(dissenting).
Although I agree that the trial court properly admitted the depositions and that we should adhere to our decision in In Re Swensons Estate, 57 S.D. 90, 230 N.W. 884, I do not agree that the judgment should be reversed.
The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that testatrix intentionally omitted to provide for Carolyn Schalk, whether we apply the clear and convincing evidence test, of which nothing is said in In Re Swenson’s Estate, supra, nor to which is the decision in Mahan v. Mahan, 80 S.D. 211, 121 N.W.2d 367, applicable, or the preponderance of the evidence test. The testimony of attorney Ross is clear and unequivocal: testatrix wanted to leave everything to Loelleta Dickinson. This testimony confirms the provisions of the will.
I am unable to find in the record any evidence that testatrix was in a very distraught and weakened condition on the day she conferred with attorney Ross about the terms of her proposed will or on the day she signed the will. Attorney Ross testified that when he first met testatrix at the conference to discuss the terms of her will she was perfectly lucid and was in possession of her mental faculties. Indeed, he testified that, “For an 85 year old woman, I thought she was remarkably well, if I can use the word, preserved * * * she impressed me by being able to get around for a person of that age quite well * *
A statement by testatrix in her will to the effect that, “I intentionally omit to provide in this my last will and testament *273for Carolyn Schalk, daughter of my deceased daughter, Ruthina Schoun,” would have satisfied the requirements of SDCL 29-6-10; no reason for the omission would have been necessary. Why should we require a reason for the omission so long as the evidence aliunde the will demonstrates, as it does to me, that testatrix intended not to provide for Carolyn?
I would affirm the judgment.