(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority today has created a new rule of law that erodes the right of citizens in Minnesota to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. I would proceed with a more cautious approach, apply our long-standing rule of law that a search and seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, and hold that when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed criminal vehicular operation, a blood sample may be taken without the suspect’s consent if the officer has a reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatens the destruction of evidence.
The charges in this case stem from an incident on May 8, 2006, at approximately 9:26 p.m., when the complaint alleges respondent Janet Sue Shriner was involved in an accident in the area of McAndrews Road and 141st Street in Burnsville, Minnesota. The complaint alleges that Shriner drove into oncoming traffic, hit another car head-on, and then continued driving, at times on the sidewalk. The driver of the other car was taken to the hospital with head and leg injuries.
Burnsville police were dispatched after the accident to find respondent. Respondent was finally stopped when a police car bumped her car and caused it to spin and go up onto a cement median. Respondent refused to get out of her car, and the police forcibly removed her from her car after breaking a window and opening the door. The police observed that respondent had bloodshot, glazed-over eyes, smelled of alcohol, and could not stand on her own. Respondent did not appear to be injured.
Respondent was arrested. She was then taken to a nearby hospital where her blood was drawn. The police did not ask for respondent’s consent to draw blood, did not give respondent an implied-consent advisory before ordering her blood drawn, and did not obtain a search warrant for the blood draw. The blood draw occurred approximately 45 minutes after the accident. Subsequent analysis of respondent’s blood showed a blood alcohol content of 0.33.
Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent with: (1) two alternative counts of first-degree driving while impaired, in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subds. 1(1) and 1(5) (2006), and 169A.24 (2006); (2) fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2006); (3) criminal vehicular operation, in violation of MinmStat. § 609.21, subd. 2b(4) (2006); (4) driving after license cancellation, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2006); (5) leaving the scene of an accident, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subds. 1 and 14(b) (2006); and (6) reckless driving, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.13, subd. 1 (2006).
Respondent filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the warrantless removal of her blood. The district court held a contested omnibus hearing on respondent’s motion on November 22, 2006. Respondent agreed that the police had probable cause to draw her blood, but she contended the withdrawal was unconstitutional because the police did not show exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure.
On January 16, 2007, the district court granted respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the blood draw. The district court ruled that the seizure was illegal because neither exi*551gent circumstances nor evidence that the officers might have reasonably believed that they were confronted with an emergency existed. The district court ordered the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless removal of respondent’s blood suppressed, and it dismissed the counts of driving while impaired based upon a blood-alcohol concentration of .08 or greater and criminal vehicular operation for lack of probable cause to proceed to trial.
In its appeal of the pretrial order by a prosecuting attorney, the State argued that the district court erred when it granted respondent’s motion to suppress. It contended that many cases of both this court and the court of appeals hold that the evanescent nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone supports a finding of exigent circumstances so that a warrantless blood draw is legal when the police have probable cause to believe a defendant violated the criminal vehicular operation statutes.
The court of appeals affirmed the suppression of the evidence obtained from respondent’s blood draw. State v. Shriner, 739 N.W.2d 432, 439-40 (Minn.App.2007). The court of appeals ruled that in order for a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, there must be probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 436. After discussing several opinions by this court,1 it found that “[a] careful review of our caselaw indicates that although there are comments which lend some support to the state’s position, none has expressly held that the presence of alcohol is a per se exigent circumstance sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw.” Id. at 437. After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions, the court of appeals decided that whether exigent circumstances exist must be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances, and that the question was whether “there are factors, together with the suspected presence of alcohol, that constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw.” Id. at 438. Such factors include the amount of time that has elapsed since the accident, the potential unavailability of the defendant once he or she is taken to the hospital for treatment, and the difficulty in obtaining a warrant. Id. at 436-37.
