concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that count I of plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a cause of action under the equal protection clause of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Accordingly, I concur in that part of the majority opinion that upholds the trial court’s dismissal of that count. 174 Ill. 2d at 32-40.
However, the majority also concludes that count III of the complaint does not state a cause of action under the education article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1). I respectfully disagree. I conclude that count III does state a cause of action under the education article. Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the majority opinion that upholds the trial court’s dismissal of that count. 174 Ill. 2d at 10-32.
BACKGROUND
This case comes to this court on a motion to dismiss. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 1994). Therefore, we must determine whether plaintiffs’ second-amended complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, alleges sufficient facts to establish a cause of action on which relief may be granted. We must take as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs. See Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 46-47 (1991); Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 473 (1990).
The majority describes the gist of plaintiffs’ detailed second-amended complaint. 174 Ill. 2d at 8-10. Plaintiffs allege the following. The Illinois public school funding scheme creates vast disparities in educational resources and opportunity among Illinois school districts. The complaint quotes from the 1989 School Report Card, published by the Illinois State Board of Education, which stated as follows. Rich school districts employed a greater percentage of teachers with advanced degrees than poor districts. Rich school districts paid their teachers considerably higher salaries than poor districts. Also, more money was spent to educate students in rich school districts than in poor districts. In contrast, poor school districts, with significantly higher proportions of students from low-income families, had considerably fewer resources to help educate their children than rich districts.
I recount some of the complaint’s specific allegations to show clearly the factual basis of this lawsuit. For example, a poor school district reported that "it replaces its worn-out desks by retrieving from a dumpster perfectly functional desks thrown away by a neighboring school district.”
The complaint offers two neighboring school districts as "a concrete example of the consequences of differences in local property wealth.” Byron Community Unit School District No. 226 and Mount Morris Community Unit School District No. 261 are located in Ogle County, which lies in north central Illinois. Based on their respective property tax bases, schools in the Byron district receive significantly greater funding than schools in the Mount Morris district. "As a result of these large differences in school funding in the two districts, the children of Byron have far greater educational opportunity than the children of Mount Morris, with far less tax effort.”
For example, Byron offers a starting salary for new teachers of $22,800 per year; Mount Morris can afford to offer only $16,000. Byron High School offers 187 courses; Mount Morris’ high school offers only 113. Byron uses relatively new and current textbooks; Mount Morris uses textbooks that are 15 to 20 years old. Physical facilities at Byron are new and in good condition; Mount Morris lacks funds to remedy a $900,000 asbestos problem, repair leaky roofs, and replace flammable stage curtains and rotting football field bleachers.
Further, the disparities in educational resources and opportunity among Illinois school districts are some of the most severe in the nation. The complaint quotes from the 1989 Annual Report of the Illinois State Board of Education, which acknowledged that Illinois ranks sixth in the nation in educational funding disparities.
DISCUSSION
I note at the outset some general principles that the majority recognizes. 174 Ill. 2d at 12-13. A court presumes legislation to be constitutional. Based on this presumption, the party challenging particular legislation has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116,124 (1993); People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992).
The meaning of a constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who gave the constitution life by ratifying it. This understanding is best determined by referring to the common meaning of the words used (League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 243 (1987)), unless it is clearly evident that a contrary meaning was intended. Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 464 (1976). Where the text of the constitution is clear and unambiguous, the constitutional convention debates can have no bearing or effect on its interpretation. Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134; People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 311 (1922).
If ambiguities remain after consulting the language of the provision, it is then appropriate to consult the convention debates to ascertain the meaning that the delegates attached to the provision. This is so because it is only with the consent of the convention that the provision was submitted to the voters in the first place. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 243-44. Also, "[i]n construing the meaning of a constitutional provision, it is appropriate and helpful to examine it in light of the history and condition of the times, and the particular problem which the convention sought to address by incorporating in the document the questioned provision.” Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 75 Ill. 2d 208, 216 (1979).
Illinois Education Article
Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the public school funding scheme violates section 1 of the education article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution:
"§ 1. Goal — Free Schools
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1.
Plaintiffs focus on the first sentence of the second paragraph (hereafter the education system provision). Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the education system provision requires the state to provide an education system that is "efficient” and "high quality.” Plaintiffs allege that the Illinois public school funding scheme creates significant and growing disparities in educational services and resources throughout the state. According to plaintiffs, "[a]n educational funding system is not an 'efficient system’ when some children have vast educational resources and others minimal. An education funding system is not a 'system of high quality’ schools where only some children can go to them.”
