concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not for the principle reason stated. My views on “per se” conflict of interest have been stated in People v. Meng, 54 Ill. App. 3d 357, 369 N.E.2d 549 (5th Dist. 1977), and People v. Spicer, 61 Ill. App. 3d 748, 378 N.E.2d 169 (5th Dist. 1978), and need not be repeated.
Nor do I find any actual demonstrated conflict of interest that resulted in Baxtrom receiving ineffective assistance of counsel condemned in Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942), and more recently in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978).
I believe it was an abuse of discretion to deny a severance to defendant and Lofton where their defenses were obviously inconsistent in that they accused each other of being the perpetrator of the crime. The arguments advanced by the majority to demonstrate a conflict of interest seem to me to demonstrate prejudice in the denial of a severance.
I agree with the majority that the failure to furnish ballistic reports was a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), People v. Nichols, 63 Ill. 2d 443, 349 N.E.2d 40 (1976), and People v. Flowers, 51 Ill. 2d 25, 281 N.E.2d 299 (1972). Perhaps a more egregious violation was the failure to produce a police report which contained the name of a subject who had been questioned in connection with the crime and told a somewhat implausible story. This material, known to the perpetrator, was never revealed to defendant.