dissenting.
I believe the trial court properly denied Hi-Tek's request for injunctive relief and determined that the liquidated damages clause in Bryant's employment contract was valid. Any injury Hi-Tek has suffered or might suffer is purely economic. I would accordingly affirm.
In Indiana Family and Social Services Administration v. Walgreen Co., 7469 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.2002), our supreme court recently reversed the grant of an injunction that prevented the State from implementing certain emergency cost-containment measures. The emergency rules would have decreased the Medicaid reimbursement rates to pharmacies for drugs they dispensed and would have paid the pharmacies less for dispensing the drugs. *909The supreme court noted the general rule that a party suffering mere economic injury is not entitled to injunctive relief because damages are sufficient to make the party whole. Slip op. at 906. It further noted that "imminent business loss or failure is a form of economic injury." Id. n. 4.
There, the pharmacies offered testimony that in addition to the economic losses, some pharmacies might close. There was also testimony that some Medicaid recipients would be harmed. However, in light of other evidence that alternative sources of pharmacy services were available and the State would work to ensure the beneficiaries had sufficient access to services, the supreme court determined Walgreens "failed to identify any injury beyond purely economic injury, which is not enough to justify injunctive relief ... post-trial damages would adequately compensate for any injuries should Walgreens prevail at trial." Id. at 9.
The majority attempts to distinguish Waigreen from the case before us on the basis that "Walgreens failed to identify any injury beyond purely economic injury ... [blut here there is more than economic injury, namely, the violation of a prior agreement not to engage in specific conduct." I would decline to hold that a "violation of a prior agreement," standing alone, represents the type of non-economic "injury" that would provide a basis for injunctive relief. Such an analysis improperly equates the violation with the injury vel non that flows from the violation.
The breach of a contract does not by itself establish the damages that must be shown to bring an action for breach of contract. See, eg., Rogier v. American Testing and Engineering Corp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied, transfer denied (the essential elements of a breach of contract action are the existence of a contract, the defendant's breach thereof, and damages). Nor does the breach of a duty in tort by itself establish the injury that must be demonstrated to support a tort action. See, e.g., Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Dept. of Natwral Resources, 756 N.BE.2d 970, 975 (Ind.2001) (a negligence plaintiff must show duty owed to plaintiff by defendant, breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care, and compensable injury proximately caused by the breach).
By the same token, the fact Bryant violated the agreement between her and Hi-Tek cannot, standing alone, prove Hi-Tek suffered or likely would suffer non-economic injury as a result of the violation. A "violation" of an agreement is not, without more, an "injury."
Because Hi-Tek's injuries, whether for past or future violations,1 appear to be purely economic, I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it essentially found that Hi-Tek's remedies at law were adequate. The trial court therefore properly denied her request for injunctive relief, and I would affirm.
. The liquidated damages provision of the contract allows Hi Tek to recover liquidated damages of $5,000.00 for "each violation," and I share the majority's concern that the scope of a "violation" is left unclear. Still, the damage from each violation is undoubtedly only economic.