(dissenting) — Divisions I and III of the majority opinion seem to me to be unsound in reasoning and erroneous in the conclusions reached. I am constrained to dissent therefrom.
I. Division I of the majority opinion holds that the trial court did not commit error in failing to instruct on section 321.354, Code of 1950, which was in effect at the time of the collision. It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff stopped his truck on the pavement; there is no dispute as to this. There is also substantial evidence that at the point where he stopped and for some distance ahead and back thereof there was a shoulder ten feet wide upon which he could have pulled his .vehicle before stopping. Since the majority opinion omits some parts of section 321.354 which may have a bearing upon the question at issue, I set it out again more fully:
“321.354 Stopping on traveled way. Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practical to stóp, park, or so. leave such vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every event a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of such part of the highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle [shall] be available from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction upon such highway * *
*1022While it may not be material, I desire to correct the record made by the majority when it refers to' the “predecessor” of section 321.354, designated as section 5054 of the Code of 1924. A part of this section is quoted; but very material parts are omitted, giving a much too inclusive meaning to the statute. The important omission from section 5054 as quoted follows the words “during any period of time”. The statute follows this with “for one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise.” This section was limited to the hours set out. It did not apply to vehicles upon the highways during the daylight hours, and so far as the ease at bar is concerned was in no sense a predecessor to section 321.354. Section 321.354 had no predecessor in our statute law for daytime hours, during which the accident with which we are here concerned happened.
The important part of section 321.354 is the words “stop, park, or leave standing.” The majority says: “Primarily, this is a parking restriction statute.” Then comes the erroneous reference to and partial quote from section 5054, Code of 1924, and then this language: “Clearly the word ‘stop’ used in the statute is intended as synonymous with ‘park’ or ‘leave standing’.” It is at this point that I part company with the majority. It may be true that the word “park” includes stopping; but as the majority points out, there is more included in “parking” than merely stopping. If the statute is merely a parking statute, if “stop” is synonymous with “park” or “leave standing”, why is the word “stop” included!
The rule of statutory construction is that meaning must be given to every word in the act, and that the legislature understood the meaning of the words it used and intended them all to have effect. 82 C. J. S., Statutes, section 316(b); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 358. That construction is favored which will render every word operative, rather than one which eliminates some words, or makes them merely repetitious and of no effect. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 358, supra. We ourselves have said that a construction making certain words in a statute redundant and useless will be avoided; it will not be presumed the legislature intended such a result. A statute should be interpreted, if possible, to give effect to all of the language used. *1023Hartz v. Truckenmiller, 228 Iowa 819, 824, 293 N.W. 568, 571. We have also said that in construing a statute all the language is to be considered. Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 185, 186, 118 N.W. 276, 277, 23 L. R. A., N. S., 1284, 132 Am. St. Rep. 261, 17 Ann. Cas. 750.
By what logic the majority avoids giving the word “stop” its usual meaning, as distinguished from “park” or “leave standing'” is not clear to me, after considerable study of the opinion. It seems evident that the legislature had something in mind in using it. It intended to prohibit something more than halting and leaving standing, or stopping and remaining standing. Other courts have had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that “stop” in similar statutes was put there for a definite purpose. It adds a restriction which would not be present if the statute meant nothing more than “park or leave standing.” In Neeley v. Bock, 184 Wash. 135, 50 P.2d 524, 526, there is found this definition from 3 Berry on Automobiles, 7th Ed., page 130:
“ ‘Parking’ within the meaning of regulatory statutes has been defined as the ‘voluntary act of leaving a ear on the highway when not in use’; another court has stated that ‘to park’ is ‘to permit a vehicle to remain standing on a public highway or street.’
“It has been held that parking means something more than stopping temporarily or momentarily for a necessary purpose.”
The question was again before the Washington Supreme Court, in Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 37 Wash.2d 831, 838, 226 P.2d 889, 893. The case involved the construction of a city ordinance which contained the words “ ‘stop, stand or park.’ ” In answer to the contention that this was merely a parking ordinance and so did not apply to the standing of vehicles while they are being loaded or unloaded, the. court said: “In the case at bar, we are concerned with the meaning of the words ‘stop, stand or park’, which are more definite and comprehensive than the phrase ‘park or leave standing’. The case cited is not here in point.” It was also said in the same case (page 837- of 37 Wash.2d, page 893 of 226 P.2d):
*1024“Appellants cite authorities to the effect that statutes or ordinances governing the parking of motor vehicles, which forbid parking or standing, do not prohibit commercial loading or unloading. These eases are not in point, as the ordinance in question forbids any person to ‘stop, stand or park a motor vehicle’ within the prohibited area.”
