concurring.
The post-conviction court concluded that the erroneous advisement by counsel, which led to petitioner's belief that the minimum sentence for conviction on the two dealing counts was forty years, was irrelevant because the plea agreement called for the twenty-year sentence.
In my opinion, such conclusion does not address the question as to whether "but for" the belief that she faced a minimum of forty years, she would have agreed to the twenty year sentence. It does not address the question whether in that light Dillehay entered her plea "intelligently".
Although Dillehay was misadvised that the minimum term of incarceration possible was forty years, the fact remains that if convicted on both dealing counts the trial court could have, in its discretion, ordered the two twenty-year sentences to be served consecutively. The post-conviction court was justified in concluding that the misadvisement did not render her plea involuntary or unintelligent. Dillehay has not carried her burden to prove *962that the misadvisement was the motivating factor in her decision to plead guilty. For this reason I concur.