concurring in result.
It appears that many jurisdictions make permanent partial awards not for physical injury as such but for “disability” produced by the physical condition. 1C Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law § 57.11 (1996). Such treatment would account for the use of the words “injury”, “impairment” and “disability” interchangeably. Even the Larson treatise itself uses the phrase “permanent disability ” (emphasis supplied), when referring only to an award for purely physical functional loss. Id., § 57.13. That is not the case in Indiana. In this state the word “impairment” refers to the physical injury itself and an award therefor is to compensate for the loss of physical function. On the other hand, an award for disability, whether temporary or permanent, is to compensate for the wage loss occasioned by the injury. Under the Indiana statutory scheme it is therefore possible and permissible to receive monetary compensation in the form of an award for an impairment rating made when the injury has reached a permanent and quiescent state, and in addition thereto to have received a disability award for temporarily lost wages during the initial period of treatment and recuperation and/or to thereafter receive an award for permanent wage loss occasioned by the physical functional impairment.
The Indiana statutory scheme does not imply strict finality to a determination of a permanent and quiescent state with regard to the injury. To the contrary, I.C. 22-3-3-27 expressly provides for modification of an award based upon changed conditions. Accordingly, what at the time of an original award was thought to be a permanent impairment of, for example as here, 4%, may thereafter be determined to be worse than originally determined. In such a case benefits may be continued or extended. Under such a scenario, an initial impairment rating, which may not have been so serious as to result in an employment disability, may have worsened to the extent of causing total or partial disability. In such a circumstance I cannot find statutory preclusion to the ability of a claimant to seek and obtain disability benefits in addition to the impairment award payments, assuming the claim is within the permissible time frame and farther assuming maximum benefits have not already been received.
In this regard, I must point to language used by myself in Covarubias v. Decatur Casting (1976) 171 Ind.App. 533, 358 N.E.2d 174, and which now appears to have been ill advised and unduly broad. As quoted by the majority here, that case states:
[Ojnce the injury has stabilized to a permanent and quiescent state, temporary disability ceases, and the extent of permanent injury resulting in a degree of impairment or total disability is determined.
(emphasis deleted from original) 171 Ind. App. at 536-37, 358 N.E.2d at 176. This phrasing is susceptible to a construction that once the physical condition has become permanent and quiescent so as to permit an impairment rating for award purposes, a claimant may receive an impairment award or a total disability award, but not both. In light of the views which I now hold, I must retreat from any such construction of the Covarubias language and must instead point to a comment in Allen v. United Tel. Co. (1976) 168 Ind.App. 696, 345 N.E.2d 261, *46which left the door open for a future determination as to “whether an impairment award precludes a later determination of permanent total disability”. 168 Ind.App. at 702 n. 3, 345 N.E.2d at 696 n. 3. Two cases cited in the Allen footnote, Bagwell v. Chrysler Corp. (1976) 168 Ind.App. 110, 341 N.E.2d 799, and Johnson v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc. (1972) 153 Ind.App. 467, 287 N.E.2d 894, suggest that an increased degree of impairment may permit not only a modification of the impairment award but also a first time claim for disability benefits so long as statutory time constraints and maximum benefit amounts are honored.
The fact that one’s physical condition has been determined to be stabilized indicates that an assessment of that physical condition may be made for purposes of an impairment rating percentage award and also for purposes of determining whether the person is totally or partially disabled. This determination carries with it an aura of finality or permanence but of course, if the physical condition should unexpectedly become worse or should the person’s employment situation change, the case can be reopened and reexamined. Larson, supra § 57.12(d). The fact that a total permanent disability award is made, whether coupled with a separate impairment award or not, does not necessarily foreclose future changes in the physical condition and/or ability to work, nor does it foreclose the ability, if proeedurally permitted, to obtain a modification in any monetary benefits awarded. In short, it is too simplistic to state that once an impairment rating is made and benefits paid accordingly, such award is intended to be all-inclusive and to foreclose any future claim for a disability award, if such disability award is otherwise appropriate under the evidence and within thé time limitations of the statute.
The illogic and unfairness of the “either/or” theory adopted by the majority is demonstrated by a New York case in which the court avoided an unfair denial of total disability to a claimant who had a factually determinable permanent and quiescent hearing loss of 19.2%.2 Cecere v. County of Niagara (1979) N.Y.App.Div., 71 A.D.2d 759, 419 N.Y.S.2d 315. In that case, claimant had a 100% hearing loss in one ear due to an unrelated pre-existing condition. As a result of a subsequent work related injury he sustained a permanent 19.2% hearing loss in the other ear. The latter condition rendered him totally disabled. In order to avoid the dilemma presented by the permanent and quiescent state of the physical condition, the court seized upon evidence that the claimant was “inquiring about more effective hearing aids or anything else that could improve his hearing”. 71 A.D.2d at 760, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The court then concluded that because the claimant’s medical condition was “unsettled”, total disability payments were appropriate rather than the inadequate amount provided in the statutory schedule for hearing loss. The better solution is that afforded by what I deem to be the compatible and non-exclusive methods in Indiana which permit disability awards as well as impairment awards.
Nevertheless, this conclusion does not lead me to accept Kohlman’s contention that she is entitled to partial disability payments under the facts or under the legal argument which she makes. In short, Kohlman seeks to acquire partial disability benefits based upon an analysis of statutory provisions which deal only with temporary total disability. Accordingly, although I disagree with the majority in its holding that when a physical impairment condition has reached a permanent and quiescent state, and an impairment award has been made, there cannot be an award for disability benefits, I nevertheless agree that in the ease before us Kohl-man’s request for temporary partial disability benefits was properly denied. For this reason I concur in the affirmance.
. The word "quiescent” is defined as “[a]t rest or inactive”. Stedman's Medical Dictionary (25th Ed. 1990); “not getting worse”. 3 Schmidt’s At-tomeys’ Dictionary of Medicine (1990). The word does not connote finality or unchangeability.