concurring.
I concur in this opinion and the conclusion that Balderas's car was an underin-sured vehicle under Indiana law and, therefore, that Schultz was not entitled to summary judgment. I write separately, however, to explain my reasons for reaching a conclusion different from that which I reached as a member of another panel that recently issued the memorandum decision in a companion case, Corr v. American Family, Ins., No. 71A03-0003-CV-85, 742 N.E.2d 43 (Ind.Ct.App. December 28, 2000).
In this case, as in many cases, a credible argument can be made to support the position taken by either party. In Corr v. American Family, we agreed with the appellant and relied on a previous opinion of this court, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 644 N.E.2d 884 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), to support our conclusion that a policy limits-to-policy limits comparison is required in determining whether a vehicle is an "underinsured motor vehicle" pursuant to Indiana Code Section 27-7-5-4. Here, a closer look at the Sanders decision reveals that we relied on Colorado law to support our interpretation of the Indiana statute. That reliance by the Sanders court was misplaced since, as we note, the Colorado statute defining an underinsured motor vehicle is substantially different than our statute. After further reflection, I believe that here we have made the correct decision to disagree with Sanders and hold that the language "amounts available for payment" used by our legislature does not equate to "policy limits." Slip op. at 9, 742 N.E.2d 43.
Cases before this court are assigned to judges at random, and I have been given the unique opportunity to consider the same issue twice. It is important that judges keep an open mind and consider well-reasoned arguments, even when they have previously taken another position. Having reconsidered the issue, I fully concur in this opinion and our interpretation of the underinsured motorist statute as applied to these facts.