concurring:
While I concur in the opinion of the court, I feel compelled to express my frustration at the result which we are required to reach.
The plaintiffs, in the context of the facts here presented, are “unemployed individuals” entitled to benefits under the statutory scheme as it now stands. Employers are required to make contributions with respect to wages paid to corporate officers just as they are with respect to wages paid to other employees. There are simply no statutory provisions which can reasonably be construed as authorizing the Department to deny benefits to an otherwise eligible claimant merely because the claimant is an officer of a corporation. To the contrary, if, as the statute provides, wages paid to an officer-employee require corresponding contributions, logic dictates that such individuals should be entitled to unemployment benefits when the statutory conditions have been satisfied. Consequently, I am constrained to agree that this court has no alternative under the facts here presented to affirmance of the judgments of the appellate court granting unemployment benefits to the plaintiffs.
My frustration with this result arises from the fact that, as the Department points out, the unemployment compensation system in its existing form is subject to manipulation and abuse by unscrupulous corporate owners and officers. While there is no evidence in this record to support the contention that either plaintiff here was “conveniently unemployed” in order to receive benefits under the Act, its provisions certainly present tempting opportunities to those so inclined. So long as the legislature requires contributions on wages paid to officer-employees, those opportunities will exist.
The legislature clearly intended the Unemployment Insurance Act to safeguard unfortunate individuals from “economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 300). The Act was not intended as a means of supplementing the income of corporate stockholders and officers in the form of unemployment benefits.
In short, I agree that the judgments of the appellate court must be affirmed, but I urge that the General Assembly reconsider the provisions of the Act as they pertain to assessments upon salaries of officer-employees in light of the potential for abuse which I believe to be present.
CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN joins in this concurrence.