Defendant, Jerry LaPine, was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of taking indecent liberties with a child (MCLA 750.336; MSA 28.568) and sentenced to from 2-1/2 to 10 years in prison. He now appeals, upon leave granted, presenting several issues for our consideration. We find it necessary to discuss only one, the others being without merit.
On November 19, 1971 defendant was charged with statutory rape in violation of MCLA 750.520; MSA 28.788. On April 27, 1972 an amended information was filed which contained the added count of taking indecent liberties. Defendant pled guilty to the added count on May 1, 1972 and he was subsequently sentenced to serve 2-1/2 to 10 years in prison. Defendant appealed to this Court challenging the propriety of the sentencing procedure employed by the trial court and another panel of *347this Court, one judge dissenting, found no error in the sentencing procedure and affirmed. People v LaPine, 47 Mich App 553; 209 NW2d 726 (1973). Shortly thereafter, in what appears to have been a separate case completely unrelated to the facts at bar, defendant’s plea-based conviction on another charge was reversed by this Court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v LaPine, # 16112. Following the reversal of the above conviction, defendant’s motion for resentencing was granted and a different judge sentenced defendant to an identical 2-1/2 to 10 years in prison.
Before resentencing occurred, however, defendant filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea, a delayed motion for a new trial, and a motion to quash the complaint, warrant and information against him. These motions were heard by the original trial judge after defendant was resentenced and the motions were denied. Defendant thereupon filed an application for delayed appeal in this Court which was granted by a different panel of this Court on May 31, 1974.
Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because the attorney who was appointed to represent him. at trial was also serving as an assistant prosecutor, pursuant to the provisions of MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801,1 during the time he was representing defendant.
An assistant prosecuting attorney appointed pursuant to MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 is subject to the same legal disqualifications and disabilities as the prosecuting attorney, MCLA 49.42; MSA 5.802, *348including that contained in MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271, to wit:
"It shall be unlawful for any prosecuting attorney of this state to defend or assist in the defense of any person charged with crime within the county of which he is prosecuting attorney.”
MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271 was violated in the case at bar. However, we do not believe that violation of the statute should inure to the benefit of the defendant where no prejudice has been shown.
In this case, none of the actions of defense counsel, while he was performing the duties of acting prosecutor, involved matters pertaining to defendant’s case. At the hearing on defense counsel’s' alleged misconduct, the defendant utterly failed to demonstrate any prejudice to himself.
Furthermore, defense counsel testified at that hearing that he revealed his appointment to defendant in a conversation with him and defendant raised no objection. Although defendant contested this version of the episode and contended that defense counsel had merely shown him the letter of appointment, without further conversation, it is uncontested that defendant had notice of defense counsel’s appointment prior to trial and raised no objection to it.
Therefore, we adopt the héaring judge’s findings:
"The testimony shows — defendant’s own testimony, that he was specifically informed of this fact by his counsel. He was given the letter of appointment to read. He made no objection to it at that time. The testimony further shows that the acts as prosecutor had absolutely nothing to do with this case, and that Mr. Denney was acting only during the absence of Mr. Elliott. The fact that he may have acted as special prosecutor *349for these special instances and events completely unconnected here, the court does not see that that in any way taints these proceedings, especially when the defendant was advised of it from the very beginning.”
While the actions of defense counsel in similar cases should be avoided, we see no reason to reverse defendant’s conviction where he has not been prejudiced. Affirmed.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 provides: "The prosecuting attorney of any county is hereby authorized and empowered to appoint an assistant prosecuting attorney, by and with the consent of the circuit judge of the judicial circuit in which such county may be situated, which appointment shall be in' writing and filed with the clerk of his county.”