dissenting:
The issue, as stated by the majority, is whether the arrest of the defendant was lawful and this is dependent upon whether the sheriff had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was committing or had committed an offense viewed in light of the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. It is my conclusion the police officers here lacked reasonable grounds to believe defendant had committed an offense. The testimony of the officers is crucial and contrary to the result reached by the majority. Sheriff Bliven testified he didn’t see defendant and his two companions do anything except sit on the car, but he wondered why they were there. He specifically stated he didn’t have probable cause to believe the three were planning anything, just suspicions.
The cases cited by the majority support the general principles concerning the legality of arrests but are not supportive of the result here due to the difference in factual situations. In People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, the arresting officers were members of the gambHng detafi and knew defendant and defendant knew them. The officers watched defendant park his car and saw him go into the building, and defendant saw the officers. When defendant came out of the building 20 minutes later he ran back into the building as soon as he saw the officers were still there. In People v. Cain, 35 Ill.2d 184, 220 N.E.2d 195, the police officers with a warrant after knocking on the door heard defendant cry out “police” and saw him- put the packet into his mouth. In People v. Pruitt, 79 Ill.App.2d 209, 223 N.E.2d 537, defendants, husband and wife, were arrested in a church at a time when services were not in session, and the budding was locked except for one door which admitted persons into a corridor off which the church office and other rooms were located. Defendant husband was seen kneeling before the safe in the office. As can readily be seen, these cases cited by the majority are distinguishable from the case at bar where the officers, responding to what they thought was yelling outside the jailhouse, went outside and observed only that defendant and two others were sitting on the hood of a car. The deputy asked one of them whether he was talking to the prisoners and was told that he was not.
It is also of some significance that none of the three were charged with disorderly conduct. One was released with a warning not to talk to the prisoners again. Another was told that the charge was trespassing and was released after being fingerprinted and searched. When defendant was searched a small amount of cannabis was found, and he was the only one booked and jailed and not for disorderly conduct.
The majority’s hypothesis seems to be that defendant and the others could have been arrested for disorderly conduct, and yet none of the three were so charged. Although it is not necessary to bring subsequent charges to justify an otherwise valid arrest, in the case at bar there were no reasonable grounds for believing defendant and the others had committed an offense, and, accordingly, I believe the arrest was illegal, the search incident to this arrest improper, the evidence should have been suppressed and therefore the conviction should be reversed.