator, the evidence adduced by the majority indicates that the County presented only contract issues.
Moreover, the majority takes the arbitrator to task for her statement that she made "no attempt... to either interpret or apply statutory law." Majority op., ¶¶ 7, 33. This incorrectly describes the arbitrator's statement. She was explicit that the parties had presented her with a contract question, and that the parties had not argued on the basis of statutory law. It is in that context that the arbitrator wrote: "Accordingly, the Award made here takes its essence entirely from the parties' Contract. There is no attempt here to either interpret or apply statutory law." The majority's implication that the arbitrator simply ignored statutory law that the parties had presented is therefore unfounded.
Wisconsin Stat. §111.70 sets forth the framework for collective bargaining in the municipal employment context.
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.38 provides for the clerks of circuit courts to appoint deputies, and Wis. Stat. § 59.50 provides for the registers of deeds to appoint deputies.
As the majority notes, prior to the passage of § 767.405, the services were provided by the County with bargaining unit positions. After the statute was passed, the director decided to continue providing the services with the employees in the bargaining unit positions. Majority op., ¶ 19 n.10.
*544The facts set forth by the majority in note 10 appear to conflict with the assertion that it makes a few paragraphs later. It states that "[i]f Van Kampen had initially filled the positions in question here, he clearly could have used independent contractors. The positions were not bargained-for positions, and they were created by statute." Majority op., ¶ 23. The fact remains that the director chose to exercise his discretion to use bargaining unit positions to provide the services.
The majority cites a reference in a brief to testimony that Vuvunas requested voluntary layoff rather than exercising her bumping rights, and that had she exercised her bumping rights, no employee would have been laid off. Majority op., ¶ 4, ¶ 23 n. 13. As noted above, the majority is engaged in appellate fact-finding. Moreover, it has failed to explain how a voluntary layoff comports with the contract language that is at the heart of this case. The collective bargaining agreement requires that "no bargaining unit employees will be laid off or have their normal hours reduced as a direct result of such subcontracting...." Here, the majority is addressing the question of whether Vuvunas's layoff violates the terms of a contract without reciting, much less examining, the language of the contract.
It is unclear what the timing of Vuvunas's husband's retirement has to do with whether the County's actions in laying Vuvunas off as a result of subcontracting violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The implication from the majority opinion is that she really wanted to be laid off, and that this somehow legitimizes the County's actions.