concurring.
This case requires the Court to determine the proper scope of a search incident to the arrest of a driver for operating a van with a suspended license. A Manalapan Township Police Officer stopped Nicholas Grass for speeding. The officer determined that Grass’s driver’s license had been suspended and placed him under arrest. The officer handcuffed Grass and put him in the back seat of the patrol car. The officer then proceeded to search the van. Defendant, Eileen Pierce, was a passenger. The search revealed cocaine in articles of clothing belonging to Pierce that were inside the vehicle. She later pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine after *216the court denied her motion to suppress the cocaine found during the search of the vehicle and its contents.
The issue posed by this appeal, as I view it, is whether the police may search articles contained inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle after the driver, arrested for a motor-vehicle-laws violation, is physically restrained, removed from the area of his vehicle, and placed in a patrol car.
The Court now holds “that under article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, the rule of Belton [New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)] shall not apply to warrantless arrests for motor-vehicle offenses.” Ante at 209, 642 A.2d at 959. The Court instead apparently relies on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), to reject the validity of the vehicle search maintaining that “when an arrestee, as was the case with Grass, has been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, and the passengers are removed from the vehicle and frisked, the officer’s justification for searching the vehicle and the passengers’ clothing and containers is minimal.” Ante at 211, 642 A.2d at 961.
Because Belton applies Chimel to a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, and because the search in Belton was “a contemporaneous incident of the arrest,” unlike the search in this case, and is, therefore, distinguishable, I disagree with the Court’s need to reject Belton. I would accept Belton and apply it narrowly consistent with the Belton Court’s own stated intention to remain faithful to the principles of Chimel.
Because all custodial arrests pose a threat to the safety of the arresting officer, I also disagree with the Court’s suggestion that the rationale for Chimel “is less persuasive when offered to justify the need for a vehicular search following an arrest for a traffic offense.” Ante at 210, 642 A.2d at 960.
However, because I believe the search was invalid under both Chimel and Belton, I agree with the result reached by the Court in this case.
*217I
“It is the fact of the lawful arrest [that] establishes the authority to search.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973).
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest The second is that a search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.
[Id. at 224, 94 S.Ct at 471, 38 L.Ed.2d at 434.]
Chimel expounds the meaning and scope of the second proposition.
Belton purports to be an application of the Chimel standard, not a reformulation of that standard. “Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m],’” Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-775 (quoting Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694). “Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” Id. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 n. 3, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775 n. 3. Thus Chimel remains the controlling source of analytical principles.
In this case, a finding that the challenged search violates Chimel would not be inconsistent with the holding in Belton, Thus I disagree with the Court’s suggestion that accepting Belton would require supporting the validity of the search.
Under Chimel the area that the police can search incident to an arrest is that which is within the “immediate control” of the arrestee. In the context of an arrest involving occupants of a motor vehicle, Belton defines that physical area to include the *218passenger compartment. Accordingly, the Court in Belton held “that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775. Because Belton applies Chimel, and does not purport to alter Chimel, it in no way obviates the requirement that the searched area actually be within the immediate control of the arrestee.
In the context of an arrest associated with the use of a motor vehicle, when an arrestee remains near the vehicle, the entire passenger compartment is likely to be within the control of the arrestee. However, when an arrestee has been physically restrained, removed from proximity to the vehicle, and placed in the patrol car, typically the vehicle is no longer within the control of the arrestee. Further, under those circumstances, there is considerably less likelihood that the ensuing search will any longer be “a contemporaneous incident of the arrest.” Id at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775. That is because “control” is the defining dimension of the reasonableness of the search, and its application necessarily turns on particular facts.
The element of “control” as the factor determining the reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest is to be understood in the sense of the physical and temporal capacity of the arrestee in light of surrounding circumstances. That understanding is exemplified by Belton. There, a sole officer searched the stopped automobile. Even though the officer had advised the four suspects that they were “under arrest,” the suspects stood near the car while the officer searched it.
In contrast, the evidence in this case suggests that the search occurred after the arrest of the driver had been completed by his physical restraint and actual removal to the patrol car and, therefore, was not contemporaneous with the arrest of the driver, and that the area searched, the van, was no longer within the physical control of the arrestee. See State v. Barksdale, 224 N.J.Super. 404, 415-16, 540 A.2d 901 (App.Div.1988) (holding that *219ten minute delay between arrest and search rendered search not “contemporaneous incident of the arrest within the contemplation of Belton").
Some federal courts that have considered the issue have held that under Belton the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is valid, even where the arrestee is handcuffed in the patrol car during the search. See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968 (7th Cir.1988); U.S. v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868 (8th Cir.1985). The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a search could not be justified as incident to arrest where the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in the rear of a patrol car for more than thirty minutes prior to the search. U.S. v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (1987). The Vasey court held that during the time that “elapsed between the arrest and the warrantless search, the Belton Court’s fear of forcing officers to make split second legal decisions during the course of an arrest evaporated and took with it the right of the officers to enter the vehicle under the guise of a search incident to arrest.” Ibid.
Those courts holding that Belton applies even when an arrestee is restrained and removed from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle have based their decisions on the Belton Court’s desire to devise a rule that would provide a clear guide to law-enforcement conduct. Although I agree that Belton established a “bright line” by defining the passenger compartment of a vehicle to be within the “grabbable” area of a recent occupant of the vehicle, I am persuaded by the Belton Court’s stated intention not to alter Chimel that the concept of control must still have real meaning and be applied in light of surrounding circumstances. I believe that Belton’s requirement that the search be a “contemporaneous incident of the arrest” provides that meaning and must be interpreted consistent with the analytical construct established in Chimel Thus, a proper application of Belton requires a conclusion that the search in this case was not valid.