The court of appeals then examined the facts of the case and determined that exigent circumstances did not exist. Id. at 438-40. It noted the absence of other factors that would support a finding of exigent circumstances, such as respondent being injured, or the arresting officer having competing responsibilities because he or she was responsible for other injured people or the crime scene. Id. The court of appeals concluded that, “[bjased on a two-hour rule to establish guilt” under the DWI and criminal vehicular operations statute, “the question becomes whether a warrant could reasonably have been obtained within a timeframe that would not have compromised the test results.” Id. at 438. The court of appeals then noted that a warrant could have been obtained directly by the police from a judge over the telephone, and it cited a case where a telephone warrant was obtained at night in a little more than an hour. Id. at 439. Because the record was silent on the local warrant process and the State did not claim there is any difficulty in obtaining a nighttime or telephone warrant, the court of appeals was unwilling to assume that the time needed to obtain a warrant created exigent circumstances. Id. at 440.
*552On appeal to this court, the State argues that the law enforcement community has been operating under a “bright-line rule” that the dissipation of alcohol alone creates a sufficient exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement in criminal vehicular operation cases. Indeed, at oral argument, the State represented that law enforcement personnel in this state routinely take warrantless blood draws in criminal vehicular operation cases on the belief that they need make no showing that it is impractical to obtain a warrant. The State argues that the U.S. Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), announced a “single-factor” exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement, this “single-factor” exigency was subsequently incorporated into the doctrine justifying warrantless body searches in the case of Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), and this court subsequently adopted a single-factor test for warrantless blood draws in reliance on Schmerber and Cupp.
Shriner contends that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor this court has held that the dissipation of alcohol dispenses with the warrant requirement altogether. Shriner asserts that Schmerber did not categorically recognize blood-alcohol exigency. Rather, Shriner contends, Schmer-ber announced a more prudent rule of law that considers whether the facts of a particular case justify a warrantless blood draw.
The question, therefore, is whether the State is correct that Schmerber, Cupp, and this court’s precedent have already concluded that a single-factor exigency applies to warrantless blood draws. For the reasons set forth below, I would conclude that U.S. Supreme Court and Minnesota precedent do not answer the question in favor of the State and, moreover, the holding in Schmerber compels the conclusion that a totality of the circumstances test remains the appropriate test in this case.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons * ⅞ * agajnst unreasonable searches and seizures.” This right is guaranteed by the requirement that a police officer obtain a warrant based on probable cause from a neutral and detached magistrate. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable. Place, 462 U.S. at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637. There are a few well-recognized exceptions to the requirement of a warrant, one of which is the situation of exigent circumstances. See id.
In Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw to preserve evidence of the suspect’s blood-alcohol content. 384 U.S. at 766-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Considering the “special facts” that “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops,” id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, that the driver and passenger were injured and needed medical assistance, see id. at 758 n. 2, 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, that the officer needed to investigate the scene of the accident, id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, and that these last two tasks would take a considerable amount of time, see id., the Court determined the officer was reasonable in believing “he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence,’ ” id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964)). In concluding that the defendant’s Fourth and Four*553teenth Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures had not been violated, however, the Court made a point of considering all of the facts in the case:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the State’s minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (emphasis added). Schmerber clearly does not support a conclusion that a single-factor exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is available simply because of the “rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood.” Rather, Schmerber calls for an individualized determination, based on all the circumstances, of whatever exigent circumstances are present.
The majority asserts that “the Supreme Court has stated in subsequent decisions that its holding in Schmerber justifies a warrantless blood draw based on the imminent destruction of alcohol caused by the natural processes of the body,” citing decisions in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), and South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). The majority’s reliance on these two decisions to justify finding exigent circumstances based only on the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is entirely misplaced. In Skinner, the Court addressed the issue of whether the government’s need to monitor compliance with restrictions on certain railway employees’ use of alcohol and drugs justified warrantless blood and urine tests for all employees involved in an accident or other defined incident, without individualized suspicion. 489 U.S. at 609, 621, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The case was brought as a facial challenge to regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration, id. at 606, 109 S.Ct. 1402, and therefore what constitutes “exigent circumstances” was not at issue. The Skinner Court cited Schmerber for the propositions that alcohol is eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate and that blood and breath samples must therefore be taken as soon as possible after a triggering event. Id. Other circumstances contributed to the Skinner Court’s conclusion that the regulations were constitutional: the regulations narrowly defined the circumstances in which testing could be imposed on employees, id. at 622, 109 S.Ct. 1402; employees certainly knew well before any testing what these circumstances were, id.; private railroad supervisors would be setting the testing process in motion, and it would be unreasonable to impose “ ‘unwieldy warrant procedures’ ” upon persons who, unlike law enforcement, are not familiar with such procedures, id. at 623-24, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987)). This is not a single factor, but the totality of the particular circumstances.
