concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Under article iy section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy § 8(d)), the provisions of a statutory enactment must not only have a “natural and logical connection” to a single subject, they must also bear some legitimate relation to one another. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997). Although our court repudiated the second of these requirements in Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 356 (1999), we have since reaffirmed that
“a legislative act violates the single subject rule when the General Assembly ‘includes within one bill unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another.’ ” People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (1999), quoting Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 9.
Under this standard, Public Act 90 — 514 cannot withstand defendant’s constitutional challenge. The Act’s two sections, denominated as section 5 and section 10, have nothing whatever to do with each other. Section 5 amends section 21 — 260 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/21 — 260 (West 1998)), dealing with the sale of property for delinquent taxes, to provide that county collectors need not continue to offer mineral rights for sale if those rights have not been sold or confirmed after 10 consecutive years of being offered for sale. Section 10, the provision at issue in this case, has no connection whatsoever with mineral rights, delinquent taxes, or the Property Tax Code. Section 10 merely amends the Code of Civil Procedure’s rule governing execution of judgments against land held in tenancy by the entirety to clarify that the general rule prohibiting such executions is inapplicable where
“the property was transferred into tenancy by the entirety with the sole intent to avoid the payment of debts existing at the time of transfer beyond the transferor’s ability to pay those debts as they become due.” 735 ILCS 5/12 — 112 (West 1998).
Because the execution of judgments against land held in tenancy by the entirety is wholly unrelated to a county collector’s sale of mineral rights for delinquent taxes, Public Act 90 — 514 is invalid under the single subject rule and should not be applied. No contrary conclusion is possible unless we alter our interpretation of article FV( section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution to eliminate the requirement that the provisions of a bill bear a legitimate relation to one another. We did that once in Arangold, and it was a mistake. Having just resuscitated the requirement in Cervantes, we should not jettison it again here. Our decisions will be useless as precedent if we persist in changing the law with each successive case.
Even if I agreed with the majority’s current interpretation of the single subject rule, I still could not endorse its application of the rule here. Sections 5 and 10 of Public Act 90 — 514 not only lack any legitimate relationship to one another, they have no natural and logical connection to a single subject. My colleagues’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They contend the provisions of the law are related to a single subject in the sense that they both pertain to “the subject of property.” They might as well say that both provisions pertain to “money” or to “the law.” A taxonomy so broad is useless. It robs article iy section 8(d), of any real meaning.
In Feuhrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193 (1974), our court considered the validity of a law which amended 30 statutes dealing with professional, vocational and occupational licensing and registration to specify that the power to regulate the various professions, vocations and occupations covered by those statutes was vested solely in the state. We held that the challenged law could not be construed as pertaining to a single subject. In our view, each of the 30 individual laws involved dealt with a separate subject. Accordingly, we ruled that the law violated the single subject rule under article iy section 8(d), and was invalid. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d at 203-05.
If the statutes at issue in Fuehrmeyer did not share a common subject, we cannot seriously contend that a common subject unites sections 5 and 10 of Public Act 90— 514. The relationship between those provisions is far more attenuated than the relationship between the provisions at issue in Fuehrmeyer. Contrary to the majority, I believe that Public Act 90 — 514’s inclusion of so varied and discordant a pair of provisions represents precisely the sort of legislative “logrolling” article iy section 8(d), of our constitution was designed to prohibit.
Because Public Act 90 — 514 is unconstitutional, our court should decide this case in accordance with the law in effect prior to the statute’s enactment. Based upon that law, I would affirm the appellate court’s judgment reversing the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. Although the preamendment version of section 12 — 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12 — 112 (West 1994)) provides that property held in tenancy by the entirety “shall not be liable to be sold upon judgment entered *** against only one of the tenants,” the protection afforded by this rule is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Accordingly, if a debtor has conveyed his personal residence to himself and his spouse as tenants by the entirety, a creditor can have the conveyance set aside if, as alleged in this case, the debtor made the transfer or incurred the debt “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” any creditor. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(l) (West 1994). See In re Marriage of Del Giudice, 287 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings. Because Public Act 90 — 514 is invalid, there is no need to direct the circuit court to afford plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint under Public Act 90 — 514’s amendment to section 12 — 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.