with whom LEVY, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 24] The Court is putting the cart before the horse. Better practice requires the motion for class certification to be heard before the motion for summary judgment. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion because McKinnon’s claim, to the extent it is based on his 2001 purchase, should not be characterized as speculative before the conclusion of discovery and before consideration of McKinnon’s motion for class certification.
[¶ 25] McKinnon is entitled to have the issue of antitrust injury and damages addressed by motion for class certification, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 23. Also, McKin-non is entitled to present his expert’s opinion that much of the proof of injury and damages is common to the class. If McKinnon’s expert can convince the trial court that common proof is sufficient, McKinnon’s lack of any receipt for his purchase may not impede his claim or his proposed status as representative of the class. McKinnon is entitled to make his best case to counter Honeywell’s contentions about injury and damages. Because discovery was not complete at the time of the summary judgment motion and because Honeywell did not assert all of the facts on summary judgment that would be addressed in the motion for class certification, McKinnon has been deprived of the opportunity to present a complete picture on the issues of injury and damages.
[¶ 26] By denying McKinnon a decision on his motion for class certification, the Court (1) deprives McKinnon of the chance to demonstrate that he can meet class certification requirements pursuant to the standards applicable to those requirements, and (2) needlessly burdens other potential class action representatives by requiring that they initiate a new lawsuit in order to vindicate their antitrust rights. I address each of these in turn.
[¶ 27] We have very little precedent on class action certification requirements. However, the First Circuit has urged district courts to use caution when considering a motion for summary judgment prior to a motion for class certification. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 299 n. 7 (1st Cir.2000). “Compliance with the Rule 23 prerequisites theoretically should not be tested by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or by a summary-judgment motion.” 7B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1798 (3d ed. 2005).
[¶ 28] In Brown, a class action involving alleged illegal stifling of competition in the automotive industry, the First Circuit encountered the same type of challenge that Honeywell raises: a dispute over whether an antitrust injury occurred and what proof can be offered to demonstrate injury and damages. 522 F.3d at 19. Although the First Circuit vacated the District Court’s orders granting class certification, it remanded the case for further evaluation of class certification issues pertaining to damages, id. at 9, 29-30, thus affirming that the motion for class certification is the appropriate procedural vehicle for addressing challenges to proof.
[¶ 29] A comparison of the Court’s decision on Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment with the First Circuit’s decision in Brown demonstrates why a summary judgment against McKinnon is premature. The facts in Brown are closely analogous *429to those alleged by McKinnon in that both cases involve indirect purchasers and challenges relating to proof of antitrust injury and damages. Id. at 17-23. The plaintiffs in Brown did not purchase directly from the defendant automotive manufacturers, but rather from dealerships, and for this reason are described as indirect purchasers. Id. at 8, 10. They allege that the manufacturers committed antitrust violations by blocking lower-priced imports from Canada, resulting in higher prices being passed through dealers to consumers. Id. at 8, 21-22. Likewise, McKinnon is an indirect purchaser who alleges that an antitrust violation by Honeywell resulted in higher prices for consumers. Under Maine law, indirect purchasers have the right to sue for antitrust injuries. 10 M.R.S. § 1104(1) (2008).
[¶ 30] McKinnon, like the plaintiffs in Brown, seeks class certification. Although McKinnon’s request for class certification is governed by M.R. Civ. P. 23, rather than the federal counterpart, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, applicable in Brown, these rules are virtually identical in all respects pertinent to this appeal.7 Thus, Brown is persuasive authority on the application of M.R. Civ. P. 23. See Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2000 ME 178, ¶ 11, 760 A.2d 250, 253-54.
[¶ 31] Any plaintiff seeking class certification must demonstrate that the claim, the class, and the plaintiff seeking to represent the class meet several requirements:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
M.R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23 sets forth additional requirements, including two pertinent to Honeywell’s challenge: questions of law or fact common to the class must predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action must be superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication. M.R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
[¶ 32] Brown demonstrates that when the putative class consists of indirect purchasers alleging supra-competitive prices, an evaluation of the proof offered of antitrust injury and damages is central to class certification. 522 F.3d at 18-23. Proof of injury and damages is more complex when plaintiffs are indirect purchasers because they need to demonstrate that illegally obtained higher prices were passed on, through an intermediary dealership or retail store, to them. Id. at 22, 27. In Brown, the crux of the dispute was whether an indirect purchaser, at the class certification stage, must produce evidence of antitrust injury to each member of the class, or whether a showing of injury could be met through evidence that is common to the class:
The real dispute revolved around whether common evidence could be used to prove the impact of the alleged conspiracy on U.S. consumers (“common impact”) and any resulting damages (“common proof of damages”).