While I agree with plaintiffs’ characterization of the "efficiency” aspect of the education system provision, I hereafter focus my remarks on its "high quality” aspect. Plaintiffs argue that the state provides an educational system in which students in poor school districts are relegated to an educational opportunity that is devoid of high quality and is dramatically inferior to that offered in rich school districts. Plaintiffs claim that these disparities are so severe that the state fails to provide children in poor school districts "an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.”
Jurisdiction
I initially address the issue of whether count III presents a justiciable issue, or whether it raises a nonjusticiable political question over which a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. When the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, they do not present a court with a justiciable controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 959, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1968). Absent a justiciable controversy, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1990). Agreeing with the State, the majority declares that the high quality aspect of the education system provision is not judicially enforceable. 174 Ill. 2d at 23-32.
I respectfully disagree. The following principles are fundamental:
"Under traditional constitutional theory, the basic 'sovereign’ power of the state resides in the legislature. From this it follows, again in theory, that there is no need to grant any power to the legislature. All that need be done is to place such limitations as are desired on the legislature’s otherwise unlimited power.” G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 111 (1969), cited in Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215.
Accordingly:
"limitations written into the Constitution are restrictions on legislative power and are enforceable by the courts. On the other hand, constitutional directives to the legislature are considered as mandates or commands to the legislature to act, and it is generally held that the courts are powerless to enforce them.” Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215.
To determine the judicial enforceability of the education system provision, I first review section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which stated:
"The general assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
Applying traditional constitutional theory to this section, this court consistently held that this section was a mandate to the legislature, requiring it to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools. The same section was held also to limit the power of the legislature, in that the section limited the purpose of the system of free schools to that of providing a good education to all the children of the state. People ex rel. Hepfer v. Price, 310 Ill. 66, 73 (1923); People ex rel. Goodell v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 286 Ill. 384, 390 (1918).
This court concluded that section 1 of the 1870 Constitution’s education article imposed only two judicially enforceable limitations on the legislature: that the schools were free, and that they were open to all without discrimination. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 30 (1948); Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 23 (1929). However, the question of the efficiency and fairness of the school system was solely for the legislature to answer. McLain v. Phelps, 409 Ill. 393, 398 (1951); Deatherage, 401 Ill. at 31.
This court expressly based this conclusion on the plain language of section 1 of the 1870 Constitution’s education article, which commanded the legislature specifically. In Fiedler, 335 Ill. at 23-24, this court cited examples from other constitutional directives in the 1870 Constitution that were addressed specifically either to the General Assembly or to the Governor. Referring to section 1 of the 1870 Constitution’s education article, the Fiedler court explained:
"The command of the constitution is addressed to the General Assembly alone. It was not a self-executing provision but required legislation to give it effect, and the responsibility and duty of providing the system and the means and agencies by which it should be made effective rest upon the General Assembly alone.” (Emphasis added.) Fiedler, 335 Ill. at 23.
In contrast, the education system provision in the 1970 Illinois Constitution is expressly addressed to the "State” generally, as opposed to section 1 of the 1870 Constitution’s education article, which was addressed to the "general assembly” specifically. I conclude that the education system provision in the 1970 Illinois Constitution is not a command addressed solely to the legislature, as was section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Constitution. Rather, the education system provision is a constitutional directive to the three branches of state government to fulfill their duties in accordance with their traditional roles under separation of powers principles. I base my conclusion on the plain language of the 1970 Constitution’s education article, which is supported by the record of the constitutional convention.
Initially, the plain language of the 1970 Illinois Constitution’s education article shows that the education system provision is addressed to the entire state government and not solely to the legislature. I earlier quoted section 1 of the current education article. The first paragraph of section 1 refers to education as a fundamental goal of "the People of the State." The sovereign power of the entire state government resides in the people of the state, who are vested with ultimate sovereignty. In other words, the people of the state are "the source of all governmental power — not only all legislative power but all executive power and all judicial power.” People ex rel. Thomson v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 65 (1931); accord Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 355 (1881); 81A C.J.S. States § 35 (1977); 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 81, 84 (8th ed. 1927).
