(dissenting). Appellant contends that it is exempt from payment of the taxes in question for the reason that the printing press purchased by it is used in operating and maintaining interstate commerce within the meaning of the provisions of Subdivision (3), Section 4, Chap. 276, Laws 1939, as amended by Chap. 301, Laws 1943, which exempts from the Use Tax Act “Tangible personal property, the storage, use or other consumption of which this State is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution or laws of the United States of America or under the Constitution of this State, or which is used or to' he used in operating or maintaining interstate transportation or interstate commerce * * *.” The use tax designed to complement sales tax and to effect equality is imposed upon the “use, storage, and consumption” of tangible personal property purchased outside the state and subsequently employed therein. Ch. 276, Laws 1939. It may be conceded as claimed that the newspaper published by appellant has a circulation in other states; that it carries advertisements obtained from sources outside the state including the interstate shipment of cuts and mats; that it publishes news transmitted in interstate commerce; and that purchases of paper, ink and other supplies incidental to publication involve transactions in interstate commerce.
*348Appellant pointing to its business activities insists that there is no basis for distinguishing the present case from that of Scandrett v. Nord, 70 S. D. 527, 19 N.W.2d 344. The distillate sought to be taxed in that case was brought from without the state by a railroad company to be used in the maintenance of its interstate transportation system. The point was brought out in that case that where property is carried into the state and there brought to rest or halted for a moment before interstate consumption had begun taxes upon the privilege of use, storage and consumption do not come within the prohibited burden upon interstate commerce. Conceding that there was a taxable moment and that there existed constitutional power to impose a tax, this court sustained a claim of exemption under the explicit language of the statute excluding from the tax property to be used “in operating or maintaining interstate transportation”.
The federal courts seeking to define the scope of the power of states to levy excise taxes have in numerous decisions dealt with local activities as incidents of interstate commerce. In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52 S.Ct. 548, 76 L.Ed. 1038, it is observed that one who produces a commodity, subsequently sold by him in interstate commerce, whether such sale and shipment were intended or not, has engaged in two distinct and separate activities. The production is an internal concern of the state. The sale and shipment to customers in another state involves interstate commerce. The court upheld a state tax on the generation of electric energy for barter, sale or exchange. Much of the electricity generated by the company was sold in neighboring states. The court regarded the generation of electricity as a local operation and distinct from the subsequent tranmission in interstate commerce.
In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 S.Ct. 546, 550, 82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R. 944, the state statute under consideration levied a privilege tax on the gross receipts from advertising of any person engaged in the publishing business. The appellant publisher sold space in its trade journal which it circulated both within and without the taxing state to advertisers in other states. The *349court held that the “business of preparing, printing and publishing magazine advertising is peculiarly local and distinct from its circulation” and hence the tax like that upon the privilege of manufacturing within the state was valid. In upholding the tax the court recognized that it differed from the privilege tax laid upon the occupation of radio broadcasting which is in itself interstate commerce without local incidents and held invalid in Fisher’s Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 56 S.Ct. 608, 80 L.Ed. 956.
In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 S.Ct. 1475, 1477, 92 L.Ed. 1832, the court sustained a state tax imposed upon “local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities” of an interstate pipe line. The court held that “such local incidents form a sound basis for taxation by a state of foreign corporations doing interstate business.”
See also Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 S.Ct. 526, 67 L.Ed. 929; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876; Coverdale v. Arkanas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604, 58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043; Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S.Ct. 913, 82 L.Ed. 1365; discussions of sales and use taxes are found in 52 Harvard L.R. 617, “Sales Tax In Interstate Commerce”; 38 Col.L.R. 49, “Sales and Use Taxes”; 48 Yale L.J. 273, “The Commerce Clause and State Sales Taxes”.
Appellant relies strongly upon Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143, 72 S.Ct. 181, 96 L.Ed. 162, as supporting the contention that the printing press involved herein is an inseparable part of interstate commerce. In that case the question was as to the scope of the Sherman AntiTrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, and the court did not re-examine the long line of decisions interpreting the commerce clause in relation to state privilege taxes. Whether the appellant is engaged in activities within the regulatory powers of Congress is not here controlling. The Federal Supreme Court has indicated that permissible state taxation and regulatory legislation involve material distinctions. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S.Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 34, 78 L.Ed. 131; *350National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893; Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra. In the Blasius case, supra, the state court had in deference to decisions of the federal courts interpreting the Anti-Trust Act held invalid a tax statute. The federal court in reversing the judgment below and sustaining validity of the statute observed that the question involved was not the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but whether exercise of state power must be deemed to be in conflict with the paramount authority. The Congress has power to regulate where interstate commerce is “affected” by the operation regulated. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra.
The statutory provisions under consideration should be given a reasonable, natural and practical construction so as to effectuate the purpose of its enactment. C. A. Wagner Construction Company v. City of Sioux Falls, 71 S. D. 587, 27 N.W.2d 916. We should bear in mind that the Legislature was supplementing the sales tax and sought to correct inequalities between taxable transactions within the state and purchases of property outside the state and subsequently employed therein. It seems to me that the Legislature in providing the exemptions under consideration had in mind federal and constitutional limitations upon its power to tax and secondly what in a sense may be termed multiple taxation. The privileges taxed as before indicated are “use, storage, and consumption”. If a taxpayer stores within the state supplies purchased outside the state in readiness to replace, repair, or otherwise maintain a transportation system or other instrumentality of commerce extending across state lines, the benefit of their use would not be confined to this state and in some instances the consumption might be wholly in a neighboring state. If we go beyond this, we impute an intent to the Legislature which is at odds with the language and. purpose of the statute. The exemption applies not to personal property used or to be used in operating or maintaining “interstate commerce” which is a term of widest import, but relates to “interstate transportation or interstate commerce”. If the Legislature *351had in mind the whole field of interstate commerce of which transportation is only a part, it would not have referred to “interstate transportation”. “Where two -or more words of analogous meaning are employed together in a statute, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense, to express the same relations and give color and expression to each other.” 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 247. It would, therefore, appear that the Legislature had in mind not all interstate commerce but the transportation or closely related feature of such commerce and intended to limit the tax exemption to personal properties used in operating or maintaining interstate transportation and communication systems or other instrumentalities directly connected with the flow of commerce across state lines. This construction harmonizes with the objects and purposes of the Act and does not impute to the Legislature an intention to favor local activities perhaps within the regulatory power of Congress, but when separately considered are intrastate and the exaction of a use tax from them would not impose cumulative tax burdens.
It appears undisputed that the printing press sought to be taxed is used in the business of printing a newspaper which “is peculiarly local and distinct from its circulation whether or not that circulation be interstate commerce.” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra. Appellant’s activities are conducted locally and no other jurisdiction can repeat the tax. The trial court in my opinion arrived at a correct conclusion and the judgment below should be affirmed.