dissenting.
I believe the post-conviction court correctly denied Mast's petition for postcon-viction relief and therefore respectfully dissent.
The Majority concludes that Mast received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel advised Mast to plead guilty without waiting for the results of two competency evaluations. In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816 (Ind.2002) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); see also Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324 (Ind.2006) (the failure to satisfy either component will cause an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail). This is the so-called Strickland test. Counsel's performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816. To establish the requisite prejudice, a petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind.2002). The two elements of Strickland are separate and independent inquiries. Thus, if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. Landis v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1130 (Ind.2001).
In this case, the Majority concludes not only that trial counsel's failure to wait for the competency reports fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also that Mast was prejudiced thereby. The prejudice cited in support of this conclusion was that "the result of the proceeding might have led to Mast's commitment to a mental institution with a re-evaluation instead of a guilty plea" Op. at 857. That is, waiting for the reports "might" have led to commitment and re-evaluation if Mast had been adjudged incompetent. In my view, this prejudice is too speculative in nature to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success.
*859The standard of competence in this case is whether Mast " '[had] sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -and ... [had] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him'" Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 659 (Ind.2005) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). The determination of competency is a fact-sensitive evaluation of a defendant's capabilities, and the trial court is best situated to perform this evaluation. See Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821 (Ind.2009). My review of the record, such as it is, reveals that Mast understood the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to, and did, consult with his lawyer concerning his case with a reasonable degree of understanding.
Mast indicated at his initial hearing that he understood the charges against him and the penalties he might incur if found guilty. At the guilty plea hearing, Mast's answers to the questions asked by the trial court were both responsive and lucid. There is nothing in the record of the proceedings at which Mast was present before the trial court indicating that Mast did not then possess a reasonable degree of rational understanding about what was happening to him. He seemed to be oriented in time and place, fully cognizant of what was happening, and his interactions with the court were appropriate and lucid. I can discern nothing that would have compelled the trial court to halt the proceedings based upon Mast's lack of competence.
Likewise, letters written by Mast to his counsel and the prosecutor during that time reflect that he clearly understood what was happening, and even reflected appropriate input with respect to matters of trial strategy. For his part, defense counsel admitted at the post-conviction hearing that his memory of the events in question had faded and that he could not testify from present recollection "about what Brian Mast's level of competence was at that time.]" Transcript at 41. He went on to state, however, that he would not have permitted Mast to plead guilty if he (counsel) believed Mast to be incompetent.
Finally, I note that the two psychiatric evaluations that ultimately were submitted did not conclusively establish Mast's incompetence. Dr. Trier reported that Mast "was oriented as to time, coherent and answered the questions in a cooperative manner. He was able to give an account of his past behavior.... [I]t seemed that he probably could have recalled the circumstances [of his offenses] if he was so inclined." Appellant's Appendix at 100. Dr. Trier went on to state that Mast did not present a classical case of psychosis and that his "behavior apparently is under control." Id. In light of these observations, his conclusion as to Mast's competence was decidedly equivocal, ie., "I doubt that he has the ability to meaningfully help in his defense or understand thoroughly the nature of the charges against him." Id. (emphasis supplied). The other expert, Dr. Rathbun, expressly did not give an opinion regarding Mast's competence to stand trial, although he did note, "[djuring the very brief interactions that we had, [Mast] did not show depressed affect. He did not express delusional thinking, and he did not appear to be hallucinating." Id. at 97.
Based upon the foregoing, I cannot agree that, had they waited for the experts' reports before proceeding with the guilty plea, the probability that Mast would have been adjudged incompetent to stand trial was high enough to meet the standard for establishing a claim ineffective assistance of counsel. That being the *860case, Mast would have been in precisely the same situation that led him to accept the plea deal offered by the State. In other words, in my opinion, Mast has failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice. I would affirm the denial of Mast's petition for post-conviction relief,