(concurring specially).
I concur in the result decided by the majority but respectfully disagree with the analysis by which it is reached. In Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa District Court for Scott County, 587 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1998), also filed this month, I set out my views in dissent concerning the effect of the legislature’s repeal of Iowa Code section 321J.4(3)(b) (1995). Applying that analysis to the case at bar, I would sustain the writ of certiorari.
This case differs from the Scott County case in this way. In the Scott County case, the defendants qualified under the 1995 statute to have their cases heard by the district court, which would then determine if their driver’s licenses should be restored. That is because the two-year waiting period required by section 321J.4(3)(b) had expired, making them eligible to apply for restoration of their driver’s licenses. The court might not grant their applications because of failure to prove that the four conditions for restoration had been met, but their right to apply was unaffected by repeal of the statute because it was an accrued substantive right that could not be taken away by the repeal.
In the case at bar, defendant Kayser is not in the same position as the defendants in the Scott County case. Kayser’s license was revoked on September 29, 1995. Under the statute, Kayser became eligible to apply for license restoration after two years had expired from the date of his license revocation. That date was September 29, 1997. However, before that date, the statute under which Kayser was seeking relief was repealed, effective on July 1, 1997. The July 1, 1997 date of repeal foreclosed Kayser from applying for license restoration because he had not completed the two-year threshold waiting period established by the statute for eligibility.
I adhere to my analysis of these legal issues as set out in my dissent in the Scott County case. Following that reasoning, I would sustain the writ.