dissenting.
Because this court, relying on the majority’s opinion in Jaksha v. State, ante p. 106, 486 N.W.2d 858 (1992), strikes down the depreciation surcharge authorized by 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 829, § 20, I certainly disagree with the majority’s decision in this case, a decision which only exacerbates the state’s property tax woes by requiring refund of all taxes collected pursuant to § 20.
Furthermore, I disagree with the court’s assertion that § 20 is inseverable from L.B. 829, § 7. As the court admits, only one of the numerous factors to achieve inseverability is present in Bahensky’s case, namely, § 7 as an inducement to passage of § 20. Moreover, in view of the result in Jaksha, the court’s protestations of unwillingness to “do violence to the intent of the Legislature” have a hollow ring and cannot be taken seriously. Also, there is nothing in §§ 7 and 20 of L.B. 829 to indicate that they are inextricably intertwined, nor is there any apparent ambiguity in the statutory language. Therefore, the provisions of §§ 7 and 20 should be construed in terms of the statutory plain language appearing on the face of the legislation. Senatorial verbal exchanges on the floor of the Legislature have no role in determining constitutionality of the legislation presently under judicial examination. To single out a senator’s statement in the legislative chamber and then transform that statement into the collective voice of the Legislature is unquestionably farfetched. Moreover, the day that an expression on the floor of the Legislature determines constitutionality of a statute will be a sad day for the constitutional separation of powers and judicial authority to construe statutes. That sad day has apparently arrived today.
Finally, the only issue presented in this appeal, the issue ignored by this court’s majority, is whether the 2 percent surcharge imposed on the exercise of the federal depreciation deduction is a property tax in violation of Neb. Const, art. VIII, § 1 A, which prohibits levying of a property tax for state *152purposes. An excise tax is an indirect tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or property [citation omitted], and is one that is ‘imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in any occupation, or the enjoyment [of] a privilege.’ ” New Neighborhoods v. W.Va. Workers’Comp. Fund, 886 F.2d 714, 719 (4th Cir. 1989). See, also, State v. Galyen, 221 Neb. 497, 500-01, 378 N.W.2d 182, 185 (1985):
“ ‘An excise tax, using the term in its broad meaning as opposed to a property tax, includes taxes sometimes designated by statute or referred to as privilege taxes, license taxes, occupation taxes, and business taxes.’ ” [Citation omitted.]
On a number of occasions this court has similarly recognized that a tax imposed upon the doing of an act is an excise tax and not a property tax.
The depreciation surcharge under § 20 of L.B. 829 is imposed on a taxpayer’s voluntary act of asserting the privilege to claim depreciation as a tax deduction allowed in determining income tax liability under the federal Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the depreciation surcharge is a constitutional excise tax, not a property tax prohibited by Neb. Const, art. VIII, § 1A. Hence, § 20 of L.B. 829 is constitutional.