It is correct and traditional to speak of the complete or unlimited power of the legislature, absent constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215; Locust Grove Cemetery Ass’n v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 138 (1959); Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 399 (1920); Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 105 Ill. 445, 450 (1882). However, it must be remembered that the people of the state, as the ultimate sovereign, vested such power in the legislature in the first place. Barnett, 344 Ill. at 66; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 306 (1883); accord 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 41, at 440 (1974); 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 175-77 (8th ed. 1927). Thus, I read the first paragraph of section 1 of the education article to declare that education is a fundamental goal of the entire state government.
The education system provision immediately follows, addressed simply to "The State.” Why would the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution use the words "The State” if they intended to refer solely to the General Assembly, as the 1870 Constitution had expressly done? If "the State” were read as referring solely to the legislature, those plain words would be rendered superfluous. However, courts do not presume the existence of surplusage in constitutional or statutory construction. The rule of construction that each word, clause, or sentence must be given some reasonable meaning, if possible, applies especially to constitutional interpretation. Coalition for Political Honesty, 65 Ill. 2d at 466 (and cases cited therein). The efficient system requirement, addressed to "The State,” plainly refers to the preceding "People of the State,” which, as I explained, refers to the entire state government.
I also note that the last sentence in the second paragraph of the education article refers specifically to the "General Assembly.” Thus, if the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution had intended the education system provision to command the legislature alone, they could have named the legislature specifically.
My analysis of the education system provision, based on the plain language of the education article, should properly end here. See Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134. However, the State contends that the convention record reveals the opposite conclusion.
I disagree. The plain language of the education article is supported by the record of the constitutional convention. The Education Committee originally drafted the education system provision to read: "To achieve this goal [educational development as the 'paramount goal’ of the people of the State], it shall be the duty of the State to provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” (Emphasis added.) 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 227, Committee Proposal No. 1 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings).
In presenting Committee Proposal No. 1 to the convention, committee member Samuel Patch repeatedly referred to the education system provision as a mandate to the "state.” 2 Proceedings 764-65. Further, in response to questions on the proposal, Patch specifically said that the "state” was mandated "to carry out this goal — therefore, we said the whole state, that is, the executive branch as well as the General Assembly.” (Emphasis added.) 2 Proceedings 766.
At the end of the debate, the phrase "the paramount goal” was replaced with the phrase "a fundamental goal.” 2 Proceedings 802-03. The proposed education article was sent to the Style, Drafting and Submission Committee (hereafter Style Committee). The Style Committee then modified the proposed education article as shown in pertinent part, with deleted language in brackets and added language underlined:
"A fundamental goal of the People of the State [shall be] is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
[To achieve this goal, it shall be the duty of] The State shall [to] provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” 6 Proceedings 331 (Style Committee Proposal No. 11).
On the convention floor, delegates questioned the Style Committee chairman on whether the deletions to the education system provision, as originally drafted, changed the meaning of the sentence. 5 Proceedings 4120. The chairman answered:
"We didn’t work a substantive change in it. If anything, I think we reaffirmed in a stronger manner by sentence 2, the intent of the [convention] on first reading.
Furthermore, sentence 2 follows sentence 1; the two are definitely interrelated. I don’t think reasonable people would differ about that ***,” 5 Proceedings 4121.
Thus, both the plain language of the education article and the convention record show that the education system provision is addressed to the entire state government and not solely to the legislature.
The State contends that the record of the constitutional convention clearly expresses the obvious intent of the framers that the education system provision is addressed solely to the legislature. The State cites several examples from the convention record.
The Education Committee originally drafted the first section, first paragraph of the education article to declare that education is the "paramount” goal of the people of the state. 6 Proceedings 227 (Committee Proposai No. 1). The State points to the many delegates who expressed their concern that such a constitutional commitment would remove legislative flexibility in addressing other important matters. 2 Proceedings 769, 793, 798-802.
The State also points to the Education Committee’s written explanation of the education system provision. The committee described it as a mandate. The committee noted that Illinois courts already used the concept of efficiency as a guide in validating school district boundary changes. The committee believed that it would be useful to continue this concept of efficiency and to add to it the idea of high quality. 6 Proceedings 234, Committee Proposal No. 1. During questioning on the convention floor, committee member Patch explained that the committee intended to reincorporate and maintain the continuity of case law on efficiency in the context of school district boundaries. 2 Proceedings 766. The State argues that this explanation clearly shows the obvious intent of the framers to continue this court’s interpretation of section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Constitution as judicially nonenforceable. .
