concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the holding of the majority which affirms the trial court's determina*298tion that Laura is liable for the damage to Wendy's car. I respectfully dissent, however, from the affirmance as to the damages awarded. My view diverges from that of the majority in several particulars.
First, and perhaps foremost, I disagree with the majority's placement upon defendant of the burden to disprove what is termed a "prima facie" showing by plaintiff of the recoverable damages. This prima facie burden is deemed carried by mere proof of the cost of repair as evidenced by an estimate of repair.
My disagreement is drawn from the unambiguous language of Wiese-GMC, Inc. v. Wells (1993) Ind.App., 626 N.E.2d 595, trans. denied, as quoted by the majority. This language clearly includes the element of fair market value before the accident as part of the initial burden of proof of damages. This burden clearly falls upon plaintiff.
Placing the burden upon plaintiff does not render redundant the First and Third options set forth in Wiese. The First option, as noted by the majority, does require a reflection of the reduction in fair market value. However, that reduction must be established by proof of two separate values, le., the value before and the value after the accident. The Second option, utilized here, requires only proof of the value before the accident, in conjunction, of course, with the cost of repair.
The Third option is somewhat similar to the Second in that it utilizes the cost of repair factor but also engrafts the First option requirement for proof of the value before and after and is applicable only where the Second option is not applicable, i.e., where repair will not restore the property to the pre-accident value.
Although, as observed by the majority, the Wiese decision stated, somewhat gratuitously, that the decision of Hann v. State (1983) Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 1144 "had essentially adopted" the Restatement measure of damages, such conclusion was not, and is not, warranted. To the extent that Hann, which did not cite the Restatement even by analogy, reflects some of the Restatement concepts, it certainly did not adopt Restatement § 928 as the law of Indiana.
The Restatement test as enunciated by the majority here, does seem to permit damages to be awarded solely by proof of cost of repair, arguably placing upon defendant the burden to seek "due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs ..." Rz. STATEMENT (SEconp) or Torts (1977) § 928. However, there is a caveat to application of this measure of damages in that it is to be used only "in an appropriate case." Id. It may well be that this Restatement approach "in an appropriate case" roughly equates to our Third option which is only applicable where repair will not restore the property to the pre-accident value. Be that as it may, it does not even roughly equate to our Second option as here applied.
Wiese must be read in light of Hann, upon which it relies. Han» clearly requires the plaintiff, when utilizing the cost of repair, to additionally prove that such cost bears a "reasonable relationship to the difference between the fair market value of the property just before and just after the traumatic event." 447 N.E.2d at 1147. I fail to see how this relationship might be shown without proof of the before and after values.
Be that as it may,; the Second option, with which we are here concerned, requires proof that the cost of repairs will restore the property to its fair market value before the causative event. Once again I fail to see how that burden could be carried without establishment of the before value.
Here, the record reveals that there was a lack of evidence before the trial court concerning the pre-accident fair market value of Wendy's car. Without some evidence of the fair market value of the car, the trial court had no basis upon which to *299properly determine the amount of damages, and the awarded amount could have improperly granted Wendy a windfall. See Wiese-GMC, supra, 626 N.E.2d at 597.
While it must be acknowledged that, in small claims actions, "[t]he trial shall be informal ... and shall not be bound by the statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence...." S.C.R. 8(A), justice still must be dispensed "according to the rules of substantive law." S.C.R. 8(A). See also Robinson v. Valladares (2000) Ind.App., 738 N.E.2d 278, 281, applying I.C. 83-5-2-5. The rule requiring evidence of fair market value is properly considered a rule of substantive law which must be followed to prevent an injured party from being placed in a better position than before the damage occurred. Therefore, Laura has established prima facie error by the trial court regarding the determination of damages.1
Whether the rule as to the proper measure of damages is, as I believe it to be, a rule of substantive law, or is a rule of evidence as indicated by the majority, the rule here enunciated by the majority is contrary to the existing substantive law.
Although I agree that, at least in a small claims setting, the new rule has much to recommend it both as to fairness and ease of application,2 such change should come about through our Supreme Court, whether by amendment of the Small Claims Rules or by judicial decision.
. The fact that the small claims process contemplates litigation between lay parties without representation by attorneys does not authorize this courl to ignore controlling principles of substantive law. This is so even though the result appears to be unduly harsh, if not unjust.
. This view may account for the adoption of the cost of repair rule in the some iwelve jurisdictions cited by the majority.