In Gaches v. Daw, 168 Wash. 162, 10 P.2d 1111, 1114, where it appeared that the defendants had stopped their car on the highway to look at a direction sign and their automobile was struck by the plaintiff, the court approved an instruction which told the jury that if they stopped the car on the paved portion of the road when it was practicable for them to drive it off the highway, they would be negligent.
The Indiana Supreme Court went into the matter at some length in Northern Indiana Transit, Inc., v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 168, 89 N.E.2d 905, 907, 908, 17 A. L. R.2d 572. The material part of the statute involved is quoted: “ ‘* * * every vehicle stopped or parked upon a roadway where there is an adjacent curb shall be so stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels of such vehicle parallel with and within twelve [12] inches of the right-hand curb.’ ”
A bus owned and operated by the appellant, transit company, had stopped at about a thirty-degree angle with the curb to take on passengers, and was struck by an automobile. The appellee was a passenger in the bus and was injured in the collision.
The Indiana Supreme Court (pages 169, 170 of 228 Ind.) used this cogent language in pointing out the distinction between stopping and parking:
“There is a distinction between parking and stopping a motor vehicle. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed.) defines the term ‘stop’ to mean, ‘A cessation of motion, operation, progress, function, or the like.’ Parking* includes stopping, but stopping does not necessarily result in parking. A leading ease on the question of parking has defined the term as follows: ‘* * # The term “parking”, as applied to automobiles and automobile traffic, has a well-defined meaning, understood by all automobile drivers to mean not only the voluntary *1025act of leaving a ear on the street unattended but also the stopping of a car on the highway though occupied and attended for a length of time inconsistent with the reasonable use of a street, considering the primary purpose for which streets exist. Streets exist primarily for the purpose of travel.’
“* * * The uniform act has been carefully prepared, and it is difficult to presume the draftsmen were careless in the use of language, or that in the many places where the word ‘stop’ is used, it means not only stop but also parking, for parking under any possible definition includes stopping. Under appellant’s contention the term ‘stop’ would be mere surplusage in the act. Moreover, the dangers to the traveling public from stopping in an unreasonable manner may be just as serious as stopping a sufficient length of time to become parking.”
These authorities fully answer the majority position that our statute, section 321.354, supra, is no more than a parking statute and that the word “stop” therein is merely a synonym for “park” or “park or leave standing.” In fact, from the standpoint of common sense and logic, no authority should be needed to demonstrate that the legislature had a definite purpose in using the word “stop.” The majority would eliminate it altogether. I cannot presume the legislature meant that it would have no meaning. The statute is worded in the disjunctive—that is, it reads “stop, park, or leave standing.” (Italics supplied.) When possible, every word should be given meaning and force.
The majority cites authorities to the effect that we should adopt that construction of the statute which will not entail unjust, unreasonable or absurd consequences. I do not disagree with this rule. But I do not find it applicable. On the other hand, I think the word “stop” was inserted in the statute for the purpose of preventing the exact danger which contributed to the collision here. In considering whether an instruction should have been given as to section 321.354 we must turn to the record to discover whether there was evidence which made it material. The defendant Walters, driver of the Wemer truck, testified that his brakes were working well; that he saw a light on the rear of the Jesse truck flash once, but did not see any *1026stop light or any other stop sign given. He says: “The plaintiff in this case made a quick stop. It was not a slow, careful stop. I would say it was an abrupt stop.” He also denies that a northbound truck passed them at or about the time of the collision.
The jury might have found, therefore, that after passing the Wemer truck the Jesse truck made an abrupt stop, without giving a stop signal. The majority apprehends that if we hold the statute means what it says, that is, that a “stop” as distinguished from a “parking” or a “leaving standing” is prohibited, we will invite endless unpleasant consequences. It points out that there are many times when, “due to road repair, narrow bridges, or other hazardous situations, due care demands that one stop his vehicle momentarily.” It reasons that we should not adopt an interpretation of the law that would require a vehicle stopping under such circumstances to drive off the traveled portion of the highway or to explain in court why he did not do so. The ready answer to this contention is that we are not here concerned with such a situation. It may be that there are times when the lack of practicality is so apparent that a trial court would be justified in refusing to instruct on the statute. But we have no such condition here. We can cross those bridges when we reach them. There is substantial evidence that the driver of the Jesse truck had just passed the Wemer vehicle; that he gave no signal of his intention to stop, but made “an abrupt stop”; and that there was ample room and adequate facilities on the shoulder for him to pull off the paved portion of the highway. If we assume, as I have no doubt we must, that the word “stop” was inserted deliberately and for a purpose in the statute, and that it was intended to cover situations where the stop was intended to be only very brief, not long enough to become a parking within the meaning of that word, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances which require its application more than in the case before us. It is not a question of whether it is convenient for the driver intending to make only a “stop” to leave the traveled portion of the roadway. Generally it will not be convenient. But we cannot say that excuses him. On this point the Wisconsin Supreme Court has said:
“Under that provision, the parking, stopping, or leaving of *1027a vehicle on the roadway of a highway, outside of a business or residence district, is prohibited whenever it is practical to park, stop, or leave such vehicle standing off such roadway. As the only issue in that respect, under that, provision, is whether it was practical to park, stop, or leave the grader stand off the roadway, the mere fact that it may have been inconvenient or less advantageous, in point of saving time, ‘Or otherwise, to move the vehicle off the roadway, affords no excuse for failing to avoid a condition which obviously was considered such a source of danger to the traveling public that it was expressly prohibited by that safety statute. The necessity for avoiding such a menace is emphasized by the fact that it is further provided in section 85.19(1), Stats., that even when it is not practical to park, stop, or leave a vehicle off of such roadway, it shall nevertheless in no event be parked, stopped, or left upon any highway, ‘unless a clear and unobstructed width of no less than fifteen feet upon the roadway of such highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles thereon, nor unless a clear view of such vehicle may be obtained from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction along such highway.’ ” Kassela v. Hoseth, 217 Wis. 115, 119, 258 N.W. 340, 342.
