also dissenting:
In seven unrelated temporary custody hearings, the trial court ordered the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide and pay for in-patient drug treatment services for mothers whose children were removed from their custody due to their mothers’ drug-related neglect of them. The majority today approves this practice. In fact, the juvenile court’s actions were premature and an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I dissent.
A temporary custody hearing must be held within 48 hours after authorities, acting upon the reasonable belief that a minor has been abused or neglected, have taken that minor into custody. See 705 ILCS 405/2 — 3 through 2 — 10 (West 1994). During that 48-hour period, the DCFS’s main focus is — and should be — the immediate needs of the minor for protection, crisis treatment, and shelter care. However, the majority finds that the DCFS should also have a treatment plan, including inpatient drug treatment for the minors’ parents where necessary, "in development prior to the temporary custody hearing.” 172 Ill. 2d at 535. Thus, in addition to securing the well-being of the child taken into custody, finding that child appropriate shelter, and preparing for the temporary custody hearing itself within 48 hours, the majority holds that DCFS is also required to conclude whether an in-patient drug treatment program is appropriate for the parents in question, to investigate what type of program would be beneficial, and to ascertain whether such programs are available.
The majority finds support for the burden it places upon the agency in section 2 — 10(2) of the Juvenile Court Act, which cautions that, at the time of the temporary custody hearing, the court shall require documentation as to the "reasonable efforts” that were made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his or her home. 705 ILCS 405/2— 10(2) (West 1994). In the lengthy context of section 2 — 10(2) of the Act, which governs temporary custody hearings, I do not read a few isolated references to "reasonable efforts” to mean that the DCFS has 48 hours to place a minor’s parent with an in-patient drug treatment program. As a practical matter, this 48-hour placement cannot be met. I understand the Act to require only that a court cannot order a child into temporary custody without a good-faith showing by DCFS that the placement is necessary to the immediate well-being of the child at the time of the hearing.
Moreover, the majority wholly ignores those provisions of the Act which govern the DCFS’s obligation to utilize its expertise in determining what type of comprehensive service plan would best serve the families before it. Section 2 — 10.1 of the Act provides that once the child is temporarily removed, DCFS is required to develop a case plan for the family within 45 days. 705 ILCS 405/ 2 — 10.1 (West 1994). This case plan must utilize family preservation services. 20 ILCS 505/6a (West 1994). Indeed, section 5 — 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act states:
"The Department shall promptly notify children and families of the Department’s responsibility to offer and provide family preservation services as identified in the service plan. Such plans may include but are not limited to: case management services; homemakers; counseling; parent education; day care; emergency assistance and advocacy assessments; respite care; in-home health care; transportation to obtain any of the above services; and medical assistance.” 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1994).
Thus, it is the responsibility of the DCFS to conduct an investigation into the needs of the families during this 45-day period following the minor’s temporary removal and to decide what types of services would be appropriate to facilitate reunification. Given these provisions, this court should not countenance the juvenile court’s hasty fiat — without the benefit of any professional evaluation or recommendation on the part of the agency charged with reunification efforts — that the DCFS provide and pay for in-patient drug counseling services for these mothers.
Finally, despite the majority’s careful effort to cull supportive policy language from lengthy and interrelated statutes to buttress its analysis, I am not persuaded that the Juvenile Court Act, along with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, the Children and Family Services Act and the Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act combine to make it "clear” that drug treatment for parents of neglected and abused children is among the services the legislatures intended the DCFS to provide. 172 111. 2d at 530. There are numerous statutory provisions in these Acts which direct DCFS to identify and refer those children and/or adults with drug or alcohol problems to other state agencies for evaluation and treatment. See 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1994) (stating that "[i]n any case where there is evidence that the perpetrator of the abuse or neglect is an addict or alcoholic *** the Department, when making referrals for drug or alcohol abuse services, shall make such referrals to [State licensed] facilities”); 20 ILCS 505/5(g) (West 1994) (providing that "[r]ules and regulations established by the Department shall include provisions *** to identify children and adults who should be referred to an alcohol and drug abuse treatment program for professional evaluation”); 20 ILCS 505/6(a) (West 1994) (stating that "[w]here appropriate, the case plan shall include recommendations concerning alcohol or drug abuse evaluation”); 20 ILCS 505/34.5 (West 1994) (directing the Department, upon a determination that drug or alcohol abuse has necessitated its involvement, "to refer a person to a licensed alcohol or drug treatment program, and to include any treatment recommendations in the person’s case plan”). None of these aforementioned provisions contemplate that DCFS itself is required to provide direct drug treatment services to parents. By declaring that the DCFS is now so required, the majority opinion renders meaningless those statutory provisions directing the DCFS to refer drug and alcohol abuse problems to other state agencies for evaluation and treatment. See Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 367 (1985) (noting the presumption that the legislature did not intend a meaningless act in enacting a statute).
The majority’s decision places enormous financial
and logistical burdens on DCFS that cannot be justified by a straightforward analysis of the statutes at issue and, realistically, cannot be met. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.