In Neville, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “Schmerber * * * clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test” results from its analysis of Schmerber’s holding on the Fifth Amendment challenge to the blood test. 459 U.S. at 559, 103 S.Ct. 916. Neville rejected the claim that admission of evidence of refusal violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 564, 103 S.Ct. 916. Neville clearly did not hold that Schmerber was intended to create a single-factor exigency.
*554Nor does this court’s precedent. We have recognized two tests for exigent circumstances: “single factor exigent circumstances, and * * * ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn.1990). We have said that “imminent destruction or removal of evidence” is one of those single-factor situations. In re Welfare of D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Minn.1992); State v. Hummel, 488 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn.1992) (describing the single-factor test as “a situation in which a single matter, such as a fleeing felon or danger to persons or evidence, is highly compelling”); Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826). We have said in dicta that Schmerber “recognize[s] the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a driver where there is probable cause to believe the driver has violated a criminal vehicular operation law.” State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168, 173 n. 2 (Minn.2004).
The majority insists that if the single-factor test is met, we do not need to consider the totality of the circumstances. My disagreement with the majority is over whether the “single-factor” test for “imminent destruction or removal of evidence” can be met simply because alcohol dissipates in the bloodstream. Until today, this court has never abandoned the requirement that in invoking “imminent destruction or removal of evidence” as a single-factor exigency, the State must explain why the peace officer could reasonably believe that the evidence would “suddenly disappear[ ].” D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d at 791 (finding the State had “wholly failed to provide facts to support the existence of exigent circumstances under the ‘single factor’ test”). Focusing on the “loss of [blood-alcohol content] evidence with every passing minute from the time the accident occurred until the blood draw is taken,” the majority fails to accord any attention to the length of delay occasioned by fulfilling the warrant requirement. Yet it is the length of the delay that determines whether the evidence will disappear. The majority asserts that “it is undisputed that this loss of the most probative evidence of criminal vehicular operation occurs during the time it takes to obtain a warrant.” I disagree. A blood draw can never be obtained at the precise moment of the accident. As a result, in any case where blood-alcohol content evidence is crucial, an expert witness must extrapolate from the results of the test to determine what the blood-alcohol content was at the moment of the accident. Nothing in this record establishes that a blood draw taken 45 minutes after the accident, as it was in Shriner’s case, would be more probative than a blood draw taken 2 hours after the accident.
When addressing the constitutionality of taking blood samples without a warrant, this court has consistently taken into account all circumstances that inform the question of whether a peace officer could reasonably believe there was a risk of “imminent destruction or removal of evidence.” In State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978), this court concluded that blood alcohol evidence would have been lost not only because alcohol dissipates with the passage of time, but also because more than 4 hours had passed since the accident.2 In State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn.1988) where the warrantless entry into a suspect’s residence was at issue, the police officers’ objective belief that a blood-alcohol test was necessary constituted an exigent circumstance when 2 hours had elapsed between a fatal accident and the decision to enter the home, there was strong probable cause that the suspect was in the home *555and refused to answer repeated knocks on the door, and there was the “additional fact” that alcohol levels diminish soon after drinking stops. This court expressly limited its decision to the facts of the case. Id. at 61.
