I concur in the result only. I write separately because I believe that this case should have been resolved without reaching the constitutional question. As stated by the majority, we granted leave in this case to decide whether MCR 6.610(E)(2) precludes the use of a misdemeanor conviction resulting from an uncounseled guilty plea to enhance the sentence in the instant case. Because the defendant’s uncounseled conviction does not fit within the protection of that rule, his sentence may be enhanced.
MCR 6.610(E)(2) provides three situations in which an indigent defendant shall be informed of the right to an appointed attorney. If: (a) the offense charged is punishable by over ninety-two days in jail, (b) the offense charged requires a minimum jail sentence, or (c) the court makes a determination that it may send the defendant to jail, then the court shall inform the defendant that if he is indigent, he has the right to an appointed attorney. Application of this rule to the instant case provides (a) the offense charged was punishable by up to ninety days in jail; (b) the offense charged did not require a minimum jail sentence; and (c) the court did not make a determination that it might send defendant to jail. Therefore, even if the defendant had proven his indigence, he would not be entitled to an appointed attorney. It follows that under the final sentence of MCR 6.610(E)(2),1 the *129defendant’s sentence may be enhanced.2
While the majority agrees that the court rule does not afford this defendant protection, it unnecessarily resolves the scope of the right to appointed counsel under the Michigan Constitution. Implicitly, the result is that MCR 6.610(E)(2) and 6.610(D)(2) are replaced by the new “actual imprisonment” test. Lower courts may now disregard the directives of MCR 6.610(D)(2)(a) and (b), and (E)(2)(a) and (b) in favor of subrule (c).
It is well settled that this Court does not answer constitutional questions where other questions are raised that will dispose of the case. Warren Twp v Raymond, 291 Mich 426, 429; 289 NW 201 (1939). The majority provides that under People v Studaker, 387 Mich 698; 199 NW2d 177 (1972), “this Court unanimously adopted the ‘actual imprisonment’ standard” for the right to appointed counsel. Ante at 116. However, upon a careful reading of Studaker, it seems that this Court held that no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he is provided with assistance of counsel or that right is waived. Id. at 700-701. Studaker places a limit on when a defendant may be imprisoned. It does not place a limit on when a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel.3 The Studaker rule is embodied in MCR 6.610(D)(2)(c) and *1306.610(E)(2)(c). These rules direct the court to inform an indigent defendant of the right to an appointed attorney if it determines that it might sentence the defendant to jail. This is exactly what this Court did in Studaker. Id. at 700-701.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.A subsequent charge or sentence may not be enhanced because of this conviction unless a defendant is represented by an attorney or he or she waives the right to an appointed attorney.
I note also that the language of the final sentence of MCR 6.610(E)(2) is problematic. Read literally, a nonindigent defendant could refuse to hire an attorney and then later assert that under the rule his sentence may not be enhanced. This problem can be remedied by deleting the word “appointed.”
This is supported by the fact that a majority opinion of this Court has never cited Studaker since it was handed down in 1972. It was cited once in a dissenting opinion which pointed out that the case did not apply. See Artibee v Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich 54, 62; 243 NW2d 248 (1976) (Coleman, J., dissenting).