(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision because I believe that it misinterprets our decision in Commonwealth v. Crawford, 410 Mass. 75 (1991) (Crawford I), and also implicitly approves of the inappropriate conduct of the assistant district attorney.
Today this court states that, “[i]n Crawford I, ... we could not determine whether, without reliance on the in camera hearing, the judge credited the officer’s testimony in open court that the informant had previously given information that had led to the arrest and indictment of two persons and the seizure of . . . cocaine.” Ante at 41. The court’s statement is clearly refuted by the language used in Crawford I.
In Crawford I, supra at 79, we stated:
“[I]t is apparent from the record that the judge was not entirely convinced that the officer was being candid in his testimony in open court. The officer refused to reveal the names of the two individuals arrested pursuant to the informant’s prior tip. The prosecutor suggested that the officer tell the judge the names of the individuals in-camera, so as not to compromise the informant. The officer did so and the judge was then apparently convinced that the officer was telling the truth. Later, the judge decided that the in-camera hearing was inappropriate and returned to his prehearing conclu*44sion, that he was unconvinced by the trooper’s statements concerning the informant’s reliability.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As I read the quoted language, we indeed did conclude that apart from the inappropriate in camera hearing with the trooper, the judge determined that the veracity prong of the Upton test (Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 [1985]) had not been satisfied because the officer had not provided enough specific details regarding the past arrests and seizures.1 While we may have suggested incidentally that the judge seemed to have a problem with the officer’s credibility, the main issue in the case was whether there were sufficient details regarding the prior arrest and drug seizure to satisfy the veracity prong of Upton, supra.2 The judge’s memorandum and order after remand reinforces this point, because in it the judge noted, “ There were no details supplied concerning these prior tips. Since the in camera hearing was invalid, and since the Commonwealth refuses to conduct another in *45camera hearing in the presence of defense counsel, there continue[ ] to be no details regarding the basis of the [informant’s)| reliability . . . [and] the reliability prong of Aguilar-Spinelli has not been satisfied” (emphasis supplied).3 See Commonwealth v. Upton, supra at 374-374. See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Furthermore, at the hearing after remand, in discussing his use of the trooper’s testimony at the in camera hearing, the judge said, “I didn’t use it as the basis of my decision.”
We remanded the case in Crawford I, in essence, to give the Commonwealth another chance at establishing probable cause “in a manner consistent with the defendant’s rights.” See Crawford I, supra at 80. We noted that a hearing should take place on remand in which the prosecutor and defense attorneys should participate. Id. We stated that, “[i]f, in the presence of the defendant’s attorney, the officer reveals the information required to satisfy the judge, the evidence should not. be suppressed” (emphasis supplied). Id. We were not concerned with the officer’s credibility and did not remand the case for the judge to make findings regarding his credibility, as the court suggests today, ante at 41. Indeed, the misconception that we remanded in Crawford I for the judge to make findings regarding the officer’s credibility was created by the assistant district attorney.
The judge stated at the hearing on remand, “I want to state it plain. I believed the Trooper, period. I didn’t have any trouble with his veracity.” In his memorandum and order after that hearing, the judge wrote that “there continue [ ] to be no details regarding the basis of the [informant’s] reliability. ... In order for reliability to be *46established by the [Commonwealth v. Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43 (1991)] standard, sufficient factual details must bé provided to prove the accuracy of the informant’s information regarding the prior arrests and seizures. . . . Since these details have not been lawfully supplied by the Commonwealth in the instant case, the reliability prong of Aguilar-Spinelli has not been satisfied.” It is clear that the judge’s problem was not with the credibility of the officer, but rather with the legal sufficiency of his testimony in satisfying the requirements of Upton. It is also clear that the court’s opinion today implicitly approves of the obstinate refusal of the prosecutor, after remand, to comply with the clear mandate of this court.
The prosecutor refused to participate in a further hearing where the officer could have testified and would have had an opportunity to reveal, in the presence of counsel, the information necessary to satisfy the requirements of Upton, despite our clear directive in Crawford I, supra at 80. There are two important issues here. The first is the veracity of the informant, not of the officer. See Crawford I, supra at 78 (“The crux of the case, therefore, is whether the officer could properly rely upon the information provided by the informant”). The other important issue that caused the remand was the Commonwealth’s successful request that an in camera hearing be held in the absence of counsel, a procedure we described in Crawford I as “inappropriate,” id. at 79, and the judge, on remand, described as a procedure he thought was “cuckoo.”
Today the court announces that, if a police officer makes a bald assertion that an informant previously has provided information leading to arrest and drug seizure, without providing details in support of this assertion, even when the judge requests those details, then the veracity prong of Upton is satisfied.4 Furthermore, the court leaves trial judges powerless to require police officers and prosecutors to provide suffi*47cient details in support of an informant’s reliability. Finally, the court gives approval to the refusal of the police officer and the prosecutor to provide information that the judge requested and that this court has mandated. Since I cannot agree with any of these results, I dissent.
At the hearing after remand, the judge stated the following, in reference to his probable cause findings following the first hearing on the motion to suppress:
“When I tried the case on the motion to suppress, after [the prosecutor] had put in most of her case I think, if my memory is correct, that I suggested to her, since this was a pre-Baez [Commonwealth v. Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43 (1991)] case, that I didn’t think that she had established sufficient probable cause . . . and that the [Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)] test hadn’t been met.”
This demonstrates that the judge’s concern was not with the trooper’s credibility, but with the veracity of the informant.
We did say, in Crawford I, that “[t]here was testimony in open court which, if believed, would satisfy both prongs of the Upton test.” Crawford I, supra at 78. If I were to take this line out of context and ignore the discussion which follows it, as the court seems to do, I also would be inclined to deny the suppression motion based on the judge’s assertion that he did not have a credibility problem with the police officer. As I read this line, however, in context with the rest of our opinion in Crawford I, it seems clear to me that what we meant was that, although the veracity prong of Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985), may be satisfied if an informant previously provided information leading to arrest and seizure of drugs, Upton was not satisfied in this case because there were not sufficient details regarding the arrest and seizure.
In his memorandum, the judge wrote, “In order for reliability to be established by the Perez-Baez standard, sufficient factual details must be provided to prove the accuracy of the informant’s information regarding the prior arrests and seizures.” I agree with the judge, and note that the prosecutor and police officer refused to provide these details. The court, however, seems intent on ignoring the deficiency in details that prompted the judge to rule as he did.
In Perez-Baez, the veracity prong of Upton was satisfied by a police officer’s affidavit which recited that the informant had provided information leading to the arrest of two named persons, described the amount and type of drugs seized, and even recited the court in which the cases against *47the two persons were pending. Perez-Baez, supra at 45 n.2. In this case, there were no details at all.