specially concurring:
I agree with the result by the majority of the court because I believe the result is in accord with the applicable precedents. However, I am disturbed about some of the reasoning employed in such precedents because of the apparent departure from our traditional concepts of arrest. To speak of “accost” or “stop” or “investigatory stop” as not being arrests suggests to me that we are employing euphemisms to avoid the application to arrests of well settled principles of law. If a police officer in his line of duty restrains an individual’s liberty, then an arrest has occurred, and calling it by some other name does little credit to our adherence to legal principles. Where, as in this case, the testimony of the officer as well as the circumstances justify the conclusion that the defendant was not free to leave, then I find it hard to conclude other than that an arrest had occurred. This is not a case where the police officer was merely intending to exchange pleasantries or discuss the weather. It is clear from the officers’ testimony and their conduct that they believed the defendant was fleeing, which contradicts any inference that the defendant was free to leave or that her liberty had not been restrained. I therefore believe that the trend of decisions which encourages deprivation of liberty by police officers without reasonable cause as would be required if the action were classified as an arrest represents a trend inconsistent with our traditional concept of individual liberties.