(dissenting).
Not me. I cannot agree with the majority’s perception of flaws in White’s guilty plea proceeding. For openers, the prosecution was faithful to the plea agreement, recommending to the court — just as it promised— that the sentences would be served concurrently. No one pretends the prosecutor even hinted to White or his counsel that the court would be bound by its recommendation. No one pretends White is innocent of either charge, or that there was no factual basis for his pleas. Rather, the reversal is grounded on what strikes me as a wholly unnecessary and unwise expansion of the formal litany required in taldng guilty pleas under Iowa rule of criminal procedure 8(2)(b).
I. It is plainly unnecessary. The better reasoned authority clearly holds that the possibility of consecutive sentences is implicit in the court’s explanation of the maximum penalties for each charge. See United States v. Burney, 75 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1304-05, 1306 (9th Cir.1978); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973); State v. Wesley, 131 Ariz. 246, 640 P.2d 177, 179 (Ariz.1982); State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Neb.1986); Rosemond v. State, 104 Nev. 286, 756 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Nev.1988).
I cannot understand how White could anticipate that the court would impose concurrent sentences. The record shows:
COURT: I should also ask the government to give us the penalties. I think I skipped over that.
STATE: On each charge, Your Honor, the maximum penalty would be an indeterminate prison term not to exceed 10 years and a fíne in the amount of $50,000. There’s a mandatory minimum fine of $1000 on each count. There’s a mandatory 180 days driver’s license revocation, and there’s the potential under [section] 124.411 for the defendant to be required to serve one-third of the time imposed before eligible for parole.
COURT: Mr. White, do you understand those are the potential penalties that you’re facing in this case?
WHITE: Yes, Ma’am.
Surely the majority cannot believe White would conclude from the above that consecutive sentences were not an option for the court.
II. No fair minded person wants a guilty plea from anyone who is or claims to be innocent. Criminal rule 8(2)(b) is an attempt to assure the accused is guilty and is cognizant of what is at stake in admitting it. The rule attempts this by requiring the judge to again advise the accused concerning the listed fundamentals, covering the same advice ordinarily expected to come from the defendant’s lawyer.
It is not prudent to expand the list, especially for our system in Iowa where persons pleading guilty are, almost without exception, represented by lawyers. See 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 665 (1998) (representation by counsel significant factor in determining whether guilty plea was knowing and voluntary). We have previously applied a common sense approach in declining to require that an accused be apprised of other serious consequences of the plea. See Kinnersley v. State, 494 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Iowa 1993) (court not required to advise ineligibility of parole); Grout v. State, 320 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1982) (same); Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1981) (same). On an analogous point, we unanimously rejected an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim grounded on failure to advise an accused that his guilty plea would result in deportation. Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Iowa 1987).
It is a mistake to answer the siren call of those who suggest that our imposition of more litany will clarify the requirements, so that future mistakes with consequent appeals can be avoided. Every requirement invites more litigation and appeals in order to test whether there has been compliance. We *248rendered our decision in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969), with high hopes, and the expectation that a prescribed format would standardize the procedure so clearly that future error could be avoided. Less than eight years later, when we filed our opinion in State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488, 492-93 (Iowa 1977), in addition to all the unnumbered and less formal dispositions, we had filed sixty-three formal opinions reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of guilty plea proceedings. To add an unnecessary one such as this is just plain wrong. I would affirm.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER and NEUMAN, JJ., join this dissent.