Petition of Giblin

Scott, Justice

(dissenting).

The majority opinion relies upon the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in remanding the question of jurisdiction to the district court. While this reliance is wholly proper, it does not necessitate remanding the matter to the district court. I must dissent and would make the alternative writ of prohibition absolute.

The prefatory note to the Uniform Act specifically states that its purpose is to use the “orderly processes of the law * * * to bring about a fair measure of interstate stability in custody awards.”1 The record before us indicates that petitioner sought in the Illinois court modification of extant Illinois custody provi*527sions, which had been included in the divorce decree entered September 10, 1971, and modified by the March 1972 order permitting respondent to remove the children to Minnesota. The children were present in- Illinois at this time pursuant to an agreement.

The respondent and her Illinois counsel stipulated to the Ilinois court’s order of July 1, 1974, which essentially granted temporary custody to the petitioner. Further, by way of general appearance, the respondent submitted to and did not challenge the power of the Illinois court to exercise custody jurisdiction. A final hearing was scheduled for August 12, 1974, following investigations ordered by the court to aid the court in ultimately determining the custody question. Subsequent proceedings in the Illinois court resulted in the August 1974 order which placed permanent custody in the petitioner.

There have been no challenges here to the adequacy, fairness, or competence of the Illinois court in its conduct of the custody hearings. Rather, all challenges are couched in terms of the lack of jurisdiction. In accordance with the stated purpose of the Uniform Act, and in view also of the general appearance of respondent and her failure to raise the jurisdictional question before the Illinois court, I would order that the alternative writ of prohibition be made absolute upon the basis that this court as a matter of comity will recognize the order of the court of a sister state which has undertaken to act in determining custody. Such a decision would be consistent with the general purpose of serving the best interests of the children, would avoid duplicitous actions in an interstate custody dispute, and would lend credence to our oft-stated humane purpose in this field of seemingly never-ending litigation.

9 U. L. A. pp. 99, 101.