specially concurring:
I agree with the majority that a sentence of court supervision is not authorized by statute under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, I agree that a mandamus order should issue directing Judge Kinzer to vacate the sentence of court supervision and impose a sentence in accordance with the law. My reasons for reaching this conclusion, however, differ from those expressed by the majority.
Section 5 — 6—1(d)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:
“The provisions of paragraph (c) [which authorize an order of supervision] shall not apply to a defendant charged with violating Section 11 — 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance when the defendant has previously ***
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(3) pleaded guilty to or stipulated to the facts supporting a charge or a finding of guilty to a violation of Section 11 — 503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [reckless driving] or a similar provision of a local ordinance or any similar law or ordinance of another state, and the plea or stipulation was the result of a plea agreement.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 6—1(d)(3) (West 2006).
The State contends, and the majority holds, that the “plea agreement” referred to in paragraph (3) above means any plea agreement, regardless of its terms or basis. Respondent, Kyle Kissack, however, contends that, pursuant to our decision in People v. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d 146 (1989), section 5 — 6—1(d)(3) has been interpreted to mean that a sentence of court supervision is prohibited only if the previous plea of guilty to reckless driving was the result of a plea agreement whereby a charge of driving under the influence was reduced or otherwise disposed of. On this point, I agree with respondent.
In Eckhardt we were asked to decide whether section 5 — 6—1(d)(3) violated equal protection guarantees provided by both the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). The defendant in Eckhardt contended that section 5 — 6—1(d)(3) violated equal protection principles because it treated those who were found guilty of reckless driving pursuant to a plea agreement differently than those who were convicted of the same offense after entering a blind plea or having gone to trial, with respect to their eligibility for supervision on a subsequent section 11 — 501 (driving under the influence of alcohol) charge.
Addressing this claim, we first noted that the equal protection guarantee does not prevent different classes of people from being treated differently, as long as there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing the class to which the law applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151; People v. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1986). Thus, we said, a legislative classification will be upheld against an equal protection challenge if any set of facts can reasonably be conceived which will sustain the classification. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151. We further noted that, where a suspect classification or a fundamental right is not involved, the legislation need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to survive an equal protection challenge. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151.
Applying these standards, we initially held that there was a rational basis for differentiating between persons who have plea bargained to reckless driving and those who have entered a blind plea to reckless driving. Plea bargaining typically results in a reduction of the initial charge. Thus, we concluded that persons who plea bargained were given some consideration for the agreement to plead guilty which persons who entered blind pleas did not receive. We further found that section 5 — 6—1(d) was rationally related to the state’s legitimate goal of promoting highway safety. We said:
“The thrust of this statute is to prevent repeat drunk driving offenders from driving and endangering the lives of motorists on Illinois highways. This is a legitimate goal that is well within the State’s police powers.” Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151-52.
We then went on to state:
“The next focus of inquiry is whether the denial of supervision to those who, pursuant to a plea agreement, have pled guilty to, or stipulated to facts supporting a charge or a finding of guilty of, a violation of section 11— 503 (reckless driving) within the last five years is rationally related to the goal of highway safety. Reckless driving is a Class B misdemeanor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9572, par. 11 — 503(b).) Driving under the influence is a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense in addition to administrative penalties. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9572, par. 11— 501(c).) The obvious focus of the prohibition of supervision found in section 5 — 6—1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections is to preclude supervision not only to those who had previously been convicted of driving under the influence, but also to those who had been charged with that offense and plea bargained for the lesser offense of reckless driving. A person who has plea bargained to a charge of reckless driving is thus in a different position from a person who has entered a blind plea to a reckless driving charge. We find that section 5 — 6—1(d) is rationally related to the State’s legitimate goal of promoting highway safety. In view of our analysis of the purpose of the statute, we find no equal protection violation.” (Emphasis added.) Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152-53.
In responding to the equal protection challenge in Eckhardt, we construed section 5 — 6—1(d) in a way which would preserve its constitutionality. Doing so, we held that the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest when applied to “those who had been charged with [driving under the influence] and plea bargained for the lesser offense of reckless driving.” The majority errs when it finds that, in Eckhardt, “we simply made statements about the broad focus of section 5 — 6— 1(d) in the context of determining whether it was rationally related to the state’s goal of promoting highway safety.” 232 Ill. 2d at 188.
The majority holds that the Eckhardt court “conclusively resolved the defendant’s equal protection claim by finding that the groups at issue were not similarly situated.” 232 Ill. 2d at 187. The majority then states that the Eckhardt court “nevertheless went on to find that section 5 — 6—1(d) was rationally related to the state’s legitimate goal of promoting highway safety,” relegating the Eckhardt court’s finding of a rational basis for the legislation to mere dicta which need not be followed. 232 Ill. 2d at 187. I cannot agree.
I agree that a person who plea bargains to reckless driving is differently situated than a person who enters a blind plea or is prosecuted and convicted of reckless driving. But, as Eckhardt recognized, the reason why it is appropriate to treat a person who plea bargains more harshly (denying them supervision) is because of the presumption that the person who plea bargains to reckless driving was, in fact, charged with DUI, could have been found guilty on that charge, but was able to obtain a reduction of that charge. The opposite is true for a person who enters a blind plea or goes to trial and is convicted of reckless driving. In these case, the presumption is that the person was either not charged with DUI or that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for DUI.
The rational basis determination in Eckhardt was not simply empty musings or meaningless dicta. It was essential to its finding of constitutionality. Pursuant to Eckhardt, the constitutionality of section 5 — 6—1(d)(3) is sustainable only if the respondent’s previous plea to reckless driving was part of a plea agreement calculated to avoid a conviction for DUI. By overruling Eckhardt’s finding of a rational basis, the majority is calling into question whether the statute survives equal protection scrutiny. Indeed, the majority’s interpretation renders the statute potentially unconstitutional.
To the extent that the circuit court interpreted the statute as requiring the respondent’s prior plea to reckless driving to be part of a plea agreement to reduce or dismiss a prior charge of DUI, I would affirm the court’s judgment. I believe, however, that the circuit court’s application of the statute, as interpreted, to the facts of the case at bar, was incorrect. The record shows that the State produced evidence which showed that respondent was charged in 2002 with DUI and reckless driving. At that time, respondent pled guilty to reckless driving and the DUI charge was dismissed “pursuant to agreement.” Although the sentencing statement for this earlier plea does not explicitly provide that the plea to reckless driving was in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss the DUI charge, that is a reasonable interpretation of the court’s 2002 sentencing order. Thus, section 5 — 6— 1(d)(3), even when interpreted as stated above, applies in this instance. Accordingly, I join in the majority’s decision to grant the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.