dissenting:
I concur with the majority in their affirmance of the dismissal of count II of plaintiff’s complaint. However, I am of the opinion that count I of the complaint, directed against John L. Yack, sole, does not state a cause of action and that the order of the trial court which dismissed count I of the complaint should be affirmed. I accordingly respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the order of the trial court as to count I of the complaint.
The basis of my position is that count I of plaintiff s complaint wholly fails to allege sufficient, or any, facts which would constitute a cause of action against defendant Yack. In paragraph 1 of count I plaintiff alleges that he is a tenured instructor at Southern Illinois University — a status he refers to in paragraph 2 as a “property interest.” In paragraph 3, in four subparagraphs, plaintiff describes the particular actions or communications defendant Yack allegedly performed falsely and maliciously, which caused injury to his property interest. In paragraph 4 plaintiff closed the figure by attempting to allege the manner in which defendant Yack’s actions, set forth in paragraph 3, caused injury to plaintiff’s “property interest,” set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 4 in its entirely states:
“4. That as a direct intended result and consequence of the Defendant’s aforesaid course of deliberate misconduct, Plaintiffs prospectively advantageous tenured economic relationship with Southern Illinois University was, from and after the Summer of 1971 and continuing to the present, grievously damaged, harmed and injured; Plaintiff’s Deans [sic — I assume plaintiff means the Deans of defendant Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University] arbitrarily have discriminated against Plaintiff by failing and refusing, at the urging of Defendant, to consider fairly in good faith any raise or promotion of Plaintiff for several years last past; Plaintiff has suffered great mental anguish and frustration in his pursuit of reasonable happiness in his chosen profession; Plaintiff has been forced to expend money for attorneys fees litigating with a third party to vindicate Plaintiff’s right to fan-consideration on raises and promotions.”
In paragraph 5 plaintiff alleges that he seeks exemplary and punitive damages in addition to other damages. In paragrah 6 he alleges that at all times germane he was in the exercise of due care for his own property interest. Count I concludes with a prayer for specific compensatory and general damages, and punitive damages.
Plaintiff seems to be complaining of communications of defendant Yack that would constitute libel or slander, but he does not allege any facts that show an injury to his “property interest” within the gambit of Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924, or Colucci v. Chicago Crime Com., 31 Ill. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461, upon which he relies.
Paragraph 4 must be considered the crux of plaintiff*s complaint against defendant Yack for it attempts to apply the actions described in paragraph 3 to some injury to the protected “property interest” described in paragraphs 1 and 2. However, it can be seen that the matters set forth in paragraph 4 bear no relation to the protected interest of plaintiff. Paragraph 4 initially asserts that his prospectively advantageous tenured economic relationship “was * * * grievously damaged, harmed and injured.” There is no further allegation explaining or describing these grossly conclusive statements. Plaintiff does not allege any means or manner in which his “property interest” is damaged or that in any way because of defendant Yack’s actions, plaintiff is likely to lose that property interest or suffer an injury to it.
Next in paragraph 4 plaintiff asserts that plaintiff’s (defendant’s?) “deans” arbitrarily have discriminated against plaintiff for failing and refusing, at the urging of defendant, to consider fairly in good faith any raises or promotions of plaintiff for several years last past. No “deans” are a party to this action, and no specific interest is set forth. Any defalcation on the part of “deans” would not subject defendant Yack to liability. The allegation is that the “deans” have been arbitrary in this discrimination. Whether or not defendant “urged” them to their position, would have no bearing on defendant Yack’s liability.
Paragraph 4 next alleges that plaintiff has suffered great mental anguish and frustration in his pursuit of reasonable happiness in his chosen profession. There is no liability upon defendant Yack for any such condition of plaintiff. No battery is alleged that would afford the basis for damages for mental anguish and frustration and the allegations are far short of those of the type set forth in Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157, which would permit recovery for emotional and mental distress in the absence of physical contact.
Plaintiff concludes paragraph 4 with a gratuitous assertion that he has been forced to spend money for attorney’s fees litigating with “a third party” to vindicate his right to fair consideration on raises and promotions. There is not the slightest indication that defendant Yack was in any way involved in this element of damage. Even under the most liberal interpretation of a notice pleading complaint in Federal court could such an assertion as this conclusion in paragraph 4 be considered sufficient to allege a cause of action.
Count I of plaintiff’s complaint is rambling and disjointed, and replete with legalese. Even by applying a liberal interpretation to pleadings count I does not state a cause of action as to defendant Yack. I would affirm its dismissal by the trial court