The State also points to the Education Committee’s Proposal No. 2, which provided that "substantially all funds for the operational costs of the free public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of the local school districts,” and which limited local school taxes to 10% of the amount that a school district received from the legislature. 6 Proceedings 295, Committee Proposal No. 2. In Blase v. State, 55 Ill. 2d 94, 98-100 (1973), this court recounted the debate on this proposal and how it ultimately resulted in the third paragraph of section 1 of the education article. Based on the convention record, this court held that the paragraph was merely hortatory and did not impose a specific, legally enforceable funding obligation on the General Assembly.
These references to the constitutional convention record do not constitute such a clear expression of an obvious intent of the framers as to allow this court to ignore the unambiguous constitutional language. Of course, the convention delegates were sensitive to the need for legislative flexibility. The delegates did not intend to constitutionally mandate any particular public school funding scheme. They also wanted to maintain the continuity of case law on efficiency in the context of school district boundaries.
Nevertheless, the plain language of the education article, additionally supported by the convention record, shows that the education system provision is not limited to the legislature, as was section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Constitution. Rather, the education system provision is a restriction that is directed at the entire state government.
The entire state government consists not only of the executive and legislative departments, as Delegate Patch stated (2 Proceedings 766), but also the judicial department. People v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 367 Ill. 260, 273 (1937); Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 509 (1915); Dodge, 97 Ill. at 355.
Neither the plain language of the education article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution nor the convention record indicates that the framers intended to strip from the courts the power to determine whether the education system provision has been violated. Since the education system provision is addressed to the entire state government, and since the judiciary is a coordinate branch of state government, I would hold that the education system provision is judicially enforceable.
I acknowledge that this court reached a contrary conclusion in Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47, 58 (1976). The court in Cronin mechanically applied this court’s interpretation of the 1870 Constitution’s education article to the education system provision of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. See also Polich v. Chicago School Finance Authority, 79 Ill. 2d 188, 203-04 (1980); Board of Education, School District No. 150 v. Cronin, 51 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841-42 (1977). Such an application is erroneous. I would reverse Cronin on this point.
The majority concludes that the plain language of the education system provision, additionally supported by the convention record, "does not alter the roles or expand the powers assigned to the different branches of government by the constitution.” 174 Ill. 2d at 26-27. I agree that it does not. However, as I have explained, where section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Illinois Constitution excluded the judicial and executive departments, the education system provision in the 1970 Constitution embraces all three branches of state government, including the judiciary. This court stated long ago:
"To the judiciary is confided the power and the duty of interpreting the laws and the constitution whenever they are judicially presented for consideration. Hence it becomes our duty to determine what is the meaning of the laws passed by the legislature, and, also, whether those laws are such as the legislature was authorized by the constitution to pass.” People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 231 (1857).
Accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73-74 (1803).
Indeed, the judicial role of construing the constitution and determining if it has been violated is essential to our form of government. Accordingly, as the highest court of this state, it is the function and duty of the supreme court to act as the final arbiter of the Illinois Constitution. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm’n, 69 Ill. 2d 445, 458 (1977) (and cases cited therein); Billings, 19 Ill. at 232; accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 1062, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3106 (1974).
The majority fears "legislating” in the field of public education. 174 Ill. 2d at 27. The majority concludes that the issue of disparities in educational services and resources among school districts is a political question and, thus, nonjusticiable. 174 Ill. 2d at 27-29. Indeed, the majority would deny the judicial department of state government jurisdiction over this issue even if the judiciary gave great deference to the legislative and executive departments in defining and regulating educational quality. 174 Ill. 2d at 29-31.
Out of fear of entering a "political thicket” (see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556, 90 L. Ed. 1432, 1436, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 1201 (1946)), the majority completely abdicates its constitutional duty to interpret the Illinois Constitution. The doctrine at issue here "is one of 'political questions,’ not one of 'political cases.’ The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political’ exceeds constitutional authority.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 686, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710 (1962).
Of course, courts cannot exercise legislative powers or compel their proper action. Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 93 (1956); People ex rel. Huempfner v. Benson, 294 Ill. 236, 239 (1920). However, "the judiciary has always had the right and duty to review all legislative acts in the light of the provisions and limitations of our basic charter. The mere fact that political rights and questions are involved does not create immunity from judicial review.” Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93; accord Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 532, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 1978 (1969). This court has not hesitated to invalidate long-standing practices under statutes that offend the Illinois Constitution. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 95 (1955). It is the duty of the judiciary "to interpret laws and protect the rights of individuals against acts beyond the scope of legislative power.” Benson, 294 Ill. at 239.
