(dissenting). The majority concludes plaintiffs injury comes within the contemplation of MCL 500.3106(b); MSA 24.13106(b), i.e. arising out of the "ownership, operation, maintenance or use” of a motor vehicle. The majority further concludes plaintiff was not a pedestrian. Therefore, plaintiffs vehicle was "involved” within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b). "Had plaintiff carried the required insurance coverage, he would be the recipient of the benefits he now attempts to claim from the substitute source.”
I do not agree with this reasoning.
Whether plaintiffs injury arose out of "the ownership, operation, maintenance or use” of a motor vehicle, which would entitle him to receive benefits had he carried the requisite insurance coverage, should not necessarily control in determining whether plaintiffs vehicle was "involved” in the accident.
The so-called "no-fault automobile insurance act” is remedial in nature.1 Insofar as the Act is remedial in nature, it is to be liberally construed.2
*59Collins v Motorists Mutual Ins Co,3 and Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins Co,4 relied upon by the majority, exemplify liberal construction of a remedial act.
I do not agree that such liberal construction should be followed in determining the issue of exclusion from benefits.
Plaintiffs vehicle was parked. MCL 500.3106; MSA 24.13106 provides in pertinent part:
"Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless ** * *
"(b) The injury was a direct result of physical contact With equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used of property being lifted onto or lowered frtím the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.”
My Brothers rely on sub-section (b) of the aforesaid statute in concluding that plaintiff incurred an accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation or maintenance or use of his parked automobile.
Not so. Plaintiffs injury was the "direct result” of being struck by another motor vehicle, not the "direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle”.
Plaintiffs motor vehicle was not "involved” in this accident within the contemplation of MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b).
I would reverse.
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
Dillon v Secretary of State, 61 Mich App 588; 233 NW2d 96 (1975).
36 Mich App 424; 194 NW2d 198 (1971).
393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975).