specially concurring:
The State’s evidence at trial was more than sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the defendant had committed telephone harassment in violation of an order of protection. Rachel Block testified at trial that she had obtained an order of protection against the defendant, her former boyfriend, in January 2004 after he had physically assaulted her and threatened to kill her. This order of protection prohibited the defendant from having any contact with her. Notwithstanding this order, the defendant made several harassing phone calls to the victim. From this evidence, the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the crime with which he had been charged.
Due to the nature of the crime of telephone harassment, which often accompanies domestic violence, the legislature has authorized several possible sentences for the trial court to impose. These sentencing options include an order of protection. An order of protection is an important sentencing option to further protect the victim because it extends up to an additional two years beyond any sentence of periodic imprisonment or probation that the trial court imposes. 750 ILCS 60/ 220(b)(2)(iii) (West 2004). Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 364 days’ periodic imprisonment and 30 months’ probation, entered a no-contact order as a condition of his sentence, and entered an order of protection on behalf of the victim. Thus, the order of protection would continue to protect the victim well after the defendant’s term of probation had concluded.
Nonetheless, as the majority explains, the order of protection was invalid because the petition was not in writing and because it did not identify Block as the petitioner. See 750 ILCS 60/202(a)(3), 203(a) (West 2004). Taking into consideration the plain and ordinary language of the statute, this court cannot reach a different result. See Olsson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 374.
I write separately to encourage the legislature to reconsider the existing law because the requirement that the petition for an order of protection be in writing is unnecessary if such an order is entered following a criminal conviction after a trial. It is apparent that the legislature has required that the petition for an order of protection be in writing and be verified or accompanied by the petitioner’s affidavit so as to thwart false or malicious allegations by the petitioner. See 750 ILCS 60/203(a) (West 2004). However, such concerns are eliminated when the order of protection is entered following a trial where the victim testified and a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been established. Furthermore, the Act requires the State to prove the petitioner’s allegations only by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain an order of protection. See 750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2004). Here, at issue were not unproven allegations but rather proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed telephone harassment. This was not an ex parte hearing without notice. The defendant was afforded all the protections to which he was entitled. The victim should also be afforded greater protections to ensure that she is not abused or harassed by the defendant again.
In suggesting that the current law be amended, I note that the legislature is well aware of the trauma that domestic violence inflicts. See 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2004). The legislature has directed that the Act is to be liberally construed so that victims of domestic violence are not further abused. See 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2004). The legislature’s commitment to deterring domestic violence is demonstrated also by the numerous times it has amended the Act to strengthen the protections it affords the victims of this crime. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 60/214 (West 2004) (and the accompanying legislative history). As such, my comments herein are not intended to criticize the legislature’s past efforts to deter domestic violence, but rather to encourage the legislature to remedy a shortcoming in the law, evident by the facts of this case.
Finally, I note that it would not have been difficult for the State to comply with the statutory requirements and to ensure that the protective order entered against the defendant was valid. All that would have been required was for the State to either ask to reinstate the previous order of protection or file a petition in writing, identifying Block as the petitioner and requesting that an order of protection be entered on her behalf. Although the State may have acted inadvertently, it nevertheless did not zealously and diligently protect the victim in this case.