Defendant, Charles B. Thayer, appeals trial court’s refusal to modify 1963 divorce decree to eliminate $100 per month alimony payment to plaintiff, Roxanne M. Thayer, contending there has been such a material change in circumstances that the alimony payments should be eliminated. We affirm.
Our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Full, 255 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1977); Iowa R.App.P. 4.
Modification of the alimony provisions of a dissolution decree is justified only if there has been some material and substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, financially or otherwise, making it equitable that other terms be imposed. In re Marriage of Jensen, 251 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1977); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Iowa 1973). The burden rests on the party seeking modification to establish such a change of circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W. 511, 513 (Iowa 1973). Circumstances that have changed, to justify modification of alimony, must be those that were not within contemplation of the trial court when the original decree was entered. Full, 255 N.W.2d at 159. Moreover, the change in circumstances must be continuous, not temporary. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d at 635.
In support of his action, Charles alleges three circumstances have changed since the entry of the original decree: Roxanne’s income increased from $4,600 per year at the time of the decree (1963) to over $19,000 per year currently; Roxanne inherited a sum from her mother that has appreciated to approximately $18,000; and her equity of approximately $11,000 in a house awarded to her at the time of the decree has increased to at least $43,000 in a different house purchased with proceeds from the sale of the first house. Charles contends these changes warrant modification because they show Roxanne no longer needs the alimony payments for support and to continue them would be inequitable. We disagree.
We think these changes were within the reasonable contemplation of the trial court at the time it made its original award of alimony in 1963. Sandler v. Sandler, 165 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Iowa 1969). It is *224foreseeable Roxanne’s income would increase, particularly when she remained at the same job. Likewise, the receiving of an inheritance in this instance is not of such a magnitude to warrant a finding of a change in circumstances. Using her equity in the awarded house to purchase another is also a reasonably foreseeable event. The magnitude of the absolute dollar amounts may be attributed to the general inflationary trend of the past two decades and, as a result, lose their impact. See generally Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d at 636; Wells v. Wells, 168 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Iowa 1969).
Charles has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been any material and substantial change, not within the contemplation of the trial court when it entered the original decree, to warrant termination of the $100 per month alimony award to Roxanne. The payment of $100 per month is not burdensome when considering that Charles’ annual income is nearly $39,000. Moreover, Roxanne’s need is not the sole criterion for the award or continuance of alimony. Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968). Considering the financial situations of both parties, we do not consider it inequitable to deny modification.
AFFIRMED.
OXBERGER, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., dissent.