In State v. Speak, 339 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn.1983), where the issue was probable cause, this court noted that “[ejxigent circumstances were clearly present,” but did not discuss why. One hour and 10 minutes passed between the time the police were called to the scene of the accident and the time the breath test was administered. Id. at 742-43. In State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Minn.1996), this court upheld the warrantless entry into a suspect’s home to arrest him because there were two kinds of exigent circumstances: hot pursuit and imminent destruction of evidence. We found that “the need to preserve evidence of Paul’s blood alcohol level is a compelling exigent circumstance,” id. at 266 (emphasis added), but we did not conclude that exigent circumstances existed based only on the fact that “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops,” id. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted). In finding that evidence was at risk of destruction, we noted that the suspect’s blood-alcohol level “might have dissipated while a warrant was being obtained, or [he] might have drunk more alcohol, making a chemical test unreliable.” Id. We did not mention a single-factor exigent circumstance, but rather held that “an officer in hot pursuit of a person suspected of the serious offense of driving under the influence of alcohol may make a warrantless entry into the suspect’s home in order to effectuate an arrest.” Id. This court thus relied on the totality of the circumstances to support the conclusion that there was no time to get a warrant.
Other opinions of this court do not address what is necessary to find the single-factor exigent circumstance of imminent destruction of evidence. In State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Minn.1980), the issue was whether a blood sample taken because the officer had probable cause to believe a felony offense had been committed could be used as evidence when the State chose instead to prosecute the suspect for a misdemeanor offense. This court stated that the officer “knew that it was essential that he obtain the blood sample without delay and without regard to whether defendant would consent,” but the court did not explain what facts led to this conclusion. Id. at 82. In State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 380, 383 (Minn.1998), where the issue was what kind of probable cause was required, this court upheld the taking of a blood sample when the standard implied consent advisory was read to the suspect and he refused to submit to the test. There was no discussion of exigent circumstances. These cases are thus not helpful to deciding the issue here.
In Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn.1985), this court reviewed the civil revocation of a driver’s license under the implied consent law. The issue was whether the police officer had probable cause to require the driver to submit to a test. Id. at 278. This court did not address exigent circumstances, but simply stated that federal constitutional law permits a warrantless blood draw if there is probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the offense of DWI and the draw is necessary to preserve evidence. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-64, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (using analysis under Fifth Amendment to conclude that suspect’s refusal to consent to test was not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) (allowing a limited search under suspect’s fingernails as a search incident to *556arrest, necessary to preserve evanescent evidence); Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79). Tyler thus offers no help in discerning whether the simple fact that alcohol dissipates in the bloodstream constitutes exigent circumstances.
In conclusion, a review of our cases leads me to the conclusion that our case law does not support a holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol alone creates exigent circumstances justifying a war-rantless, nonconsensual blood draw. Rather, we have consistently applied a rule of law that requires a reasonable belief by the officer that there is not enough time to obtain a warrant. I would thus decline to adopt a per se rule.
The majority contends that the view urged by Shriner is “the minority view.” I strongly and respectfully disagree with this characterization of the holdings of other courts. In two of the cases cited by the majority in footnote 11, the presence of exigent circumstances was not at issue. See State v. Entrekin, 98 Hawai'i 221, 47 P.3d 336, 348 (2002) (the defendant did not dispute that exigent circumstances were present); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212-13 (1989) (the defendant argued probable cause and lack of conformity with Idaho’s implied consent statute). In cases where the exigent circumstances exception is not squarely at issue but addressed only briefly, I do not find the detailed reasoning necessary to conclude that a single-factor exigency exists. See State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 492-94 (Me.1985) (discussion of probable cause and exigent circumstances not separated).
