(dissenting). Early in tbe majority opinion it is pointed out what is not being decided. Tbe opinion then states,
“We are here concerned only with tbe propriety of tbe conviction of tbe individual defendants of tbe crime charged, under tbe circumstances hereinafter set forth.”
This is too simplistic. Inherent in the case is tbe basic question, can those charged with tbe responsibility of control of a public institution exercise that control?
Pacts in tbe record, but not in tbe majority opinion, which are pertinent are as follows: tbe presence and activities of defendants interfered with tbe operation of the booths of tbe Marine Corps and Michigan National Bank, and tbe latter’s representative asked someone in authority to correct tbe situation. Tbe defendants refused to leave because they were not shown a valid ordinance, they did not know who signed tbe order, and they were exercising' their right of free speech. Among tbe signs and leaflets in tbe possession of defendants was a box for contributions for “medical aid for tbe Yiet Cong”. One purpose of defendants was to embarrass the military forces of tbe United States.
*62The pertinent part of the trespass statute involved, CL 1948, § 750.552 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.820[1]) reads:
“* * * or any person being upon the land or premises of another, upon being notified to depart therefrom by the owner or occupant, the agent or servant of either, who without lawful authority neglects or refuses to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
The majority holds that the statute has no application because the gist of the order given defendants was,
“That they should remove their signs and materials from the building, but that they were welcome to be present and participate in the career carnival.”
This is sophistry. Read in contest with the events then occurring, the order told defendants to leave and why they were so ordered. The order was given by one authorized to give it, and it was a reasonable order under the circumstances. Defendants had no lawful authority to neglect or refuse to depart, and in my view, the statute is applicable.
It is true that there are factual differences between this case and People v. Weinberg (1967), 6 Mich App 345. Weinberg involved “sit-ins” on private property and here we have demonstrators on public property, but the basic issue is the same under the trespass statute involved in both cases, namely : after being asked to depart, does the record establish lawful authority to neglect or refuse to depart? On the facts of Weinberg this Court said no, and on the facts of Harrison, I say no.
It is unnecessary to discuss the conviction on count 2, since affirmance of the trial court on count 1 has the same result as affirmance on both counts.
*63The other issues raised by defendants on appeal have been considered and found to be so unsubstantiated as to require no discussion.
I vote to affirm.