dissenting: The Trial Court determined without exception that Kattar took title “subject to an equitable servitude in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the so-called ‘standard restrictions’ ” and that the “standard restrictions” were “binding upon and applicable to all the remaining land conveyed by the Melanson Estate to defendant” which was “subject to the implied equitable servitudes.”
Not only were no exceptions taken to these findings of the *430Trial Court, but they were correct. This is a classic case of an implied reciprocal servitude which is imposed by implication of law upon the developer and the remaining land. The conveyances were made in accordance with a general scheme, with reference to a plan, the same restrictions were included in forty-eight deeds, they were stated to be for the benefit of the remaining land, and representations were made that the same restrictions would be inserted in all deeds. There is no statement that the developer or the remaining land was not to be so restricted. Under these circumstances, the restrictions became mutual and binding on all the remaining land and enforceable against the developer and his grantees and not just among lot owners inter se. Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227; Lanski v. Montealegre, 361 Mich. 44; Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S. C. 512; Rieger v. Wessel, 319 S. W. 2d 855 (Ky. App.); Mienner v. Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180. See Annots. 60 A. L. R. 1216; 144 A. L. R. 916; 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, s. 173, et seq.
The statements in the deeds that the restrictions were to be kept for the grantor and succeeding owners of “any and all portions of . . . Castle Shores which lie within 1,000 feet” and the representations to purchasers that identical restrictions would be inserted in all deeds, rather than showing that the restrictions did not apply to the developer, form an important basis for the imposition of implied reciprocal servitudes and under some cases are an indispensable ingredient. This is a fair rule which was designed to prevent the very kind of injustice to purchasers in such developments as is now being upheld.
It is my opinion that the admissible evidence in this case supported, if indeed it did not require, the above findings of the Trial Court and that the “standard restrictions” properly interpreted determine the rights and obligations of the parties. Their meaning, like the meaning of all written instruments, is ultimately for this Court, so that a finding by the Trial Court may be disregarded. Hogan v. Lebel, 95 N. H. 95; Smart v. Hernandez, 95 N. H. 492; Murray v. Peabody, 106 N. H. 319; Kennett Corporation v. Pondwood Co., 108 N. H. 30.
Under these restrictions the land conveyed and the land retained by the grantor could be used for “residential purposes only and the usual and natural uses in connection therewith.” This language is not ambiguous and therefore its meaning is not to *431be determined by resort to parol evidence. See Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N. H. 149, 158. In fact the words “residential purposes only” are themselves such plain and ordinary words that it is difficult to give them a definition which is more expressive of their meaning than the words themselves. “Residential purposes” means for the purpose of an abode. The word “only” means “only”. It means to the exclusion of all else. Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879. While the “usual and natural uses in connection therewith” are permitted, the use of the conjunctive word “and” indicates that these uses are permitted only in conjunction with a residential use of each lot. It is also clear that the lots were to be used only for single-family dwellings with a bona fide guest house “in connection therewith.”
Neither a community beach, picnic area, parking lot, nor a wharf is a residence and the use of any of the waterfront lots for any or all of these purposes necessarily prevents these lots from being used for residential purposes. Klapproth v. Grininger, 162 Minn. 488; Braes Manor Civic Club v. Mitchell, (Texas App.) 368 S. W. 2d 860. The use of certain of the shore lots by large numbers of people would be at odds with the obvious intention to restrict the lots to use by one family and their guests so as to prevent “too dense a population.” Gillis v. Bailey, supra, 157.
Whether the Court is saying that when the Trial Court made the finding that the restrictions applied to Kattar and the remaining land, he didn’t really mean it, or that he meant it but made it because he thought the restrictions would not prevent the uses in question and that therefore his finding of applicability should be limited to his construction of the restrictions, or that he was wrong in making the finding of applicability, I will not attempt to say. All are unacceptable to me, however. The Trial Court’s well-worded findings give clear evidence to me that he did not improperly make his findings of applicability dependent upon his construction of the restrictions, but radier that he found them applicable but misconstrued them. This is evident from such statements as that the questioned uses are “not commercial or public” and that they would be “appurtenant to lots” in the development. It is also apparent that he improperly considered his view of what was equitable in construing tire restrictions.
Neither we nor the Trial Court have a right to modify the *432restrictions in accordance with our view of what is equitable. In any event, there is nothing inequitable about denying owners of back lots access to the lake in violation of the rights of the front lot owners. They all had knowledge of the restrictions and plaintiffs’ claim when they purchased then lots. My heart goes out, however, to the owners of the front lots who have invested their money in reliance on the shorefront being restricted to residential purposes only but who now will find themselves adjacent to what for all practical purposes is a public beach and playground if people occupying 600 acres of individual lots and their guests are funnelled into these areas.
The granting to purchasers of shore lots the right to use roads through the back land to get to the highway cannot be construed, as the Trial Court did, as an exclusion of any of the shore lots from the standard restrictions or the reservation of tire right to create a means of access to the lake.
The Trial Court admitted evidence relating to the meaning of the word “Reserved” opposite some of the lots on the “price lists” but found this evidence to be “doubtful at best” and found that “no clear or concise understanding existed between the plaintiffs and the original developer as to the meaning of‘Reserved. ’ ” He then ruled that the burden as to the meaning of this word and the planned use of those areas was on the plaintiffs. I do not agree. The developer created the reciprocal restrictions. If any of the land in the development was to be excluded from these restrictions, the obligation was on him to set forth these exceptions in clear and unequivocal language. If the words he chooses are ambiguous so that their meaning cannot be clearly determined, they should be construed “to the disadvantage” of the person using them. Smart v. Huckins, 82 N. H. 342; Pettee v. Chapter, 86 N. H. 419, 429-430.
In addition, the Trial Court admitted a substantial amount of evidence relating to the intention of Melanson with respect to his plans for the development of the back land. This took the form of alleged statements to his son and others and notes made for him by his wife when he was ill. Since these alleged statements were neither in the presence of nor communicated to the plaintiffs, they were inadmissible to show that the standard restrictions did not apply with full force to all portions of the land in the development. Smart v. Huckins, 82 N. H. 343, 347; Pettee v. Chapter, 86 N. H. 419; Barclay v. Dublin lake Club, 89 N. H. 87.
*433The court does not deny that this evidence was improperly admitted, but decides that the Trial Court did not rely upon it in making his findings to which exceptions were taken, although he did not so state and although the court itself relies upon some of this evidence in upholding the Trial Court.
While I would decide the case here and now adversely to the defendant, I think there should at very least be a new trial.