(dissenting). The court of appeals concluded that the state narcotics enforcement special agent who represented the State in the John Doe proceeding by questioning the defendant (who was a witness at the John Doe proceeding) was practicing law without a *234license, a criminal offense.1 Indeed, the special agent was both an advocate and witness in the proceeding. The court of appeals further concluded that the appropriate remedy was, to exclude the information obtained by the State's unauthorized practice of law if the defendant is retried.
¶ 43. I am persuaded by the reasoning and conclusions of the court of appeals.2 The special agent was not a lawyer and falls under none of the authorized exceptions for the practice of law by non-lawyers. The defendant was never charged for drug offenses, which were the subject of the John Doe proceeding, and the special agent's unlawful practice of law yielded the perjury charge against the defendant. Wisconsin courts should not be partners to the unlawful practice of law in a criminal case.
¶ 44. Although not presenting precisely the same facts as those here, several cases are sufficiently similar to support the reasoning and conclusions of the court of appeals in the present case.
¶ 45. In State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W 441 (1892), a Minnesota attorney, not licensed in Wisconsin, assisted the district attorney in the prosecution of a criminal case. The Minnesota attorney was appointed by the Wisconsin district attorney and was competent. The court declared, as it has in numerous cases there*235after,3 that the district attorney is a constitutional officer in Wisconsin, a "quasi judicial officer," an attorney with special responsibilities and powers, and no attorney or non-attorney can substitute for the district attorney unless authorized by statute.4 A person not licensed to practice law in this state is not considered an attorney in Wisconsin. The Russell court held that the error of having a Minnesota attorney replace the district attorney was material and prejudicial and that the conviction must be reversed.
¶ 46. In Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888), and State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 218 N.W. 367 (1928), private counsel licensed to practice in Wisconsin assisted the district attorney in prosecuting the respective criminal cases, either before or during trial.5 In both cases, the court concluded that "public policy, and the fair, just, and impartial administration of the criminal law of the state, make it the duty of the courts to exclude the paid attorneys of private persons from appearing as prosecutors."6 The convictions in both cases were reversed.
¶ 47. The Russell, Biemel, and Peterson cases stand for the proposition that when someone other than *236a district attorney (or a person authorized by statute) exercises the functions of a district attorney, the criminal proceedings are void. In the present case, the special agent who acted as counsel at the John Doe proceeding was neither an attorney, nor the district attorney, nor a person identified by statute or case law as authorized to substitute for a district attorney. Relying on the Russell, Biemel, and Peterson cases, I conclude that this conviction based on a non-attorney substituting for the district attorney cannot stand.
¶ 48. I write separately to also point out that various cases relating to the unauthorized practice of law do not seem to be readily reconcilable. In civil cases, even though a non-lawyer engages in the unauthorized practice of law, the civil judgment apparently is not void.7 Yet in Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., *237209 Wis. 2d 187, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997), this court ruled that a notice of appeal in a civil case signed by a non-lawyer on behalf of a corporation is void, and the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18, 250 Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715, this court dismissed a civil complaint with prejudice, throwing a case out of court, because the summons and complaint were signed by an attorney licensed in Minnesota on behalf of an attorney licensed in Wisconsin.
¶ 49. Jadair, Schaefer, and the present case seem incongruent. In Schaefer and Jadair, the court is unforgiving when a non-Wisconsin lawyer signs preliminary documents on behalf of a client. The result in those cases: final dismissal of a case and of an appeal. In the present case, this court imposes no sanction when, in a Wisconsin courtroom, a non-lawyer is permitted to perform the functions of a district attorney at the behest of the State. The effect of the unauthorized practice of law on the outcome of civil and criminal proceedings is apparently a work in progress by this court — and from my perspective, needs more work and more progress.
¶ 50. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
Wis. Stat. § 757.30 (1999-2000) (every person practicing law without a license shall he fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year in the county jail or both, and in addition may be punished as for contempt).
State v. Noble, 2001 WI App 145, 246 Wis. 2d 533, 629 N.W.2d 317.
See, e.g., County of Kenosha v. C&S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 400, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999); State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 531 n.9, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981), and cases cited therein.
State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 334, 53 N.W 441 (1892).
In Schedlberger v. State, 204 Wis. 235, 235 N.W 419 (1931), this court held that no error occurred when nothing in the record demonstrated that the Chicago attorney rendered any material aid to the district attorney in preparing the case for trial or that the Chicago attorney was present at the trial.
State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 356-57, 218 N.W 367 (1928), quoting Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 446, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
*236In Peterson a private attorney who was paid by private persons summoned prospective witnesses, questioned them, and prepared memoranda for the district attorney's use at trial. Peterson, 195 Wis. at 354.
See, e.g., Littleton v. Langlois, 37 Wis. 2d 360, 364, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967) (plaintiffs wife appeared as witness, not advocate, during litigation, and even if her appearance constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the judgment would not be void); In re McManus, 13 Wis. 2d 228, 233-34, 108 N.W.2d 648 (1961) (statute making unauthorized practice of law illegal does not make acts complained of void and appearance by lay employee of collection agency on behalf of plaintiff in suit commenced by collection agency does not strip court of jurisdiction, even if such appearance amounted to the unauthorized practice of law).
A John Doe proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986). A John Doe proceeding is, however, intimately related to a criminal prosecution.