The Wisconsin statute, set out in the opinion, is substantially the same as our section 321.354; and it should be noted that attention is called to the provision that an unobstructed width of fifteen feet (in our statute it is twenty) must be left opposite the stopped vehicle, and it is thought that this emphasizes the purpose of the statute.
In Gaches v. Daw, supra, the defendants had stopped their car on the highway near an intersection, to determine which fork of the highway to take to reach their desired destination, when the plaintiff’s vehicle, approaching from the rear, collided with it. The Washington statute is similar to ours. The Washington Supreme Court approved an instruction (page 169 of 168 Wash.) which told the jury that if the defendants “stopped their car on the paved portion of the highway, when it was practicable to leave [it] standing off the highway, then they *1028were guilty of negligence”; and further that if they stopped their automobile on the highway without leaving “a clear and unobstructed width of not less than sixteen feet” of the main traveled portion of the highway opposite their car, they would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law. (Italics supplied.) In Northern Indiana Transit, Inc., v. Burk, supra, the stop was only momentary, to take on passengers; but the statute was held to apply.
We ourselves have said that there was a jury question on the negligence of a driver who stopped his ear on the highway at night, to remove ice from the windshield so that he could see, weather conditions having so encrusted the glass that visibility was destroyed. We cited several cases from other jurisdictionswhieh hold that a car is not disabled within the meaning of a statute such as our section 321.355, which excuses a stop under such circumstances. The holding was that this does not amount to a disability of the vehicle within the meaning of the last-cited section, and there was a jury question upon the issue of the negligence of the driver who stopped without leaving the pavement. The evidence as stated in the opinion was that the driver knew he was stopping on the pavement, but could not see the shoulder. Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442, 443, 444, 41 N.W.2d 13, 14, 15, 15 A. L. R.2d 903. Surely the situation of the driver of the defendant’s car in the cited case was much more difficult than was the plaintiff’s in the case at bar. Jesse was driving in bright daylight, on a dry pavement, with knowledge that another truck was not far behind, and there is substantial evidence he had a broad shoulder on his right hand upon which he could have driven with no more than some slight inconvenience.
The plaintiff-appellee cites and relies upon Winter v. Davis, 217 Iowa 424, 251 N.W. 770. This is another case of an ice-obscured windshield. The exact holding was that the question of the negligence of the plaintiff, who had stopped his car partly on the pavement to clear his windshield, was for the jury. That is the identical point I seek to make in the case at bar. However, the case has little relevance here in any event, since it was decided before the enactment of section 321.354. Section 5054, Code of 1924, then in effect, prohibited permitting unlighted *1029vehicles to stand upon the traveled part of the highway from one-half hour after sunset until one-half hour before sunrise. (Italics supplied.) “Stop”, and for that matter “park”, was not a part of the statute at that time. The ease is not referred to in Tulin v. Clark, supra; no doubt because of the change in the statute and because in any event the holding goes no further than that there was a jury question on the matter of the plaintiff’s negligence.
As the defendants point out and the majority agrees, violation without legal excuse of a statute which prescribes certain standards of care is negligence per se. But I do not contend that the situation in the instant case shows such violation, so that a peremptory verdict for the defendants was required. The statute itself is elastic, to the extent that it must be found that it was “practical” to “stop, park, or leave standing” the vehicle in question off the traveled part of the highway. But surely the jury should have been instructed upon section 321.354, and told that if they found it was practical to stop off the traveled portion of the roadway and the driver did not do so, he was guilty of negligence. Failure to do so was reversible error.
