dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority's determinative conclusion the process of mediation had not started, I must respectfully dissent. I believe the mediation process started when the trial court provided notice on August 20, 2001 to all parties that they were ordered to mediation. Therefore, the sanctions the trial court could properly impose on Office Environments were limited by A.D.R. Rule 2.10 to mediation costs and attorney fees, and the sanction of dismissal of the complaint was not available to the trial court.
My belief is supported by A.D.R. Rule 2.7, which is entitled "Mediation Procedure." Rule 2.7(A) is entitled "Advisement of Participants." As "advisement of participants" is, by the rule's own terms, the first step in the "mediation procedure," this advisement must necessarily represent the initiation of the mediation process. Any other interpretation would frustrate the Alternative Dispute Resolution framework. If, for example, the mediation "process" does not begin until the parties and mediator report to a scheduled mediation conference, no party could ever recover its attorneys fees for a delay of mediation.1 That result seems inconsistent with A.D.R. Rule 2.10, which explicitly permits sanctions in the form of attorneys fees "relevant to the process." Under the majority's interpretation, nothing that occurred prior to the initial mediation conference would be covered under the A.D.R. rules; instead, the trial rules would apply. One wonders, then, what is the reason for and value of separate A.D.R. rules?
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that we assume "the legislature did not enact a useless provision" such that "[where statutory provisions are in conflict, no part of a statute should be rendered meaningless but should be reconciled with the rest of the statute." In re Guardianship of Hickman, 805 N.E.2d 808, 816 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Robinson v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467, 474-475 (Ind.1998)), trans. denied 822 N.E.2d 979 (Ind.2004). Nor would I attribute to our supreme court an intent to enact "useless" rules when it promulgated A.D.R. rules that are independent of the trial rules.
Only the A.D.R. rules should apply to A.D.R. proceedings. AD.R. Rule 210 makes that clear by limiting sanctions to assessment of mediation costs and/or attorney fees. T.R. 41(E), which provides the sanction of dismissal, applies when there has been a failure to comply with "these rules." The term "these rules" in T.R. 41(E) undoubtedly refers to the trial *497rules, and not the A.D.R. rules. And see Ford v. State, 650 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (specific provisions (here, the AD.R. rules) prevail over general provisions (here, the trial rules) with relation to the same subject matter).
Nor do I believe Office Environments has failed to comply with the trial court's order for mediation to such an extent its claim should be dismissed with prejudice. As the majority notes, that "order" required the parties to complete mediation at least sixty days prior to the set trial date. When Lake States filed its Motion to Dismiss, no trial date had been set. Without such a set trial date, Office Environments could not be in violation of the court's order to mediate.
There is no question there were delays in this case, but not all were attributable to Office Environments. For example; on June 23, 2003, Lake States and Office EKin-vironments filed a joint motion for continuance of their ninth choice trial setting. Counsel for Lake States represented to the court that the case involved "complex damages issues." (App. at 71.) The mediator twice cancelled scheduled mediation conferences due to conflicts. On at least one occasion the attorneys for both sides-not just Office Environment's counsel-failed to respond to the mediator's request for calendars, and the May 2002 mediation conference was rescheduled because neither party was ready.
This mediation dispute is more appropriately resolved by application of the A.D.R. Rules. I believe the trial court erred in dismissing this case under Trial Rule 41(E), and I accordingly would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I offer a final comment. Many counties require mediation in all civil cases, and I do not believe that is a good practice. Some cases simply cannot be productively dealt with through mediation. When mediation is imposed without any inquiry into whether that process suits the dispute or the litigants, parties will often be ordered into mediation when both sides (and perhaps the judge, as well) know the process will be futile. In some situations, like the one before us, a party alleges its financial difficulties are attributable to an act or omission by the other party. Forcing the financially challenged party into mediation, and forcing that party to pay mediation costs, will often be counter-productive.
. The majority notes Lake States "had to devote time and energy into scheduling and preparing" for mediation and "had these claims hanging over its head for over three years." (Op. at .) It then goes on to state "the trial court could have first imposed a lesser sanction such as attorney fees and costs([.]" Id. But if, as the majority holds, the mediation "process" had not yet started, the trial court could not in fact have imposed that "lesser sanction" provided under the A.D.R. rules.