Other cases cited by the majority in support of a bright-line rule are not on point. See United States v. Eagle, 498 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir.1991); State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 709 P.2d 1336, 1344-45 (1985); State v. Bohling, 173 Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (1993). The Codo court offered no reasoning for its interpretation of Sehmerber, and Codo differs factually from this case because the blood draw was initiated by a doctor for medical reasons, rather than by law enforcement. 709 P.2d at 1345. The Eagle court stated that “[ejxigent circumstances exist when there is a risk of destruction of evidence, including a risk that a defendant’s blood-alcohol content will dissipate because ‘the body functions to eliminate [alcohol] from the system.’ ” 498 F.3d at 892 (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826). But the court did not base its determination that exigent circumstances existed on the simple fact that alcohol dissipates in the bloodstream; it considered whether a warrant could be obtained before the evidence was destroyed or removed. Id. Specifically, the court noted that nearly 2-1/2 hours had already passed between the accident and the blood draw and concluded that further delay would have allowed “further dissipation of alcohol” and created a risk that the suspect would be unavailable for a blood draw upon the officer’s return. Id.
In Reid, where a breathalyzer test was at issue, the court took pains to explain that a telephonic search warrant does not eliminate the exigency because compliance with the rules for obtaining one takes time and “[t]ime is what is lacking in these circumstances.” 929 F.2d at 993. The finding of exigent circumstances thus depends not only on the dissipation of alcohol, but also on the fact that obtaining a warrant creates a delay long enough to destroy the evidence. The Reid court explicitly laid out three factors in holding that exigent circumstances were present: societal recognition of the government’s interest in protecting citizens from drunk drivers, necessity of prompt testing for alcohol in the bloodstream, and the fact *557that “[b]reathalyzer tests cause a lesser intrusion than blood tests.” Id. at 994. The Reid court’s conclusion does not inform our decision here, because its holding concerned breathalyzer tests rather than blood tests.
Only one other court that has directly addressed the precise issue before us has concluded that a per se exigency exists. In State v. Bohling, 173 Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (1993), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Schmerber must be read as creating a single-factor exigency, without explaining how such an interpretation was possible in the face of Schmerber’s admonition that its holding “in no way indicates that [the Constitution] permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions,” 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826. For this reason, I do not find the Bohling court’s reasoning persuasive.
One other state court directly addressing the precise issue in this case is persuasive on why this court should reject a per se exigency. State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007). In reading Schmerber, the Utah court pointed to three categories of “special facts” that combined to create an exigency, as well as to the Court’s emphasis on the “stringently limited conditions” under which a warrantless intrusion could be made into an individual’s body. Id. at 776. It refused to assume that unacceptable delay always accompanies efforts to obtain a warrant, pointing to the availability of technology to aid in more rapid procedures. Id. at 778. It expressed confidence in the ability of law enforcement officials and courts to request and issue warrants within a timeframe that ensures the preservation of evidence. Id. at 779.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently addressed the admission of test results from a warrantless blood draw, within the context of its implied consent statute, and rejected Bohling’s reasoning in favor of Rodriguez’s. State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa 2008). Interestingly, in both Rodriguez and Johnson, the court considered the totality of the circumstances and concluded that the warrantless blood draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 344-45; Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 782.
Based on my reading of Schmerber, of this court’s precedent, and of decisions from other courts, I would hold that an individual determination of whether exigent circumstances exist, based on the totality of the circumstances, must be made in each case. Like the Rodriguez court, I am confident that law enforcement and the courts in Minnesota are fully able to evaluate the circumstances and make these determinations without a per se exigency. I would not, as the majority suggests, require police officers to know with certainty how long it would take to obtain a warrant or when the suspect had his or her last drink. I would simply require that the officer be reasonable in his or her belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would result in destruction of the blood-alcohol evidence.
In this case, the police officer who stopped and arrested Shriner did not have the responsibility of investigating the accident or seeking medical attention for any injured person. Nor did Shriner herself need medical attention. The officer was not worried that Shriner would quickly “slip under the legal limit.” The accident occurred close to a hospital. The State presented no evidence of exigent circumstances other than the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream. Applying a “totality of the circumstances” test, I would affirm the district court’s suppression of Shriner’s blood test results.
. The court of appeals discussed State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168 (Minn.2004); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260 (Minn.1996); State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.1980); and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). Shriner, 739 N.W.2d at 436-37.
. The issue in the case was whether an arrest was necessary. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d at 72.