*220Moreover, this Court has endeavored to apply the standard of control as the operative factor in determining the reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest in the context of an arrest that involves the use of an automobile.
In State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 419 A.2d 1123 (1980), a majority of the Court rejected the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile as incident to an arrest for illegal gambling under the theory that the search was of an area not in the “immediate control” of the arrestee. That conclusion was grounded on the fact that the search had occurred while the arrestee was handcuffed in the patrol car. Because the arrestee was both restrained and removed, the Court concluded that the passenger compartment was no longer under the control of the arrestee. In State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981), we suggested that the result reached in Welsh appeared to be inconsistent with Belton. I now conclude that that suggestion was overstated. See generally David M. Silk, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 313 (1987) (urging that Belton be read and applied narrowly). Welsh invalidated the search of the vehicle, not because the vehicle represented a physical area that was too broad, but rather because that area was no longer within the control of the arrestee and the search was therefore not contemporaneous with the arrest. As the Court noted in Welsh, “the arrestee’s freedom of movement and the passage of time [are the] controlling factors.” 84 N.J. at 355, 419 A.2d 1123.
In Welsh no one disputed the reasonableness of the arrest. I expressed the view that the challenged search was incident to a lawful arrest and was thus undeniably constitutional. Id. at 356, 419 A.2d 1123 (Handler, J., dissenting). In fact, the arrest itself in terms of the confinement and removal of the defendant was not completed; put differently, the arrest, having been completed, was in effect “undone.” Following the defendant’s arrest and removal, the police, prompted by the presence of the defendant’s young child, freed him to drive his own car to the State Police barracks. *221Because the return of the defendant to his car would clearly restore the passenger compartment to his control, I found the search that was undertaken at that time to be valid under Chimel. Id. 84 N.J. at 358, 419 A.2d 1123.
Neither my reasoning in Welsh nor that of the Court foreclosed the conclusion that under other circumstances,, such as those in Belton, the entire passenger compartment might be amenable to a search incident to an arrest.
II
The Court maintains that it does not “reject [ ] the rationale of Chimel, but Belton’s automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all arrests for motor-vehicle offenses.” Ante at 211, 642 A.2d at 961. The Court cannot mean that all vehicular searches stemming from motor vehicle arrests are automatically validated under Belton regardless of circumstances. In fact, the Court correctly states that “in the event of an arrest for a traffic offense in which the arrestee remained in or adjacent to the vehicle, with the result that the vehicle was within the area of the arrestee’s ‘immediate control,’ [citation omitted], a contemporaneous search of the vehicle could be sustainable under Chimel.” Id. at 42.
Nevertheless, the Court elsewhere maintains that the rationale for Chimel is “less persuasive when offered to justify the need for a vehicular search following an arrest for a traffic offense.” Ante at 210, 642 A.2d at 960. I disagree with that assertion and its implication that the Chimel standard is not fully applicable to a search in the context of a motor vehicle arrest. The Court makes this statement despite its concession that “police officers are at risk whenever they make a vehicular stop, and that a significant percentage of assaults on police officers occur in the course of traffic stops.” Ibid. We have previously made clear the danger associated with all custodial arrests. “Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer____ There is no way for an officer to predict how a particular subject *222will react to arrest or the degree of the potential danger.” State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 231, 463 A.2d 320 (1983) (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 812, 817, 70 L.Ed.2d 778, 785 (1982)). “[W]e know from bitter experience that any arrest, regardless of the nature of the offense must be presumed to present a risk of danger to an officer.” Id. 94 N.J. at 233, 463 A.2d 320. See also State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 615, 637 A.2d 158 (1994) (“The safety concerns of a police officer unquestionably merit grave consideration.”). In fact, the offense committed in this case is a perfect example of a motor vehicle offense that is sufficiently serious to pose an unquestionable danger. See, e.g., Struck by a Suspended Driver, 3 in a Family Die, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1994 at Al, B2 (describing spate of incidents in which pedestrians were killed by drivers with multiple license suspensions); State Unable to Deal With Suspended Drivers, The Newark Star-Ledger, May 23, 1994 at 1, 20 (reporting that motorists who drive after having their licenses suspended are flouting law and endangering others); Scofflaw Kills, The Bergen Record, May 19,1994, at A1, A19 (reporting death of college professor ran over by man with record of five license suspensions).
The Court maintains that prior to Belton, it “did not sustain vehicular searches solely on the basis of arrests for motor vehicle violations.” Ante at 213, 642 A.2d at 962. For that proposition the Court quotes State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77, 232 A.2d 141 (1967): “Surely not every traffic violation will justify a search of every part of the vehicle.” I agree with that statement; however, when a traffic offense is serious enough for an officer to justify a custodial arrest of the driver, a Chimel search is supported. In fact, the Court in Boykins stated that “if an officer decides to take a traffic violator into custody rather than to issue a summons, he may search the occupants and the car for weapons if he reasonably believes it necessary for his own protection or to prevent an escape.” Ibid. Furthermore, Boykins was decided before Chimel and this Court adopted Chimel without limiting its application based on the type of arrest.
*223III
The Court’s ambivalence about the “persuasiveness” of Chimel in the context of arrests for motor vehicle violations concerns me. The Court discounts the potential risks associated with any custodial arrest.
Furthermore, I disagree with the Court’s perceived need to reject Belton. The search here was invalid, under both Belton and Chimel, for the straightforward and narrow reason that it was not a “contemporaneous” incident of the arrest and the passenger compartment was no longer within the “immediate control” of Grass once he had been physically restrained and removed and placed in the patrol car.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
HANDLER and GARIBALDI, JJ., concur in the result.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.
Opposed—None.