dissenting.
In my view, the trial court was within its considerable discretion to conclude that a manifest necessity existed to justify a mistrial and permit retrial in the instant case without violating Jackson's double jeopardy protections. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. In addition, I conclude that Jackson's challenges to the exclusion of certain evidence and to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him are without merit. Accordingly, I would affirm Jackson's conviction for Class C felony Battery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury.
I. Double Jeopardy
The majority employs a two-part analysis, the first part of which concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial based largely on the fact that an admonition could have been curative. As I see it, the single dispositive issue in Jackson's double jeopardy claim is whether the mistrial was justified on "manifest necessity" grounds. Once jeopardy attaches, the trial court may not grant a mistrial over a defendant's objection unless "manifest necessity" for the mistrial is found. Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 (Ind.1998) (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)).
Significantly, the availability and use of an admonition or other remedial language is not necessarily a determining factor under the "manifest necessity" analysis. Indeed, a "manifest necessity" justifying mistrial may be found irrespective of whether such an admonition was requested or given. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. 824 (acknowledging that cautionary instructions were not given and that mistrial not "necessary" in strict literal sense but nevertheless affirming trial court's grant of mistrial on "manifest necessity" grounds). The Indiana Supreme Court, adopting the United States Supreme Court's broad conception of "manifest necessity" in Arizona, has emphasized that "necessity" is "not to be interpreted literally" and that there need only be a "high degree" of necessity to justify a mistrial and permit retrial without violating double jeopardy. Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1015 (citing Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824). I am therefore unpersuaded by the majority's reasoning that the absence of an admonition in the instant case was fatal to the State's eligibility for a mistrial.
Of additional significance, when evaluating whether this "high degree" of necessity *550exists, the Indiana Supreme Court places great importance upon the extent to which the State is responsible for the circumstances leading to the mistrial. In Brown, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting the State a mistrial on "manifest necessity" grounds based largely upon the fact that the State was not responsible for, nor had any part in, creating the cireumstances leading it to request a mistrial. 703 N.E.2d at 1015-17. The facts in Brown involved the State's request for a mistrial after a juror revealed, following opening argument and attachment of jeopardy, that his role as a minister at a local jail would affect his ability to be an impartial juror by compromising his ministerial position and potentially his safety. Id. at 1014-15. The Brown court first determined that the presence of a juror with such concerns presented a structural impediment to a fair trial. Id. at 1016. The court then determined, based upon the State's questions and this juror's answers during voir dire, that the State could not be held accountable for failing to divine the unsuitability of this juror. Id. at 1017. On these grounds, and with great deference to the trial court due to its superior position to evaluate the "gravity of the impediment," the Brown court affirmed the existence of a "manifest necessity" warranting a new trial. Id.
Here, the record reveals that, through no action or fault by the State, five jurors were exposed to a newspaper article exhibiting the defendant's view that he was "another" victim of the State, largely due to the highly charged issues of his race and economic status. Two of the jurors read the article in its entirety. One of them suggested he would have difficulty judging somebody, and that he might "hurt the situation" and "hold up the process." Tr. p. ix. Based upon this evidence, the prosecutor argued that the State's case was irretrievably compromised, both because the prosecutor had been branded a racist and because Jackson had been permitted to allege unfairness by the State without risk of cross-examination. Although the jurors had reassured the court that they had not been influenced by the article, the trial court was not required to accept their claims on this point.
