(concurring). I agree this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. My reason is that considering, all of the facts preceding and surrounding this accident, a jury question was presented as to Buder, Jr.’s gross negligence.
I cannot accept as the law of this state Judge Levin’s reasoning with respect to the doctrine of negligent entrustment as it relates to the liability of an entrustor to a guest passenger of the entrustee. I believe the legislature and the Supreme Court have spoken contrary to the reasoning and the result reached by Judge Levin.
To me, Perin v. Peuler (1964), 373 Mich 531, says the common law doctrine of negligent entrustment is not impaired by our owner-liability statute, CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2101). However, to support an action for negligent entrustment, actionable negligence on the part of the entrustee must be shown as well as negligence on the part of the entrustor. In this instance, actionable negligence on the part of the host-entrustee requires proof of his gross negligence. My view on this point is as Justice O’Hara stated it in his concurring opinion m Tortora v. General Motors Corporation (1964), 373 Mich 563, 572:
“Negligent entrustment is a legal doctrine by which the act of entrustment relates the actions of the entrustor to the acts of the entrustee. When the entrustee injures a third party by the use of an *26object entrusted, the entrustor’s liability is to be measured by the same legal rules of responding in damages as the entrustor himself would be measured had he occasioned the injury.”
On new trial, Ruhala v. Roby (1967), 379 Mich 102, will control on the admission of Buder, Jr.’s deposition and no more need be said on this point.