{dissenting). In light of the determination of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 US 458 (58 S Ct 1019, 82 L Ed 1461) as reiterated in Moore v. Michigan (1957), 355 US 155 (78 S Ct 191, 2 *622L Ed 2d 167) and Carnley v. Cochran (1962), 369 US 506 (82 S Ct 884, 8 L Ed 2d 70) a mere showing that the accused knew of his right to counsel is not, in itself, sufficient to' show an intelligent and understanding waiver of counsel. In Carnley, supra, the • court said:
“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must he an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” (Emphasis added p 516.)
I cannot read People v. Hobdy (1968), 380 Mich 686; People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693; People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704; and People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719 to permit finding an “affirmative acquiescence”, and “affirmative waiver” of counsel as discussed in Carnley, supra, through a mere showing that the accused knew his right.
The trial court here interrupted defendant’s question, “if I pleaded guilty * * *” by insisting on -his plea. I find in this record no intelligent, understanding rejection of an offer of counsel as was required in Moore, supra and Carnley, supra.
Justice would be better served to let Benjamin P. Berry stand trial than read into this record a waiver of his constitutional right to counsel.