The trial court heard and observed the jurors' voir dire examination, and it was in a superior position to evaluate the article's influence on the jury. In granting mistrial, the trial court credited the State's claim that its case had been compromised in the eyes of the jurors. In deference to this factual assessment by the trial court, I am compelled to conclude that the jurors' exposure to the article presented a structural impediment to a fair trial. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 824 (citing Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 12 S.Ct. 171, 35 L.Ed. 968 (1891)) (endorsing great deference to a trial judge's assessment of juror bias, and grant of mistrial, due to a newspaper article even in cireum-stances where the court did not examine the jurors to determine whether they had been improperly influenced). Furthermore, no part of Jackson's letter or the publication thereof was attributable to actions or neglect by the State, and given the timing of the request for mistrial before the introduction of evidence, the State cannot have been said to be seeking a more favorable opportunity to convict. Given the structural impediment presented by the jurors' exposure to the article, the State's lack of responsibility, and my great deference to the trial court, I would affirm the trial court on the grounds that a "high degree" of necessity existed justifying the State's request for mistrial such that retrial did not violate double jeopardy.
In reaching this conclusion, I am satisfied that the record, as elucidated by de*551tailed arguments by counsel, adequately discloses the basis of the trial court's decision. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. 824, cited in Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1015 (observing that the record need not include an "explicit finding" of manifest necessity, that it need only "adequately disclose" the basis for the trial court's decision, and that extensive argument by counsel may be used to inform the reviewing court of the trial court's decision).
II. Exclusion of Evidence
Jackson claims that the trial court erred when it refused to allow testimony from EMT Ronald Bennett concerning an alleged statement made by one of the men in the apartment that Roberts had jumped up, yelled something, fallen down, and hit his head against the wall. Jackson alleges that the statement was admissible either as a statement for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under Indiana Evidence Rule 808(4) or as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes under Indiana Evidence Rule 613.
The admission of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of discretion. Weis v. State, 825 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
Under Rule 808(4), otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if it consists of statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. This hearsay exception is based upon the belief that a declarant's self-interest in seeking medical treatment renders it unlikely that the declarant will mislead the person he wants to treat him. McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.1996). In determining whether a statement is admissible pursuant to this rule, courts consider (1) whether the declarant is motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment, and (2) whether the content of the statement is such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely upon it in rendering diagnosis and treatment. Id.
Here, neither the purpose of the rule nor its test is satisfied. To the extent the statement was for purposes of medical treatment, it was allegedly for the treatment of Roberts, who was not the declar-ant. There was no self-interest at stake in the declarant's statement and thus no inherent reliability under Rule 808(4). Accordingly, Rule 808(4) provides no relief.
Jackson also claims that the statement is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 613. A prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a witness, and when it is used in this manner, it is not hearsay because the statement is not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Martin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (Ind.2000). Here, Jackson sought to introduce Bennett's statement for purposes of impeaching Marcus Ben Smith's testimony that he had not made this statement. Yet Bennett could not identify Smith as the declarant, so the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the statement as improper impeachment evidence. Accordingly, Rule 613 provides no relief, and the trial court was within its discretion to exclude Bennett's statement.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for Class C felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. In making this argument, Jackson claims that the evidence fails to implicate him as the perpetrator of Roberts' serious bodily injury. Our standard of review for sufficieney-of-the-evidence claims is well-settled. We do not reweigh *552the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 407 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence which supports the conviction and any reasonable inferences which the trier of fact may have drawn from the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts of testimony and to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. State, 701 N.E.2d 863, 867 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).
To convict Jackson of Class C felony battery, the State was required to prove, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1(a)(8), that Jackson knowingly or intentionally touched Roberts in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in serious bodily injury. Here, Smith testified that Jackson was very angry with Roberts because Roberts had taken Jackson's liquor, cigarettes, and money, and that Jackson had vowed to "whoop" Roberts. Tr. p. 783. Smith saw Jackson hit Roberts in the face and cause Roberts to fall down. Smith, Timothy High, and Garry Campbell saw Jackson continuously beat Roberts with his fist and kick him repeatedly, while wearing boots, in the stomach and head. When Jackson finished, Roberts was bleeding significantly, at least partly from his mouth, and he was not fighting back. Roberts ultimately died, which according to forensic pathologist Dr. William Ralston was due to a blunt force trauma to the head. This evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient to support Jackson's conviction for Class C felony battery beyond a reasonable doubt.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm Jackson's conviction.