dissenting.
Appellant is a prisoner incarcerated at the Graterford Correctional Institution in Graterford, Pennsylvania. In June of 1982, the Commonwealth and Perkiomen Home-Vue, Inc. contracted for Perkiomen to install, maintain and sell cable television service to the prison. This agreement contained a list of the buildings to be wired for service which included all 1,942 cells at the prison.
Inmates were to subscribe to the service and were responsible for payment of the monthly charge. No change of the amount of the charge was permitted unless the company notified the Commonwealth one year in advance of its request to renegotiate the rate with the Commonwealth. Appellant is an inmate and subscriber to the service. Suburban Cable Television Company, Inc. is the successor to Perkiomen, and Daniel M. McMonigle is its manager. On November 10, 1989 the company gave notice to the users that a new price was effective on January 1,1990. There was no prior notice to the Commonwealth nor did it agree to the increase.
Appellant filed suit seeking an injunction and declaratory relief to prevent the increase. The trial court sustained Appellees’ Preliminary Objections finding that Appellant was not entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement between the Commonwealth and the Defendants. The Majority affirms; however, since I view the underlying agreement created benefits for persons situated as is Appellant, I must dissent.
The question simply put is — does the contract with the Commonwealth create a class of persons who are intended beneficiaries that can seek its enforcement? The Majority correctly states that the law in this area was substantially *147changed by the Supreme Court in Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983) when Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 was adopted. Previously, to be a third party beneficiary of a contract, both parties to the contract must have expressed the intention in the agreement that the promisor’s obligation was to that third party.
Given this change, the Supreme Court went further and in Scarpitti v. Weborg, 530 Pa. 366, 609 A.2d 147, 150 (1992) permitted the plaintiffs to enforce an agreement as “intended third party beneficiaries of the implied contract.” In so doing the court stated:
Accordingly, we hold that a party becomes a third party beneficiary only where both parties to the contract express an intention to benefit the third party in the contract itself, Spires [v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co.], supra [364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828], unless, the circumstances are so compelling that recognition of the beneficiary’s right is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties, and the performance satisfies an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. Guy [v. Liederbach], supra [501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744],
Applying that standard we can readily conclude that Appellant was not expressly mentioned in the contract. Nor does the performance of the agreement by the Appellees satisfy an obligation owed Appellants by the Commonwealth. However, I conclude that the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the promisee, (Commonwealth) intended to give the benefit of the promised performance, renegotiated rate increases, to the inmates.
We must keep in mind that Appellant entered into a separate contract for the cable service under the terms of the master agreement. The terms of that agreement were binding on the inmates and dictated how they would pay for their service and their responsibility for the equipment. The contract manifests an intention or the part of Appellee and the *148Commonwealth that it is the inmates who are intended to benefit from the installation of the cable service. Appellant, although not specifically mentioned by name, certainly falls within the class of persons who are intended to benefit from the contract, and who, by subscribing for the service, became a part of that class.
Nor do I agree that this is the type of government contract that precludes third party enforcement. Here the class of persons sought to be affected was determined by those persons contracting with the promisor, a contemplated event which was sought by the promisor. This is not a contract that provides in general for the public good, and therefore not subject to individual enforcement, or one that provides for a purely public purpose, such as road maintenance. Therefore, I dissent.