dissenting.
I agree with my brother Justice DeBru-ler's dissenting opinion on the issue of the summary judgment granted against the Church. I agree that there are material issues of fact involving the Church and that the summary judgment should be reversed.
I also feel that the summary judgment against the City must be reversed. It is well settled in this state that on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, must consider the facts set forth in the opposing party's affidavits as true. Poxon v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (1980) Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1181. The purpose of summary judgment is to provide a procedural device for prompt disposition of cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be determined. Krueger et al. v. Bailey et al., (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 665; Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) 176 Ind.App. 299, 375 N.E.2d 647; Ind.R.Tr.P. 56(C). It cannot and should not be used as an abbreviated trial. Podgorny v. Great Central Insurance Company, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 244, 311 N.E.2d 640.
In the instant case, plaintiff's affidavit raised two factual issues which precluded *1317the grant of a summary judgment. He alleged that the city street was negligently designed, constructed and maintained so that he was not able to determine exactly where the end of the street was. There was not enough evidence before the trial court when summary judgment was granted to establish conclusively any of the allegations of negligence in this regard. While plaintiff acknowledged that he knew the street was a dead-end, he stated that he was not aware of the exact place where the dead-end road met the Church driveway. I agree with Judge Garrard that summary judgment is an ill-suited device for resolving the merits of tort claims sounding in negligence.
Furthermore, I do not agree with the majority's broad holding that an affidavit which contradicts testimony in a prior deposition is always insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment where the only issue of fact raised by the affidavit is the credibility of the affiant. This holding would require the trial court to become a fact-finder as to the credibility of the affi-ant before granting the summary judgment motion which is contrary to our prior case law. The trial judge may not weigh the evidence in a summary judgment proceeding. Carrell v. Ellingwood, (1981) Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 680.
In this case, there was a conflict between testimony in plaintiff's deposition and affidavit that created a genuine issue of material fact in addition to the factual question of the City's negligence. As Judge Staton has pointed out, if plaintiff's affidavit was presented in bad faith, our Trial Rules prescribe relief. Ind.R.Tr.P. 56(G).
I feel that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment and the Church's motion for summary judgment. I find that the Court of Appeals' opinion reversing these judgments is correct. I would deny transfer.