(dissenting).
I am of the opinion that payments made to decedent here under § 52 of the St. Paul charter were not made as compensation, but rather as payments for salary or for services previously rendered; hence, that § 176.11, subd. 6, providing for the deduction of “compensation” payments, is inapplicable.
It is to be noted that the workmen’s compensation act was enacted on October 1, 1913, subsequent to the adoption of the St. Paul charter. Accordingly, when § 52 came into effect, its provision for payments following injuries by city employes could not be viewed as compensation payments similar to those provided for in the subsequent compensation act. As the term “compensation” indicates, payments under the act were intended to compensate an injured employe or his dependents in the event of his death. Payments under the charter were not necessarily intended to have the same effect, since it is obvious that in many instances an injury might extend far beyond the periods provided for in § 52. In Hanson v. Hayes, 225 Minn. 48, 50, 29 N. W. (2d) 473, 474, we limited the term “compensation” as used in the act to payments made “under the workmen’s compensation act for injury, medical care, and hospitalization.”
*280It would seem to follow that the payments referred to in § 52 were not affected by the subsequent enactment of § 176.01, subd. 8, which relates to compensation payments provided for in a city charter. Section 52, as clearly indicated by its language, does not cover or relate to compensation payments as such, and there is no reference therein to the term “compensation.” The temporary “full pay” and “one-half pay” requirements extending for a brief period can scarcely be regarded as compensation payments as contemplated by the workmen’s compensation act for disabilities which, in many cases, might extend over a long period of time.
Our decision in Markley v. City of St. Paul, 142 Minn. 356, 172 N. W. 215, upon which the commission based its decision, is not to the contrary. There we stated (142 Minn. 358, 172 N. W. 216):
“The theory of the compensation act includes the idea that the wage earner ought not to be required to bear the whole result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that the community ought to share in the loss. The carrying of this theory into practical effect, the subject of which is one of public policy, must necessarily be committed to the legislature for governmental control. But such provision will not prevent a city operating under a home rule charter from providing additional compensation to a fireman injured in the course of his employment. Nor is a charter so providing inconsistent with the object of the compensation act. It follows that section 52 of the charter in question was not repealed but remains in force.”
While in this decision the term “compensation” is used in reference to § 52 of the charter, there is nothing therein which compels the conclusion that this court intended to construe the “full pay” and “one-half pay” salary payments provided for in § 52 as identical with, correlated to, or in lieu of the compensation payments provided for under the workmen’s compensation act.
In Segale v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 148 Minn. 40, 42, 180 N. W. 777, 778, likewise involving § 52 of the charter, the payments provided therein are not designated as compensation, but rather as “relief granted by the city.” Further, it is significant that other *281parts of § 52 make provision for payments of “salary” for “disability through injury or sickness” not connected with employment— quite distinctive from payments for compensation for injuries received in employment such as are provided for under workmen’s compensation legislation.
Considering the extrahazardous nature of the occupation involved, it would seem that § 52 of the charter was in the nature of an inducement to prospective employes, and that the extra payments provided for therein constituted compensation for the hazardous services which would be rendered rather than for any injuries received while in such service. Under such circumstances, I do not believe that payments made under § 52 bear any relationship to the deductions provided for in § 176.11, subd. 6, or § 176.01, subd. 8(1).