The best example of a "political case” is one involving legislative apportionment. The 1970 Illinois Constitution confers upon the supreme court original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning redistricting the state legislature. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 3(b). The constitutional function of the supreme court "is to review what has been done by the body charged with that responsibility to determine if it has comported itself and discharged its responsibility in a lawful, legal manner. If it is determined that such has been done, that is the end of the matter.” People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 301 (1991) (Heiple, J., concurring).
In apportionment, this court’s "historic function does not give us the right to indirectly exercise the legislative function by striking down- a redistricting merely because we conceive that it might have been done better. The complicated considerations involved require careful study and a weighing of factors.” Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93. Rather, this court’s role is limited solely to determining whether or not the legislature complied with the constitution:
"The drawing of a reapportionment map is essentially a political and not a judicial process. It becomes judicial only if the parties who have the responsibility of drawing a map violate the law and produce a legally unacceptable map. A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally unacceptable. The courts must necessarily extend latitude to the political and governmental authorities in discharging their duties. Otherwise, the courts would become a political rather than a judicial institution.” (Emphasis in original.) Burris, 147 Ill. 2d at 302 (Heiple, J., concurring).
Although this court is appropriately sensitive to its limited role, it has never abandoned its constitutional function to determine solely whether or not the legislature has complied with the constitution. Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93; People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 462, 480 (1895).
As with a reapportionment map, I believe that the judiciary cannot strike down the Illinois public school funding scheme merely because it might have been done better. However, it is the constitutional function of this court to determine solely whether or not the Illinois public school funding scheme comports with the education system provision.
Giving great deference to the legislative and executive departments of state government, I believe that the education system provision establishes a constitutional floor regarding educational adequacy. That provision imposes a constitutional responsibility on the entire state government. It is the duty of the judicial department to adjudicate the nature of that responsibility. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 655 N.E.2d 661, 665, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1995).
Despite the stark disparities in educational resources and opportunity alleged in this record, the majority concludes that the subject of educational quality is so important that only the political departments of state government, and not the judiciary, may play a role in outlining its parameters. 174 Ill. 2d at 28-29. I believe, however, that education is too precious a commodity for the judiciary to permit such a constitutional violation.
A public school education is not "merely some governmental 'benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 801, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2396 (1982). Courts have repeatedly recognized that a public school education is vital in two ways. First, it prepares individuals for participation as citizens; its deprivation has a lasting impact on the life of the child. Second, it maintains our basic institutions and, indeed, preserves the values on which our society rests. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 801, 102 S. Ct. at 2396-97; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-78, 60 L. Ed. 2d 49, 56-57, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 1594-95 (1979) (and authorities cited therein).
Regarding the importance of a public school education on the individual citizen, the following has been recognized:
" 'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’ ” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 803, 102 S. Ct. at 2397-98, quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 98 L. Ed. 873, 880, 74 S. a. 686, 691 (1954).
Education also plays a "pivotal role *** in sustaining our political and cultural heritage” (Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 802, 102 S. a. at 2397):
"The 'American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.’ [Citation.] We have recognized 'the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government,’ [citation] and as the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society rests.’ [Citation.] '[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.’ [Citation.] *** In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 801-02,102 S. a. at 2397.
Despite the inestimable value of a public school education, the majority forever forecloses any judicial inquiry into whether the legislative and executive departments of our state government conform to the education system provision. Regardless of how abysmal educational resources and opportunity become in poor school districts, and how severe the disparities in educational quality grow among school districts, the judiciary is now powerless to enforce the constitution. I would hold that count III of plaintiffs’ complaint presents a justiciable issue.
Sufficiency of Count III
The appellate court read plaintiffs’ complaint as demanding equal educational resources and services among all school districts, and the same instruction in all schools. 267 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22.
However, it is important to identify what plaintiffs allege. Plaintiffs do not allege that the education system provision mandates equal funding among all school districts, or uniform instruction in all schools. Rather, plaintiffs contend that the state cannot provide a high quality education to some students, but not to others. Plaintiffs allege that the Illinois public school funding scheme creates significant disparities between the richest and poorest school districts in the quality of educational resources and services provided. Plaintiffs further allege that, due to these disparities, the state fails to provide students in poor school districts "an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1.
