dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Proof of age in a juvenile case serves a dual purpose. I agree with my colleagues that such proof confers authority to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 702—1), rather than conferring jurisdiction, as was held in Frazier. But proof of age also establishes one of the elements of delinquency — an element clearly set out in the Act — that the acts committed by the respondent occurred prior to his 17th birthday. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 702—2.) While this court in Brown (and in Green and Eicher through quotations from Brown) did state that proof of age was a jurisdictional fact, the holding in those cases was that proof of age was an element of delinquency, and the failure of the State to prove that element was held to mandate reversal without remandment. The majority in this case has failed to distinguish those cases as to that holding — a holding which was based on the explicit language of our statute. Our supreme court implicitly recognized this requirement in its affirmance of Brown when it found that proof of age had in fact been established through the admission of the respondent.
The one case which deviated from this line of authority, Frazier, discussed only the jurisdictional question and thus did not explicitly hold that proof of age was not an element of delinquency. Two of the respondents before us have specifically argued that such proof is a necessary element of delinquency as well as being a jurisdictional fact. We are thus squarely presented with the issue. The legislature has made proof of age an element of proof of delinquency. The legitimate policy concerns raised by such a requirement are properly the concern of that body. This court should enforce that requirement.