II. I am equally unable to agree with my learned colleagues of the majority that no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court’s refusal to instruct upon the duty to keep an adequate lookout to the rear. I must first part company with them because I am unable to understand from the lengthy dissertation in the majority opinion exactly what it decides or what the true rule is thought to be. I fear only confusion will result in the mind of the trial court or the practicing lawyer who attempts to say what we have decided. I see no reason why we should not adhere to the rule laid down in Clayton v. McIlrath, 241 Iowa 1162, 1170, 44 N.W.2d 741, 27 A. L. R.2d 307. It is succinct and what it says is not left in doubt. I think there is a definite duty to keep a lookout to the rear, as expressed in Code section 321.437, which requires that every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a rear-vision mirror, so located as to give a view of the highway to the rear for a distance of at least two hundred feet. If there is no duty to keep a lookout to the rear, the purpose of this statute is obscure. The true rule, I believe, is that *1030a driver of a motor vehicle on the public highways is at all times required to use ordinary care under the circumstances to keep a lookout, to the rear as well as in front, and to the side for vehicles which may be in the act of passing. I do not think we should say that the duty to keep a lookout in front is paramount to the duty to look to the rear. Under all circumstances, the duty is that of using ordinary care to keep a lookout, whether to the front, the rear or the side.
However, since the majority ends with the determination that there is some duty to keep a lookout to the rear, my major disagreement with Division III of the opinion is that it concludes with a holding that, although there may be a duty to keep a lookout to the rear to some unspecified extent, the court did not commit reversible error here because the plaintiff-driver did all that he could have done if such lookout had been kept. This proceeds upon an assumption of facts not justified by the record.
I do not find the “undisputed evidence” to which the majority refers, that the plaintiff “gave warning signals which were seen and understood by the operator of the following vehicle while still some 150 feet behind him.” I do not so read the record. I have pointed out above, in Division I of this dissent, a part of the defendant driver’s testimony on this point. To give it somewhat more in detail, he said that he saw a light blink on the Jesse trailer: “They were corner lights and a cluster of lights and they are located on the lower part of the trailer. They are not what you call stop lights. They are those running lights on the trailer. I saw them flash once. * * * At or about that time I did not see any stop light on the other vehicle come on. I didn’t see a stop light on the other vehicle until after the accident.” Surely this made a jury question as to whether a warning signal was given which was seen and understood by the driver of the following vehicle. If this is so, the basis upon which the majority places its holding that failure to instruct on the duty to keep a lookout was nonprejudicial is destroyed.
Nor am I able to agree that failure to give an instruction on lookout was without prejudice, even if the record had been as the majority says it is. There were other things that the plaintiff-driver might have done, in addition to giving warning *1031signals of his intention to stop. If he had been keeping a proper lookout, he might have decided to keep in motion instead of stopping; he might have made a gradual instead of an abrupt stop; he might, under his own testimony, have started again before the collision occurred; or he might even have obeyed the mandate of section 321.354 and pulled his vehicle to the shoulder at the side of the road. It must be kept in mind there is substantial evidence, as pointed out in Division I above, that the plaintiff made a sudden stop; an “abrupt stop” is the exact language. This in itself tends strongly to negative the use of ordinary care in keeping a lookout to the rear. The jury might have found, if properly instructed, that the plaintiff was not using due care in keeping such a lookout. In fact, the majority’s reasoning* has the practical effect of negativing the necessity for a lookout or any issue made or instruction given concerning it. I am unable to believe that a driver who is under a 'duty to use ordinary care in keeping a lookout to the rear is relieved from that duty for no better reason than that he has given a signal of his intention to stop his vehicle, without using his rear-vision mirror or making any other attempt to observe what the situation behind his vehicle might be. The plaintiff had the burden to prove his freedom from contributory negligence. Under the circumstances here the jury might well have found that he owed the lookout duty above defined, and that he had failed to show that he had discharged it.
It is noteworthy that the appellee does not argue the point made by the majority, that although there was a duty to use ordinary care in keeping a lookout to the rear, and there is no evidence of the discharge of such duty, the failure to instruct thereupon is excused by the supposed fact that the plaintiff did all that he could have done by giving a signal of intention to stop. The appellee’s contention is that there is no such duty to keep a watch to the rear. The majority concedes there is such a duty.
Both the questions discussed in Divisions I and II of this dissent were called to the attention of the trial court in several ways. It was error to fail to instruct upon them. This is elementary, but see Dakovich v. City of Des Moines, 241 Iowa 703, 710, 711, 42 N.W.2d 511, 515.
*1032I would reverse because of the failure of the court to instruct upon the plaintiff’s duty under section 321.354 and to keep a proper lookout.
Bliss, C. J., and Garfield and Oliver, JJ., join in this dissent.