(concurring). I agree with the majority that the existing case law does not dictate a holding here that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. I am disturbed, nevertheless, by what I perceive as the court’s tacit approval of trial counsel’s behavior. Mr. Brower’s willingness to take the case in spite of its unpopularity is doubtless praiseworthy, but cannot suffice to immunize his conduct from further scrutiny.
One element of the "fundamental and absolute” right to counsel is the full and undivided loyalty of attorney to client. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942). I am not convinced that counsel here demonstrated the requisite sensitivity to, and respect for, this principle. Mr. Brower was notified by his professional associate, Mr. Piscitello, that Mr. Piscitello’s wife was "good friends” with the victim of the crime. When Mr. Piscitello urged Mr. Brower not to take the case for several reasons, including his wife’s relationship with the victim, Mr. Brow-er replied, "So what,” and told Mr. Piscitello to mind his own business.
So glib a reply is particularly suspect in light of the real incidents of Mr. Brower’s association with Mr. Piscitello. While the two attorneys were not partners, they shared secretarial help and library facilities, and consulted each other on some cases. With relation to the instant matter, on one occasion Mr. Brower told the defendant that his *657(Brower’s) absence from a hearing on the case would not make any difference since Mr. Piscitello was there from his office and would represent the defendant if necessary. Further, Mr. Piscitello accepted money from the defendant on Mr. Brower’s behalf, subpoenaed hospital records for the case, and was billed for these. Thus, while Mr. Piscitello’s active involvement with the case may have been only tangential, Mr. Brower clearly availed himself of tangible attributes of their mutual association in regard to this case.
Mr. Brower was well aware of Mr. Piscitello’s serious personal and professional misgivings about his having taken the case. Mr, Brower admitted that Mr. Piscitello’s relationship to the victim could have had a subconscious effect on him. Without engaging in an extensive psychoanalytic exploration, I am left with the uncomfortable feeling that Mr. Brower’s advocacy for his client might well have been dampened by these countervailing considerations.
A look at a few of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association is instructive.
Canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.”1 EC 5-1: "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client” (emphasis supplied). EC 5-21: "The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf of his client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free judgment. The desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless that person is in a position *658to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon the lawyer. These influences are often subtle, and a lawyer must be alert to their existence. A lawyer subjected to outside pressures should make full disclosure of them to his client; and if he or his client believes that the effectiveness of his representation has been or will be impaired thereby, the lawyer should take proper steps to withdraw from representation of his client” (emphasis supplied).
The quoted language emphasized highlights my concern here, namely, the extent of Mr. Brower’s disclosure to the defendant of the arguable potential for divided loyalty in the handling of this case. The record indicates that on one occasion the defendant saw Mr. Piscitello talking to the victim. When he related this observation to his attorney, Mr. Brower merely told him not to worry "because Piscitello is not representing him.”
A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to expect loyalty from his counsel, and is entitled to an explanation of behavior which casts doubt on that loyalty. In this case, the defendant deserved more than a cursory dismissal of his stated concerns. He should have been informed fully of the outside pressures on his attorney, and of the facts creating such pressures, whether or not that attorney had already convinced himself that he was impervious to their influence. On full disclosure of all the facts, including Mr. Piscitello’s expressed desire that Mr. Brower not take the case, the defendant should have been given the opportunity to decide whether the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation had been, or would be, impaired thereby. If the defendant decided that he could no longer be represented effectively, or that he no longer wished to have Mr. Brower represent him for any reason, Mr. Brow-er would have been obliged to take appropriate steps toward withdrawal from the case.
I agree with the majority in its holding that the circum- • stances here do not mandate a per se disqualification of Mr. Brower. Nor do I think that the case law supports the *659view, propounded by the defendant, that the conflicts inherent in Mr. Brower’s position give rise to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude. But I view influences such as those involved here as significant nonetheless, calling for serious, thoughtful consideration by counsel, and full disclosure to the client.
See S.J.C. Rule 3:22, adopting ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5, 359 Mass. 814 (1972).