Id. at 19. The First Circuit held that proof of antitrust injury may be determined by evidence that is common to the *430class, whereas the measure of damages may be determined by either common or individual proof:
To establish an antitrust claim, plaintiffs typically must prove (1) a violation of the antitrust laws, (2) an injury they suffered as a result of that violation, and (3) an estimated measure of damages. For a class action to be appropriate, “plaintiffs need to demonstrate that common issues prevail as to [both] the existence of a conspiracy and the fact of injury.” If these two elements are established by common proof, the measure of damages can sometimes be left to individual proof....
Id. at 19 n. 18 (citation omitted) (quoting Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir.2005)).
[¶ 33] McKinnon offers expert testimony that the price charged to consumers of circular thermostats can be calculated based on common proof. In Brown, the First Circuit held that common proof may be sufficient, at the class certification stage, to demonstrate consumer-level impact for each class member:
The plaintiffs might intend to use their damages model to prove both fact of damages and the measure of those damages. If so, the district court would need enough information to evaluate preliminarily whether the proposed model will be able to establish, without need for individual determinations for the many millions of potential class members, which consumers were impacted by the alleged antitrust violation and which were not.
Id. at 28. In order to recover under the Maine antitrust statute, 10 M.R.S. § 1104(1), and the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S. § 213(1) (2008), a plaintiff must have suffered a personal loss caused by the antitrust violation; injury is not presumed or inferred. Brown, 522 F.3d at 22. However, neither of these statutes requires a particular type of proof of loss, and neither statute precludes plaintiffs from offering common proof, provided it sufficiently demonstrates consumer-level injury to each member of the class.
[¶ 34] I express no opinion about the validity of the submissions by McKinnon’s expert or whether this evidence would withstand an eventual motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, McKinnon is entitled to have the expert’s opinion evaluated in accordance with the standards that apply to motions for class certification. See id. at 20-22.
[¶ 35] Even if McKinnon is not able to produce any further evidence of the price he paid, Honeywell has failed to meet its burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The Massachusetts Superi- or Court denied Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment on similar antitrust and unfair competition claims. Fagan v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 04-4903, at 1 (Ma.Super. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Nov. 21, 2006) (Garsh, J.). The court held: “Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ failure to have records of their purchases in their possession and their inability to recall, to the precise penny, what they paid for the thermostats, the plaintiffs’ representations during discovery combined with the opinions of their expert suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
[¶ 36] McKinnon testified in his deposition that he paid twenty-six or twenty-seven dollars for the thermostat, give or take five dollars. Thus, he has presented proof that the minimum he paid was twenty-one dollars. If McKinnon can piece this pricing testimony together with all of the other elements necessary to a successful antitrust claim, he may be entitled to recover. The measure of his damages would be the difference between the hypothetical *431price in a competitive market and the price McKinnon actually paid, assuming that no part of the higher price was absorbed by the retail store. McKinnon has presented sufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to damages. The current record provides no basis for granting a summary judgment to Honeywell.
[¶ 37] The summary judgment motion should not have been decided in advance of the motion for class certification. However, regardless of the order in which the court considered these motions, it should have permitted McKinnon’s counsel to substitute another plaintiff prior to making its final decision in the case. See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir.2008); Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir.1995). There is no reason to burden other potential class action representatives by requiring them to initiate a new lawsuit in order to vindicate their antitrust rights.
[¶ 38] For all of the above reasons, I dissent from Part B of the Court’s opinion. I concur in Part A of the Court’s opinion, which holds that the statute of limitations bars the claims that are based on the 1986 purchases. I would vacate the summary judgment as to the 2001 purchase and remand the case for consideration of the motion for class certification. I express no opinion regarding whether McKinnon’s motion for class certification should be granted or whether, at some later stage, Honeywell might be entitled to a summary judgment.
. There is one distinction worth noting, although it does not affect this appeal: M.R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) permits conditional orders of class certification, whereas Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) was revised to remove this option. Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 26 & n. 27 (1st Cir.2008).