dissenting:
I dissent. I agree with the statement of the appellate court that a construction of our survival statute which did not preclude recovery of punitive damages “would once and for all put to rest the old adage that it is cheaper to kill your victim than to leave him maimed. In addition to deterring others from wilful and wanton misconduct, it would bring death actions into complete harmony with the general body of law governing other types of tortious conduct. Logically, it would seem that punitive damages should be allowed to the estate of the decedent under the survival statute.” 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 54.
In 1853 when the General Assembly enacted the wrongful Death Act (Laws of 1853, at 97), and in 1872 when the Survival Act (Rey. Stat. 1874, ch. 3, par. 122) was enacted the principle that punitive damages could be awarded was already firmly established. (See Peoria Bridge Association v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 236, 251.) Early in our history this court said, “Where the wrong is wanton, or it is willful, the jury are authorized to give an amount of damages beyond the actual injury sustained, as a punishment, and to preserve the public tranquillity. Foot v. Nichols, 28 Ill. 486." Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 476.
The majority treats as established doctrine that punitive damages may not be recovered in an action for wrongful death. The only authority for that proposition is dictum in Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410, which did not involve a verdict awarding punitive damages. It is further to be noted that Conant, decided in 1868, was not cited as authority for that proposition until 1973. See Baird v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co., 11 Ill. App. 3d 264.
Assuming, arguendo, that Conant v. Griffin is authority for the majority’s holding, I find apposite here our comment in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d 423, “What this court observed in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26, may appropriately be said again:
‘We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. (Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 111; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 615; Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422.)’ ” 56 Ill.2d 423, 431-32.