To the appellate court, plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege "that plaintiffs are being denied a minimally adequate education.” The court read the complaint as resting "not on the adequacy of education in a district, but on differences in benefits and opportunities offered from district to district.” 267 Ill. App. 3d at 21.
However, plaintiffs’ complaint clearly alleges that the disparities between rich and poor school districts cause children in poor school districts to receive an inferior education. Plaintiffs allege that educational resources and services in poor school districts are inferior not only in comparison to those provided in rich school districts, but are intrinsically so inferior and inadequate as to harm "[e]ach of the plaintiff school districts and each of the plaintiff schoolchildren” and to violate the education system provision.
Further, the appellate court appears to have rejected plaintiffs’ underlying correlation between educational resources and services and educational quality. The court concluded:
"To allege that certain educational resources are unavailable in poorer school districts, or inferior to those in wealthier districts, does not compel the conclusion that the funding provided by the State’s financing system is insufficient to provide an adequate education.” 267 Ill. App. 3d at 22.
I flatly reject such a conclusion. I presently accept the following propositions. A correlation exists between educational resources and educational quality or opportunity. Lesser educational resources, below a certain level, result in lower educational quality or opportunity. Conversely, the improvement of public education funding, up to a certain level, would correlatively improve educational quality and uniformity of opportunity. These propositions are widely recognized. See, e.g., Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 38 n.3, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363 n.3, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 n.3 (1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 637-38, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160-61 (1981); Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 129, 129-32 (1991); J. Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools 40-82, 236 (1991) (discussing, inter alia, disparities in educational funding, services, and resources, and corresponding disparities in educational quality, between Chicago public schools and suburban school districts); see generally C. Tesconi & E. Hurwitz, Education for Whom? The Question of Equal Educational Opportunity (1974).
Indeed, these propositions form the very premise upon which the Illinois public school funding scheme is based. The state’s supplementary aid is "designed to ameliorate in part the dollar disparities generated by a system of local taxation.” Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 481, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (1973); A. Schwartz, Illinois School Finance — A Primer, 56 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 831, 836-38 (1980). However, I acknowledge that these propositions are not universally accepted. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 48-49, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1302 (1973); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md. 597, 639, 458 A.2d 758, 780 (1983); Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982).
True, the mere allegation of lack of educational resources does not compel the conclusion that the public school funding scheme actually fails to provide an adequate education. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that count III is legally insufficient. It must be remembered that this case comes to us from the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the allegations that would entitle the party to relief. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 473; Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill. 2d 356, 360-61 (1984).
After carefully reviewing count III, I conclude that the complaint states a cause of action. I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of count III of plaintiffs’ complaint.
Available Relief
I would hold only that count III of plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action, emphasizing that this holding would not have been a final judgment on the merits. At trial, plaintiffs would have had the burden of presenting evidence to support their allegations. However, under the circumstances of this case, I believe that it is appropriate to note what relief I believe would have been available to plaintiffs. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 650, 376 A.2d 359, 375 (1977).
If the trial court had ultimately entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, then it would have been up to the legislative and executive departments of state government to recreate and reestablish a public school funfling scheme that would comply with the Illinois Constitution. The trial court could not have instructed the General Assembly to enact any specific legislation or to raise taxes. Likewise, the trial court could not have instructed the Governor how to implement or enforce any public school funding policy or plan. The trial court could not have retained jurisdiction of the case to enforce the court’s orders.
It is the duty of the judicial department of Illinois government only to determine what the Illinois Constitution requires. It is the duty of the legislative and executive departments to carry out that requirement. I am confident that they would have proceeded with their duty if they had been called to do so. See Bismarck Public School District No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 263 (N.D. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212, 214 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
CONCLUSION
The legislative and executive departments of Illinois government need such a call. As of this writing, it is questionable whether they have met their constitutional duty under the education system provision. According to one study, in the 1989-90 school year, only one state had a greater level of disparity than Illinois in resources available to elementary and secondary school districts. Research Note, Variations in Expenditures Per Pupil Within the States: Evidence From Census Data for 1989-90, 19 J. Educ. Fin. 358 (1994).
Unfortunately, by holding that the high quality aspect of the education system provision is nonjusticiable, the majority today abandons its responsibility to interpret the Illinois Constitution. The judiciary joins the legislative and executive departments in failing to fulfill our state government’s constitutional responsibility of providing for an efficient system of high quality public education.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court of Cook County as to count III. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that upholds the trial court’s dismissal of that count.